Cross-border cooperation  between inspectorates:  From challenge to strategy by Groenleer, M.L.P. & Kartner, F.






The following full text is a publisher's version.
 
 





Please be advised that this information was generated on 2018-07-08 and may be subject to
change.
Cross-border cooperation 
between national  
inspectorates 
Conference paper to be presented at the
International Conference on Enforcement in  
a Europe without Borders, 
February 23rd 2016, Amsterdam, The Netherlands. 

Cross-border cooperation 
between national  
inspectorates 
Conference paper to be presented at the
International Conference on Enforcement in  
a Europe without Borders, 
February 23rd 2016, Amsterdam, The Netherlands. 
Edited by:
Martijn van der Steen 
Nancy Chin-A-Fat

Introduction: The supply and demand of cross-border cooperation
Martijn van der Steen & Nancy Chin-A-Fat, Netherlands School of Public Administration  6
1. Harmonizing enforcement in product markets and establishments safety at the 
 European level – approaches, outcomes, lessons learned   
 Florentin Blanc, World Bank Group  10
2.  International cooperation via networks and agencies: A tale of perceptions,  
informality and national cultures   
 Esther Versluis & Josine Polak, Maastricht University, The Netherlands  26
3. Cross-border cooperation between inspectorates: From challenge to strategy  
 Martijn Groenleer & Fay Kartner, Tilburg University, The Netherlands  34
4. Regulatory oversight (monitoring, compliance, enforcement) as a function of  
the state: The case of the Netherlands   
 Ferdinand Mertens, Netherlands School of Public Administration  48
5. Transnational cooperation over the public-private divide: The challenges of  
co-regulation   
 Haiko van der Voort, TU Delft, The Netherlands  58
Conclusion: organize inspections around problems   
Martijn van der Steen & Nancy Chin-A-Fat, Netherlands School of Public Administration  70
Editor and author information  79
Table of contents
| 6 | 
The supply and demand of  
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Netherlands School of Public Administration
Introduction
| 7 |
This edited volume examines how regulation, enforcement 
and compliance can be organized more effectively in the 
context of cross-border issues. More specifically, we discuss 
how the circle of regulation that currently governs cross-
border issues can be effectively closed in order to improve 
levels of compliance across all member states. Without 
effective arrangements for inspection and enforcement, 
regulation is only partly delivered and will not produce the 
intended societal outcomes. Closing the circle would 
represent a crucial step, since inspection and enforcement 
to a large degree determine the outcomes of joint regula-
tion. This, in turn, is essential for accomplishing the 
intended consequences of cross-border regulation. 
The case for cross-border cooperation
There is a strong – if not self-evident – case for more 
cross-border cooperation in the field of inspection: there is a 
broad demand for more cross-border cooperation. National 
inspectorates face complex challenges that exceed the 
individual countries’ jurisdiction. Goods travel across borders 
before they arrive in the places where they are used; 
transactions span countries; activities in one place have the 
potential to effect conditions to a significant degree in 
another; ‘cyber-issues’ exist beyond the jurisdiction of single 
countries, but nonetheless have tremendous implications for 
the safety and security of those very countries. Within the 
single market of the EU, all of this is a given; the market exceeds 
the borders of individual countries and has transformed the 
EU into a unitary regulatory space. This single space is begging 
for examination of how current regimes and arrangements 
for inspection and enforcement are matching up to the 
principles of joint regulation and standards in practice. 
But there is more. The question of cross-border regimes 
and arrangements does not just apply to topics pertaining 
to the unified market: inspectorates face many other 
cross-border issues in which the single market is not a factor, 
where they would nonetheless benefit from cross-border 
cooperation of inspectorates. For example, a Youth 
Inspectorate or a Health Inspectorate might be investigating 
a clinic that has offices in The Netherlands and Spain, with 
patients/clients traveling between the two countries. Prison 
Inspectorates face similar cross-border quandaries when 
countries lease or share prison capacity, forcing institutions 
to work together on their inspection work. There are many 
issues concerning transnational cooperation outside the 
bounds of the unified EU market that call for cooperation by 
countries’ inspectorates.
Furthermore, there can be professional arguments for 
working together across borders with inspectorates from 
other countries. Education Inspectorates in Europe face few 
cases of multinational schools, but nonetheless have an 
institutionalized tradition of exchanging professional 
standards and practices. Education Inspectorates cooperate 
not because the issues call for a joint approach, but because 
there are professional lessons to learn from each other’s 
national practices and expertise. They share a joint 
professional interest, not a joint object of inspection or joint 
regulation. Inspectorates want to learn from their counter-
parts in other countries and organize cross-border programs 
for professional development. 
Therefore, cross-border cooperation is a solution for a 
variety of possible issues and problems including, most 
clearly, joint regulation of the single market. In that case, 
member states are part of a joint regulatory space that 
requires arrangements in order to achieve the effective, 
comprehensive enforcement necessary for the market to 
succeed. However, there are other lighter issue-categories 
that can benefit from a more cooperative approach to 
inspection and compliance. Cooperation is not just limited 
to issues pertaining to the single market. Different issues 
warrant differing levels of demand for cooperation. It is 
important to take this variety into account when discussing 
cross-border cooperation of inspections. Cooperation can 
be a solution to a variety of problems, and different 
problems may ask for entirely different types, modes, and 
levels of cross-border cooperation.
A range of forms for cross-border cooperation
Just as demand for transnational cooperation may vary, so 
might its counterpart, supply. Cross-border cooperation can 
be achieved in a number of ways. One option could be to 
organize inspection agencies at the European level, e.g. in 
the form of European Inspection Agencies for particular 
sectors of the internal market. A single, shared inspection  
of this nature would have to work from local branches and 
deliver local outputs, but the operation’s management and 
inspection protocol could be accomplished through a 
shared perspective and repertoire. Another option would be 
to organize shared protocols and standards for use by 
national inspectorates. Though this method wouldn’t create 
unified inspectorates, it would still integrate and synchronize 
working methods and work practice across nations. A third 
option could involve organizing the interchange and 
interaction of methods and practices across different 
countries, while allowing for independent methods of 
practice, without any integration or synchronization across 
borders. In this scenario, inspectorates in separate countries 
have the option to make multilateral arrangements about 
accepting each other’s protocols and judgments in more  
or less closely defined circumstances and cases. As such, 
individual inspectorates remain national entities that work 
according to national standards and protocols, but 
interactions between different national practices are 
organized, synchronized, and perhaps even codified. In this 
way, national practices still possess the potential for 
producing a comprehensive and cooperative international 
‘European’ inspection-practice. 
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The options discussed above all possess great potential for 
producing comprehensive inspection practices that close 
the circle of regulation to increase societal outcomes. They 
are especially applicable to the single market, which 
represents the clearest instance of strong ‘demand’ for 
cooperative inspection practices. It isn’t necessarily essential 
that the institutional form be unified in order to yield 
synchronized and comprehensive organizational practices 
of cross-border inspection; such cooperation may actually 
be better achieved via ‘lighter’ forms of cooperation that 
also achieve synchronized results. Cooperation is partly a 
matter of synchronized structures that organize multiple 
actors, but it is also a matter of agency; local practices, 
carried out by local people, according to local cultures, 
within local networks. There is barely evidence supporting 
the argument that supranational institutions will yield in 
terms of productive local solutions. Moreover, supranational 
institutions can be especially ineffective in instances where 
inspection fails to consider the necessity for direct contact 
with stakeholders, or lacks emphasis on the locality, place, 
local culture, and local intelligence. 
Furthermore, there are a number of non-comprehensive 
options for cross-border cooperation by inspectorates that 
should be considered with equal weight. Many issues that 
are not related to the internal market could benefit from ad 
hoc ‘issue-based’ cooperation. The same goes for profes-
sional cooperation and learning from shared practices. 
These do not require entirely synchronized organizations, 
but function better when provided a certain foundation of 
shared means and processes to support cooperation. In 
domains of the Health and Education Inspectorates, these 
institutionalized practices for transnational ‘ad hoc’ and/or 
professional cooperation are already quite strong; there 
exists a tradition of transnational exchange built into the 
very institutional structures and platforms of these 
inspectorates. This represents a possible option for other 
domains to pursue, where inspectorates want to improve 
their basic infrastructure in order to attract and support 
future cooperation. 
Outline of this volume: a critical reflection on  
cross-country cooperation
In this volume, we have collected a number of essays that 
reflect on a variety of perspectives on the supply and 
demand of cross-border cooperation of inspections. The 
essays critically reflect on the opportunities and obstacles 
that national inspectorates encounter in regulating 
cross-border issues; e.g. because of the increasing influence 
of EU regulation or the presence of different regulation 
routines and cultures across EU member states. In short, the 
essays explore some of the most important problems faced 
by inspection in cross-border settings, but also look into the 
possible benefits of a comprehensive transnational approach. 
Florentin Blanc describes how, over time, more areas have 
become subject to European regulation. He argues that 
although joint regulation was already established, the circle 
of the regulatory system was never entirely closed with joint 
inspection regimes. This creates a gap in the single market 
that reduces regulatory effectiveness and causes high 
societal costs. Blanc analyses four regulatory areas that 
make up a significant part of European regulations and of 
regulatory enforcement: food safety, the safety of non-food 
products, occupational health and safety (OHS), and 
environmental protection. Then, he describes regulatory 
developments in these four fields and shows how these 
fields have moved in separate directions, at different paces, 
and have resulted in different outcomes. From this 
empirical analysis, he identifies possible institutional forms 
for further cooperation with the potential for achieving 
greater harmonization of inspections within the internal 
market. There is a more centralized, formalized, and also 
more top-down route towards formalized harmonization. 
But Blance also points at a more bottom-up and evolving 
process leading to a less formalized, but equally effective 
variety of harmonization with the potential to still achieve 
the intended societal outcomes of cooperation. 
Esther Versluis and Josine Polak also look empirically at 
different areas of cross-border cooperation in inspections, 
but focus on the pragmatic consequences of joint regimes. 
Their main argument is that although it is possible to reach 
formal agreement on protocols, norms, and standards, 
inspection is essentially a local practice; it is carried out by 
local inspectors, according to local cultures, within long-
grown local traditions, and with local levels of professionali-
zation, technology, and effectiveness. Even if inspectors in 
different countries carry out the exact same protocol, the 
outcome of their inspection will probably be different 
because of the importance of local context. Instances of this 
are clearly visible when looking at the capacity exerted 
across borders to inspections of similar cases; Versluis & 
Polak show that when similar inspections are working under 
joint protocols, they are in fact doing very dissimilar things. 
Therefore, Versluis and Polak argue that in many fields, local 
context is too important to be defined away in highly 
standardized and formalized agreements for supra-country 
harmonization. Instead, they argue that a more viable 
strategy involves taking local context as a given and making 
it a starting point for designing cross-border cooperation 
arrangements. Moreover, they argue that a culture of 
informality, mutual trust, and a sense of mutual dependency are 
crucial drivers for successful and ‘real’ cross-border 
cooperation. These cannot be designed or implemented 
hierarchically, but Versluis and Polak single out interventions 
with the potential of achieving them from a grassroots 
perspective. One such example would be the establishment 
of a Commission to promote these cooperative processes 
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bottom-up. In order to achieve more cross-border 
cooperation it may be important not to press too hard for it, 
to provide more space for open debate about cooperation, 
and to keep the Commissions’ profile in the discussion low 
and supportive. 
Martijn Groenleer and Fay Kartner investigate why, when and 
how national inspectorates cooperate. They argue that 
cooperation is not prevalent across a broad set of issues, 
but is instead issue-specific and related to a unique set of 
problems. Decisions about cooperation should be made 
from an analysis of the nature and scope of any given 
problem, and the societal outcomes being pursued by 
solving it. The authors identify a range of arguments for 
making such a decision that can help policy-makers to 
define their own strategies for cooperation. Furthermore, 
Groenleer and Kartner argue that cooperation is a strategy 
that not only requires the right mindset, but also demands a 
particular skillset. Cooperation involves a range of profes-
sional dilemmas that need to be dealt with by highly skilled 
professionals, and that cannot be tackled solely through 
joint protocols, systems, or structures. Therefore, apart 
from institutional arrangements between inspections, 
cross-border cooperation for inspections also requires a 
joint effort for professionalization in order to function 
properly. Cross-country cooperation requires investment in 
joint institutional structures, but also in improved professio-
nal agency.
Ferdinand Mertens provides us with a close case study of 
professional development in the field of regulatory 
oversight in the Netherlands. He shows how the field has 
undergone considerable changes over past decades, in 
terms of professionalization, the level of political attention 
for inspections, and the appreciation of the work of 
inspections. On the professional side, a steep increase in 
political attention has resulted in an oversight system that is 
now more comprehensible and organized, with a high 
degree of professionalization and a strong sense of 
methodological rigor. Political attention fueled strong 
efforts for an improved, more systematic, and more 
professional field of inspections. However, expectations 
regarding the promise of regulatory oversight became 
inflated and reached unsustainable levels. A series of critical 
incidents flipped the appreciation of inspections. They 
became instead characterized as burdensome, as lacking 
economic and societal oversight, and as lacking proper 
levels of effectiveness and compliance. This flip in fortune 
draws attention to two lessons. First, expectations of the 
results promised by inspections should not be raised too 
high. Closing the circle of joint regulation with harmonized 
inspections will not prevent streams of critical incidents 
from occurring. Second, according to Mertens, there is a 
strong resulting argument for a more intense professional 
exchange between inspections of different countries. 
A better-synchronized and systematic approach to 
professional development across all of the European 
countries – which can be achieved through more professional 
interaction – will more effectively tame inevitable future 
crises than joint institutional arrangements. Mertens argues 
that professional exchange should precede more institutio-
nalized harmonization. Cross-border cooperation will not 
be capable of solving anything if it is not accompanied by a 
deep and thorough investment into the professional 
knowledge and practices of the various inspectorates.
The essay by Haiko van der Voort adds an extra dimension to 
the issue of cross-border cooperation. Van der Voort draws 
attention to the already widespread and further developing 
issue of co-regulation in many of our regulatory fields. 
According to Van der Voort, co-regulation, which he defines 
as the cooperation between public and private regulators, is 
a dynamic phenomenon. The aims and logic of public and 
private regulators will inevitably conflict and cause dynamic 
interaction. He explores these dynamics for two types of 
regulation: in instances of private parties executing 
oversight activities within a public regulatory framework, 
and in instances of public and private parties regulating and 
executing oversight side-by-side. These are accepted 
practises and oft-applied arrangements in many countries, 
but are more difficult to handle in a cross-border context. 
How should one country deal with a co-regulated regime in 
another country? How can national inspections relate to 
private oversight bodies that already work across borders, 
for multi-national organizations? Does a certificate issued 
under a co-regulation regime in one country automatically 
apply in another country as well? And who is responsible for 
making agreements with private regulators about transna-
tional norms and standards? These are interesting questi-
ons that become increasingly pressing in a context of 
increasing cross-border inspection.
A vocabulary and grammar for the debate about  
cross-border cooperation
The essays show that there is practical and conceptual 
variety in national inspectorates that establish cross-border 
cooperation. The promise of cooperation comes with 
pitfalls, challenges, and dilemmas. None of the essays 
included provide an ultimate analysis or the definitive 
answer to obstacles faced by transnational cooperation. 
Rather, these essays reveal a diverse set of directions and 
arguments for considering cooperation. Assessed as a 
collection, these essays provide readers with a broad 
perspective on the supply and demand of cross-border 
cooperation. Comprehension offers a vocabulary and a 
grammar that will hopefully foster a more precise transnatio-
nal debate about issues’ specific conditions, and the 
potential means of cooperation to distinguish between 
them and address them. 
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1.  Harmonizing enforcement in 
product markets and 
establishments safety at the 
European level – approaches, 
outcomes, lessons learned 
 





“Regulation” has many elements, and many discontents. 
Some complain about its burden, some lament its insuffi-
cient strength. What interests us here is not the contents of 
regulations of economic activities, but how they are 
“delivered” to the regulated entities and stakeholders, 
including through control and enforcement, to achieve 
compliance and public welfare
The expectation of protection by regulations underpins the 
trust in the food we eat, the products we buy, the air we 
breathe – and relies on an expectation of compliance. In 
practice, however, regulations can sometimes be ineffective, 
or counter-productive. Much attention has been given over 
the past two decades, within the “Better Regulation” 
agenda, to improving the design of regulations. As the OECD 
itself pointed out1, “enforcement” broadly speaking2 (all 
activities aimed at implementing regulations –also called 
“regulatory delivery”), and its components (in particular 
inspections) have seen far less research and improvement 
efforts. However, effective and adequate enforcement is 
indispensable to achieve regulatory goals, sustain the 
legitimacy of regulatory systems.
Inadequate enforcement can mean regulations remain “on 
paper”, or impose more burden on economic operators 
(and citizens) than needed (potentially triggering resistance). 
To improve enforcement, several countries have launched 
initiatives over the past decade (Vernieuwing Toezicht in the 
Netherlands, Hampton Review and creation of the Better 
Regulation Delivery Office in the UK etc.), and the World 
Bank3 and OECD4 have developed guidance documents. For 
members of the European Union, however, many regulati-
ons are adopted at the European level, and economic 
operators operate and compete across national boundaries. 
This raises the question of consistency in enforcement of 
European regulations when it is done by national authorities 
(or local ones, but within a national framework). It also 
requires to consider the “delivery” side within the European 
“smart regulation” agenda. These questions are essential 
for businesses, citizens and consumers, and regulators. 
Indeed, the latter have to act in a context where national 
boundaries are increasingly irrelevant in the areas covered 
by the Single Market. Excessively different practices or 
outcomes between Member States may lead to gaps in 
effectiveness, unfair competition, and ultimately to a 
breakdown in trust and legitimacy.
1  Best Practice Principles for Regulatory Enforcement and Inspections, 2014, 
Foreword
2  In the narrow sense, “enforcement” refers only to measures taken 
when violations of regulations are identified.
3  How to Reform Business Inspections, 2011
4  Op.cit.
The significance of European regulations
Over time, areas subject to European regulations have 
increased considerably, and they are of considerable 
relevance to businesses, consumers and citizens. We will 
consider here four regulatory areas that make up a 
significant part of European regulations and of regulatory 
enforcement: food safety, safety of non-food products, 
occupational health and safety (OHS), and environmental 
protection. These have in common that they relate to 
immediate safety concerns, have a significant “technical” 
dimension, and are highly “visible” to economic operators 
and the general population5. 
The 1957 Treaty of Rome included both long-term goals 
and specific requirements, measures and steps. Among 
the former was the “essential objective” of “constant 
improvement of the living and working conditions”6. 
Among the latter, the (gradual) implementation of the 
“four freedoms” (of movement, for goods, persons, 
services and capital)7. The gradual transformation of the 
EEC into the EC and then EU saw a significant increase of 
powers delegated to the European levels on non-strictly-
economic issues, related broadly to the “living and 
working conditions” goal. 
Logically, the European institutions8 long focused primarily 
on rules that were indispensable for the development of 
the “four freedoms”, and the establishment of a “Common 
Market” and then “Single Market”. Among these, the 
freedom of movement for goods clearly came first, and 
with it the development of regulations for product 
markets was at the forefront of European regulatory 
activity. Among these four freedoms, the “most highly 
developed” is undeniably the free movement of goods, 
and “around 75% of intra-EU trade is in goods”9. By 
contrast, freedom of movement of people, capital and 
services have faced more political resistance and hurdles, 
and are still to an extent incomplete.
The different pace and manner at which European 
regulation (and enforcement) developed in these four 
areas gives us the opportunity to consider how circum-
5  We do not cover here financial regulations, where enforcement 
structures and methods tend to be significantly different from 
those in technical fields. We cover regulatory spheres rather than 
economic sectors, as this corresponds to how regulators in Member 
States, and institutions at the European level, are mostly organized 
(cf. OECD 2014) – a given sector (e.g. automobiles) can be covered 
by several regulatory spheres (environment, product safety, OHS).
6  Preamble, point 3
7  Article 3, points a and c
8  Be it Commission, Council or Parliament
9  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council and the European Economic and Social Committee – More Product 
Safety and better Market surveillance in the Single Market for Products, 2013, 
p. 2
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stances and policy choices led to certain structures and 
outcomes, what the latest evolutions suggest and, most 
importantly, what cross-learning could help make 
enforcement more effective, efficient, transparent and 
conducive to growth. 
Product markets regulation – food 
and non-food safety
Origins
The Rome Treaty’s Article 3 foresaw “the elimination(…)  
of customs duties and of quantitative restrictions on the 
import and export of goods, and of all other measures having 
equivalent effect” (emphasis ours), as well as “the abolition 
(…) of obstacles to freedom of movement for persons, 
services and capital” and “the approximation of the laws 
of Member States to the extent required for the proper 
functioning of the common market”. This made the EEC 
different from a simple customs union by ensuring the 
common market was not distorted by what would now be 
called “technical barriers to trade” in the WTO’s vocabu-
lary10. The Treaty also created a litigation mechanism, with 
a jurisprudence-making European Court of Justice (ECJ).
In the EEC’s early years, there was relatively little done on 
food safety regulations. The focus was increasing food 
production, something the CAP (which entered into force in 
1962) aimed at doing11. Regulations started with animanl 
health issues (first veterinary directive in 1964, poultry 
meat in 1971 , fresh meat in 1972 , and first mandatory 
inspections requirements in 1977). In parallel to these 
directives initiated by the Agriculture Directorate General 
(DG) of the Commission, environmental regulations set in 
1976 the first Maximum Residue Levels (MRLs) for 
pesticides in food (EU 2007, p. 22).
Limited awareness of risks seems to explain this relatively 
slow development. Changes in food supply and risk 
perceptions drove regulatory changes, as seen in other 
contexts, with a “rising demand for easy-to-prepare, 
processed food, large-scale manufacturing” leading to 
expanding, increasingly complex supply chains (ibid., p. 16). 
Regulations, however, remained sector-specific, not 
looking at food safety in a comprehensive way. Consumer 
issues were handled by a separate DG from agriculture. 
Rules tended to be highly prescriptive, mandating the 
exact characteristics a product had to comply with. 
10  And clearly the TBT and SPS Agreements owe much to the develop-
ment of EEC law and jurisprudence over several decades.
11  And succeeded at, notwithstanding the many problems the CAP 
also led to.
Turning points – towards a stronger European regulatory 
integration
Several important decisions in the 1970s paved the way for 
deeper changes: the 1974 Dassonville ECJ case, the adoption 
of a directive on food labels in 1979, the creation of the 
Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed (RASFF) in the same 
year – and the 1979 Cassis de Dijon ECJ decision. With 
Dassonville, the ECJ drew radical conclusions from the 
clause about “measures with equivalent effect” to 
quantitative restrictions – and severely curtailed the power 
of Member States to restrict free trade inside EEC borders. 
With the food labels directive, the EEC started using 
information regulations rather than standardization of 
contents and processes to facilitate trade. By setting up 
the RASFF12, the Commission acknowledged the limit of 
regulations, and the need to respond to problems rapidly 
and effectively.
Arguably an even more important “turning point” was the 
ECJ’s 120/78 case, nicknamed “Cassis de Dijon”, after the 
product that was at issue in the dispute. The ruling 
enabled regulation (more broadly than Dassonville), but put 
requirements on its contents and effects that significantly 
shaped further European regulatory efforts in product 
markets. The ECJ found for the plaintiff and struck down 
the regulation (which prevented fruit liquors with less than 
25% alcohol to be marketed in Germany), but it also 
clarified the parameters for legitimate regulation. These 
should be allowed to safeguard “mandatory require-
ments” such as “the effectiveness of fiscal supervision,  
the protection of public health, the fairness of commercial 
transactions and the defence of the consumer” could 
justify restrictions to trade (Purnhagen 2014, p. 9).
The decision formulated two principles of European 
regulation: reliance on information rules whenever 
sufficient (ibid., p. 12) and “principle of mutual recognition” 
which grants “the right to circulate a product, once 
lawfully marketed in one Member State13” throughout the 
European market (ibid., p. 14) – and a benchmark of 
“confident consumer”, that refuses to “take the ignorant 
consumer as a yardstick since such an approach would 
ultimately require the prescription of uniform products” 
(ibid., p. 29-30). All these principles have enforcement 
12  The RASFF network was strengthened by the General Food Law in 
2002. It includes EU, EFTA/EEA states and EC institutions, and ena-
bles the rapid exchange of information on all foodstuffs and animal 
feed, specifically when a national authority has identified a risk to 
human health and taken measures, such as withholding, recalling, 
seizure or rejection of the products concerned, ensuring coherent 
and simultaneous actions across the EU and protecting the safety 
of consumers. (EC 2007, p. 20)
13  With limited exceptions possible to safeguard key public interests 
but always subject to proportionality.
| 13 |
effects: a more selective, risk-focused approach, risk-
proportional regulatory instruments, and a certain level of 
“risk acceptance”. These principles also mean that 
regulators have to actively promote consumer 
information.
The “New Approach”
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, complaints of Brussels 
bureaucrats wanting to standardize sausages or vegeta-
bles multiplied. Producers and consumers, scholars and 
policymakers, were dissatisfied with what came to be 
known as the “Old Approach” to product market regula-
tion, which relied on “vertical”, product-specific, content-
oriented standards. This approach was seen as excessively 
rigid, but also to narrow to really integrate the market. In 
response, in 1985 was adopted Council Resolution 85/C 
136/01 “on a new approach to technical harmonization and 
standards”. “New Approach” came to designate the way in 
which the EC/EU has developed its product market 
regulations since then – a term normally used for 
non-food products, but an approach which also permea-
tes food safety. 
The first change was breadth: “general rules which are 
applicable to sectors or families of products14 as well as 
types of hazard15”. The second was that mutual recogni-
tion would apply to “the results of tests”, and the decision 
to “establish harmonised rules on the operation of 
certification bodies” – thus clarifying the practicalities of 
mutual recognition, and moving towards harmonization 
of control16. 
The Resolution (in line with the Cassis de Dijon principles) 
established that “legislative harmonisation is limited to 
essential safety requirements (or other requirements in 
the general interest) with which products put on the 
market must conform”, while compliance with harmoni-
zed standards gives a “presumption of conformity”. The 
Resolution was also concerned with building trust in the 
system, and covered also enforcement: “the public authori-
ties must ensure the protection of safety (or other 
requirements envisaged) on their territory. This is a 
necessary condition to establish mutual trust between 
Member States.” 
14   Cf. Purnhagen (2014), p. 34: “the ‘new approach’ was the first  
systematic regulation to be applied to several product 
groups”. 
15  This quote and subsequent ones from Council Resolution 85/C 
136/01 accessible at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
TXT/?uri=URISERV:l21001a. 
16   The Resolution also set an early “better regulation” goal: “keep a 
constant check on the technical regulations which are applied so as 
to withdraw those which are deemed obsolete or superfluous” (a 
kind of “sunset clause”, which has been inconsistently applied).
The “New Approach” is significant also by the emphasis it 
puts on the effectiveness of post-market control. Growth 
in market volumes and complexity, even before 1985, led 
to “an increasing realization that only pre-market 
measures (…) would not suffice and could not ensure 
European product safety” (Purnhagen 2014, p. 34) and that 
“post-market measures” could not be left to Member 
States to avoid a divergence in marketing of hazardous 
products, which would be contrary to the goal of the 
single-market integration (ibid.). 
To address this, European efforts involved enforcement and 
liability. Steps were made to make “market surveillance” 
more uniform (to the extent possible) and effective, 
including through successive “general product safety” 
Directives (92/59/EEC then 2001/95/EC). These required 
Member States to effectively supervise the safety of 
products, and to this aim gave them specific powers 
including ordering the withdrawal of products from the 
market. A European system of notification and withdrawal 
of products was also put in place (RAPEX). A 1994 
Communication by the Commission requested Member 
States to ensure “uniform enforcement”. At the same time, 
stronger economic incentives were sought through 
operators’ liability (“Product Liability Directive” 85/374/EEC). 
While the “New Approach” stricto sensu applies only to 
non-food products, the same evolution was seen in food 
safety regulations. Several important “horizontal” 
directives were adopted (under the auspices of the 
Industry DG) in the 1980s and early 1990s (sampling and 
testing in 1985, “Official Control” in 1989, “Hygiene of 
Foodstuffs” in 1993) – while, at the same time, DG 
Agriculture continued to develop a number of “vertical” 
directives covering milk, eggs, fishery products, game etc. 
Some additional factors, however, led to a more complete 
transformation of the food safety sphere.
Food scares and increased integration in food safety
Over the 1980s and 1990s, a series of food safety crises 
“led to an increase in the demand for regulatory  
protection, at the same time as the European construction 
moved from the “Common Market” to the “Single 
Market”.These crises included the beef hormone case 
(1980-85, EU 2007, p. 26), followed by outbreaks of 
botulism, salmonella and E.coli over the decade, (ibid.) -  
but the most significant by its regulatory impact was the 
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) crisis. This crisis 
cast doubts on the science used as basis for regulations, 
on the credibility of the authorities and their reassurances, 
on the controls’ effectiveness– and led to border closings, 
a significant breakdown of the European market integra-
tion process. 
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This coincided with the transformation process of the 
“Common Market” into a “Single Market” based on the 
1986 Single European Act. By January 1993, physical border 
posts (including customs) were to disappear. Whereas 
food markets were to a significant extent segmented until 
December 1992, they made one from January 1993.  
No additional requirement could be imposed (except in 
emergency circumstances, such as the BSE crisis) on 
shipments from one Member State to another. Until 1992, 
for instance, veterinary controls in England were applied 
specifically to meat for exports, while controls for the 
internal market were looser (and veterinarians played a 
minor role). From 1993, there was only a single, unified 
European market – and thus new procedures (and bodies) 
had to be introduced for England to guarantee the same 
level of inspections as other Member States.
A single market required making consumers confident that 
(at least) the same level of safety would be ensured. in 
order to provide appropriate trust for the market to 
function. Efforts at harmonization pre-1993 had created 
no permanent structure, except (in a limited way) for 
veterinary control (and even then, its resources were 
limited). While the European market was now as integra-
ted as the US market, and European food safety legislation 
to a large extent harmonized (possibly more than in the 
US)17, there was no equivalent to the Food and Drugs 
Administration (FDA) and Food Safety Inspection Service 
(FSIS). While the US model sees these agencies (responsi-
ble for food entering interstate commerce) coexist with 
state-level (or county-level) ones (for food remaining in 
the local market), the EC/EU situation was and is different. 
The single market does not distinguish between interstate 
and other commerce (more integration), but the principle 
of subsidiarity18 means implementation should as much as 
possible be done at the Member State level or lower (less 
integration). 
The BSE crisis led to the creation of a new institutional 
framework19. First “in 1997, the Food and Veterinary Office 
was established as a successor of the former “veterinary 
inspection unit” to carry out inspections to ensure 
17  While Member States have retained (at least in some cases) some 
additional requirements (which, as per ECJ jurisprudence, end up in 
many cases applying only to their own businesses), EU food safety 
law covers all aspects of food safety, and all types of products – which is a 
significantly higher level of integration than the US case.
18  As well as strong objective factors such as the difficulty of creating 
control bodies that would have to function in all EU languages, 
and of achieving acceptance by the public for controls performed 
directly by “Brussels”. Both obstacles are daunting enough, even 
were subsidiarity to be weakened.
19  And, eventually, to the strict liability regime being “widened to ap-
ply to agricultural and fishery products” (Purnhagen 2014, p. 37)
“compliance with EU food safety and animal health rules” 
(EU 2007 p. 33). Then, in 1999, all food units of the EC 
merged to form a part of the Directorate-General for 
Health and Consumer Protection, separating food safety 
from agricultural production (ibid.). With the Food and 
Veterinary Office (FVO) reporting to this new DG ( 
“SanCo”), the EU now had a new, and original, institutional 
setup. One “quasi-regulatory” institution with a mandate 
covering all the food chain– and an implementation body, 
not inspecting food business operators, but supervising 
the way Member States’ “competent authorities” do so. In 
2002 was adopted Regulation (EC) 178/2002 called 
“General Food Law” which “introduced the “farm to fork” 
approach (…) and the necessity for food to be traceable 
right back to its original source” and also “provided for the 
creation of the European Food Safety Authority” (EFSA) 
(EU 2007, p. 38), in charge of scientific risk assessment .
The EU food safety regulatory system today – a high level 
of harmonization in enforcement
The core of the EU food safety system is a set of regulati-
ons adopted in 2004, known collectively as the “Hygiene 
Package”, and regularly updated. The “Hygiene Package” 
replaces previous “vertical” legislation, and embodies the 
principles affirmed in the 2002 Food Law, and is comple-
mented by a number of “horizontal” directives and 
regulations, the most important for enforcement being 
Regulation 882/2004/EU on Official Food and Feed 
Control.
These regulations incorporate key principles such as 
traceability of products and full liability of “Food Business 
Operators” (FBOs). They internalize the impossibility of 
“zero risk” –foreseeing the conditions in which a recall is 
mandated, and the ways in which it should be performed 
(and incentivize FBOs to proactively initiate a recall if they 
detect a problem). Crucially, they require of FBOs not only 
to comply with hygienic requirements or MRLs, but also to 
implement permanent self-control systems, to ensure that 
food is constantly safe at every stage –based on the 
Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points (HACCP) 
approach. The “package” also formulates risk as an 
organizing principle – the basis to select regulatory 
instruments have to be chosen, allocate regulatory 
resources, and decide enforcement responses. This applies 
also to the pre-operation stage – only FBOs producing/
processing food of animal origin are subject to mandatory 
prior approval, others can start operating after a simple 
registration (notification). 
Regulation 882/2004/EU on official controls defines risk as 
the fundamental criterion to organize food safety controls. 
It governs how national inspection bodies should work – 
so as to provide confidence that official controls are 
equivalent all over the EU’s territory. It covers inspections 
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and enforcement in detail, risk assessment, planning, 
quality control, staffing levels and training, funding level 
and sources, methods and tools – in ways rarely found in 
national legislation. Point 13 of its preamble prescribes 
that “the frequency of official controls should be regular 
and proportionate to the risk, taking into account the 
results of the checks carried out by (…) operators under 
HACCP based control programmes”. The Regulation 
mandates the use of risk-based planning, specifically 
through “multi-annual national control plans” to “identify 
risk-based priorities and the most effective control 
procedures” (Preamble, point 34). In Article 1 the aims of 
official controls are defined as “preventing (…) or reducing 
to acceptable levels risks to humans and animals” and 
“guaranteeing fair practices in (…) trade and protecting 
consumer interests” – thus, it keeps the duality of purpose 
(safety, and market rules), but puts risk prevention first. In 
Article 3, the Regulation defines the risk factors to be taken 
into account: “identified risks associated” with specifics of 
the product or operation (inherent risk), “operators’ past 
record as regards compliance”, the “reliability” of internal 
controls and external information “that might indicate 
non-compliance”. Article 54 further directs that “when 
deciding which action to take [in case of non-compliance], 
the competent authority shall take account of the nature 
of the non-compliance and that operator’s past record 
with regard to non-compliance” – and Article 55 also 
prescribes that sanctions should be “proportionate”. 
Thus, the Regulation seeks to ensure as much uniformity 
of food safety controls all over the EU, and to ground this 
on risk proportionality20. It mandates coordination at all 
levels, across Member States. It also regulates the capacity 
and functions of reference laboratories. In order to ensure 
that these requirements are complied with, the Regulation 
foresees a system of “control of the controllers”. In this 
two-tier system21, the Commission controls Member 
States’ Competent Authorities. Member States also 
submit annual reports to the Commission. Most impor-
tantly, the FVO exercises the powers granted by the 
Regulation to “carry out general and specific audits in 
Member States” according to an annual control 
programme. 
The system makes the FVO very powerful, through its 
audits of Member States, and its work on assessing 
candidate countries’ readiness (and advising on reforms 
necessary for EU accession). To the extent that evidence is 
20  There are exceptions to this risk-based approach, e.g. the manda-
tory 100% control of animals at slaughter, which dates back to 
much earlier phases of regulatory development, and was strength-
ened by the BSE crisis.
21  Or three-tier, when national Competent Authorities themselves 
supervise local authorities which conduct the actual controls.
available, the overall performance of the system appears 
high – and it has supported a far greater integration of the 
EU market, and increase in trade volumes. Success on 
consumer trust and confidence is not perfect, but real, 
particularly considering the situation was in the 1990s. 
New Member States have been “brought up” from (in 
some cases) very problematic situations up to levels of 
food safety that are generally in line with the older EU 
Members – as evidenced by FVO audits and EFSA 
monitoring. 
There are, however, limitations that prevent us from 
drawing too strong conclusions. First, there is insufficient 
epidemiological data to assess if the system performs 
better than (for instance) the US’s – and in any case, there 
are serious attribution issues. It is unclear how strong is 
the link between food safety data, and improved (or 
assumed to be improved) controls. Second, while the 
inspection regime foreseen by EU Regulation 882/2004 is 
strongly risk based, risk focused (but not fully) and (to a large 
extent) risk proportional, it fails to incorporate a really 
comprehensive approach to compliance. Throughout the 
directive, compliance is seen through a deterrence angle 
(requirements to have dissuasive sanctions: Preamble 
point 41, article 55). The FVO harmonization efforts are 
conducted from this perspective: ensuring inspections are 
well targeted, and competent – but not that serious efforts 
are made to support FBOs to understand and comply. 
Weaker integration – and recent efforts to strengthen 
“implementation” – in non-food products
While the early development of European regulations for 
food and non-food products were linked, they have taken 
different trajectories from the 1990s and the institutional 
and regulatory changes adopted in response to major 
“food scares” such as BSE. The framework for non-food 
product markets includes a General Product Safety 
Directive (since 1992, 2001/95/EC being current), there are 
also “New Approach” Directives covering specific types of 
products (from toys to electrical equipment) – as well as a 
few “Old Approach” Directives still applicable (mostly to 
“niche” issues). In addition, there are a number of product 
types that are not harmonized and circulate based on 
mutual recognition (some of them quite significant, e.g. 
motor vehicles). Most Directives also include a section on 
market surveillance, some of them quite specific (e.g. on 
medical devices). In addition, the variety of technical fields 
means that many Member States have several market 
surveillance authorities for different products, even 
though there is a trend towards consolidation. The 
fragmentation of the regulatory framework has made it 
more difficult to have a consistent enforcement approach, 
and European institutions have attempted to address this 
problem in several ways.
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In 1990, PROSAFE (Product Safety Forum of Europe) held 
its first meeting. It was established by market surveillance 
officers and institutions from the EC/EU (and EEA). Though 
not affiliated with the Commission, the latter is represen-
ted at PROSAFE meetings, funds its “Joint Actions”, 
including the development of “best practice” guidance. 
This work has led (under EC-funded EMARS projects) to a 
book called Best Practice Techniques in Market Surveillance - 
subsequently revised with an updated risk-assessment 
chapter. The latter reflects the RAPEX guidelines adopted 
by Commission Decision 2010/15/EU and includes a 
detailed section on risk assessment (with a web-based 
tool: http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/consumer-safety/rag/
public/).
While having no legal strength , the PROSAFE/EMARS 
guidance is clear, unified and specific – and it draws on the 
binding RAPEX guidelines. Still, it is a far “softer” instru-
ment than what exists for food, where FVO guidelines are 
binding for competent authorities. European institutions 
have, for years, been concerned about significant 
implementation gaps regarding non-food product safety 
legislation (in particular after the latest rounds of EU 
enlargement), resulting in (perceived or real) increased 
risks for consumers. The first response was the adoption 
of Regulation 765/2008 on accreditation and market 
surveillance, which aimed at establishing “a broad-based, 
legislative framework of a horizontal nature to deal with” 
all types of products22, aiming at a “high level of safety”. 
This new Regulation emphasized the importance for risk 
assessment to “take all relevant data into account” as well 
as “measures (…) taken by the economic operators” to 
alleviate risks (Preamble, point 29), to allow for the 
“destruction of products” if necessary (point 35), to have 
“effective, proportionate and dissuasive” penalties and 
increase them for repeat offenders (point 41), and to 
allocate Community financing for the Regulation’s 
implementation (point 42). Several articles have direct 
bearing on enforcement structures and practices. Article 18 
requires Member States to allocate adequate powers and 
resources to market surveillance bodies, to ensure they 
follow the proportionality principle, and they conduct 
periodic assessments and submit findings to the 
Commission. Article 19 mandates that they “shall perform 
appropriate checks on the characteristics of products on 
an adequate scale”, based on “established principles of 
risk assessment, complaints and other information”. 
Article 20 foresees powers to conduct recalls and other 
measures in cases of serious risk, and article 23 the 
creation of a general information support system. What 
the Regulation does not, however, foresee is a European 
institution for market surveillance (contrary to what is 
included in the same Regulation for accreditation).
22  Preamble, point 4
The Commission conducted a subsequent review of the 
implementation of Regulation 765/2008, summarized in a 
report that became part of the proposed new “Product 
Safety and Market Surveillance Package” submitted in 
2013. This report pointed out a number of shortcomings, 
e.g. in communication and coordination mechanisms, in 
procedures to monitor accidents and harm to health, 
leading to insufficient data for risk assessment (p. 7). It 
reported on the successful introduction of the new ICSMS 
information management system, now expanded from a 
few Member States to all of the EU (ICSMS allows for a 
comprehensive exchange of information between all 
market surveillance authorities of the EU, and contains all 
information on every product that was checked by any 
authority – part of it is accessible to the public). These 
were important achievements, but not sufficient given 
remaining implementation gaps. As a result, in order to 
introduce more coherence in product market regulations, 
the Commission proposed the aforementioned new 2013 
“Package” (still under consideration).
In the Communication23 that is part of this “Package”, the 
need for new regulations aims at “lowering compliance 
costs”, “reducing the administrative burden” (for authori-
ties) “and eliminating unfair competition” – making 
products safer, and confidence higher (p. 3). The 
Commission sees the need for simplified “rules and 
procedures”, as well as “better IT tools”, stronger 
“external controls at the Union borders” and “harsher 
penalties for infringements” (ibid.). It notes that “enforce-
ment needs to be stepped up” because “people still suffer 
harm and harmful products still pollute the environment” 
(p. 4) – a paragraph that is doubtly problematic. First, 
because it is impossible to avoid all harm. Second, because 
the links between enforcement measures and safety are 
indirect, and even problematic (in other words: more 
inspections and stricter enforcement do not guarantee 
higher compliance and improved safety24). 
In order to increase market surveillance effectiveness, the 
new Regulation would apply to “harmonised and non 
harmonised products” (p. 5). It also “would strengthen 
controls at external borders” through powers to suspend 
“release for free circulation” in case of risk, would give 
market surveillance authorities “the power to charge 
economic operators fees where they require corrective 
action to be taken” – and would also strengthen the role 
of the unified database (ICSMS) (p. 6). It would also give 
the Commission more powers in case of significant risk 
– and foresees “enhanced cooperation between customs 
and market surveillance authorities” at the borders (p. 8), 
23  COM(2013) 74
24  See Blanc 2012, Blanc et al. 2015, OECD 2014 and 2015, Tyler 2003, 
Hodges 2015.
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greater coordination between different market surveil-
lance authorities, common risk assessment practices, and 
a “multi-annual market surveillance plan” (p. 7). On the 
institutional side, however, the proposal limits itself to a 
“European Market Surveillance Forum” (EMSF) that would 
lead development of “best practices” (ibid.). A detailed 
review of the draft Regulation25 shows that while it puts 
obligations on Member States (article 4: market surveil-
lance to be “carried out in accordance with this 
Regulation”, “report on these activities and controls to the 
Commission every year”) and on market surveillance 
authorities (Article 6: “appropriate checks (…) on an 
adequate scale and with adequate frequency”), implemen-
tation mechanisms are decidedly weaker than for food 
products. It foresees that “the Commission may adopt 
implementing acts to establish uniform conditions” for 
market surveillance checks of given products and 
emerging risks, and that “these may (…) a temporary 
increase of the scale and frequency of checks” but the lack 
of a body empowered to exercise this role appears 
problematic. 
Overall, the draft Regulation would harmonize and 
reinforce procedures relating to “products presenting a 
risk” (article 9), allow to charge fees when “measures” are 
taken (article 10), allow for “Union assessment” for 
products subject to harmonisation legislation (article 11), 
and action at the Union level in case of serious risk (article 
12), extending similar strengthened powers to border 
controls (articles 14-16) etc. The draft also strengthens 
RAPEX (articles 19-20) and the ICSMS (article 21). In terms 
of implementation bodies, however, it is far more limited. 
It extends the EU “reference laboratories” approach, 
crucial in food safety, to non-food products (article 28), 
and allocates financing for “technical or scientific exper-
tise” to the Commission (article 29), and sets up the EMSF 
and Commission support to it (articles 25-27). While the 
EMSF would “facilitate” exchange of information and 
“coordinate” market-surveillance programmes, as well as 
“provide advice and assist the Commission”, it is not 
vested with as much power as the FVO, and the draft 
Regulation is less far reaching than Regulation 882/2004 
for food.
Recent and proposed aim at more consistency in non-food 
products surveillance, in more risk-based and proportio-
nate way, , it is not clear whether they will, indeed, be fully 
effective26. First, because the 2013 “Package” is still to be 
25   2013/0048 (COD) 
26  It is important to note that the European institutions are simultane-
ously working on reducing the scope of non-harmonised regulatory 
areas, and to bring harmonisation to more products, as this makes 
it easier to ensure consistency (and to try and drive higher effective-
ness). One of the most notable developments in this area has been 
the Construction Products Regulation 305/2011.
adopted. Second, because the instruments foreseen to 
ensure harmonization and coherence may not be 
sufficient, in particular because institutions are clearly 
weaker than on the food safety side. Third, while the 
“Package” mentions the need to make regulations clearer 
and actively support compliance, alongside its focus on 
deterrence, it fails to articulate a fully coherent vision of 
the links between regulation, compliance and safety – i.e. 
the integration of the different “drivers of compliance” 
(and of the safety drivers, which may be different) is 
insufficient. 
Occupation Health and Safety and Environmental 
Protection
Environmental issues were not listed among areas of 
Community competence in the Rome Treaty, and 
Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) had only a marginal 
place. Until the early 1970s there was essentially no 
European action on these issues. Justification for European 
action was less direct than for product markets regulati-
ons, which were essential for the ‘four freedoms’. 
A first source was the Treaty’s Preamble objective of 
“constant improvement” of living and working conditions. 
The Treaty’s chapter on free movement of persons (incl. 
workers, articles 48-51) focused on abolishing discrimina-
tions, ensuring access to benefits and pensions. 
Foundations for OHS were in Title III (Social Policy), articles 
117 (“need to promote improved working conditions and 
an improved standard of living for workers” including 
through approximation of provisions laid down by law, 
regulation”27) and 118 (“promoting close co-operation 
between Member States (…) relating to: (…) - labour law 
and working conditions (…) - prevention of occupational 
accident, and diseases; - occupational hygiene”28). In 
addition, articles 100 and 101 on approximation of laws 
allowed to “issue directives for the approximation of such 
provisions (…) as directly affect the establishment or 
functioning of the common market”29 – in cases where 
differences are “ distorting the conditions of 
competition”30. In short, OHS was mentioned, but not 
prominent – and environmental issues were absent 
(unsurprisingly for 1957) but could potentially “come in” 
under the Preamble’s goals and articles 100 and 101.
European action in both fields started in the 1970s, with 
important similarities in methods and instruments in spite 
of the obvious specificities of each field.
27  Now article 151 TFEU
28  Now article 153 TFEU
29  Article 100, now article 115 TFEU
30  Article 101, now article 116 TFEU
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Occupational Safety and Health
Before 1974, the focus was on harmonizing workers 
compensation and “mapping” and researching OHS 
problems31. These appeared acute enough32 to warrant a 
stronger response, first sketched out as part of the 1974 
Social Action Programme. An Advisory Committee to the 
Commission was created including representatives from 
governments, trade unions and employer associations, 
meant to provide direct, specific advice on OHS issues.  
In 1975 was created the European Foundation for the 
Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, the 
“Eurofound”, with a remit of policy research and recom-
mendations in the social field. Regulation was, however, 
slower and limited – the first significant Directives (safety 
signs, protection from certain chemicals) came in 1977-78. 
The First Action Programme on Safety and Health at 
Work(1978) opened a new phase, focusing on “dangerous 
substances” and “dangers and harmful effects of machi-
nes”. It also led to improvements and harmonization in 
statistics which resulted in the Eurostat data that now 
allows to compare the performance of Member States 
(with fatal accidents the most reliable indicator). 
The 1980 “Framework Directive” (80/1107/EEC) was a 
major step, covering “risks related to exposure to 
chemical, physical and biological agents at work”. It 
foresaw the adoption of Directives on specific agents (four 
“Daughter Directives”), setting specific requirements, 
maximal acceptable values etc. It required workers’ 
information and involvement (article 5), and active 
surveillance of workers’ health for the more hazardous 
agents (articles 3 and 5). 
In 1982, the first “enforcement forum” for European OHS 
legislation, the “Senior Labour Inspectors Committee” 
(SLIC), started meeting informally. Gathering senior 
delegates from every OHS inspectorate in the EC/EU, 
SLIC’s aim is to improve information exchange and bring 
practices closer. SLIC (which became an official Committee 
advising the Commission in 1995) defines “common 
principles” and conducts assessments of the national 
inspection systems. While SLIC is a well established body, 
it is also very “lean”, and has no binding powers. 
Treaty changes led to stronger European involvement in 
OHS – as the Single European Act (SEA, 1986) strengthened 
article 118 of the Rome Treaty in terms of OHS objectives 
and of instruments available. Regulating OHS was now a 
31  Neal and Wright (1992), pp. 3-6
32  Neal and Wright (1992), p. 4, suggest the rate of fatal occupational 
accidents was close to 1 per 1,000 –40 times higher than the 2012 
EU-28 average (as per Eurostat data). The figure seems largely 
exaggerated however, and does not appear to match historical data 
available elsewhere (e.g. OECD 1989, p. 138)
“core” area of European regulation. This was followed by a 
new Commission Programme on OHS (1988) and a new 
“Framework Directive” 89/391/EEC, arguably more 
significant than all previous European actions in this field. 
It introduced “general principles of prevention” based on 
risk. It created obligations for employers (and, to a lesser 
extent, workers) –a duty to “prevent risk”, and constantly 
adjust to evolving techniques so as to raise the safety 
level. It required all enterprises to conduct risk assess-
ments and develop risk management policies. The 
Directive went much further than previously existing civil 
liability in its specifics, and in the onus it put on employers 
to prevent risks. A total of 19 “individual Directives” 
deriving from its article 16 have been adopted as of end 
2015.
Since then, European regulations have expanded and 
often overtaken national legislation as the main source of 
OHS rules. EU regulations tend to precise and prescriptive, 
far more e.g. than UK OHS regulations (see Baldwin 1992) 
- though the Treaties and “Framework Directive” require 
attention to specifics of SMEs, it is unclear how much this 
is the case in practice. 
In 1994 was set up the European Agency for Safety and 
Health at Work (EU-OSHA) with focus on research, data 
and information. It has produced a number of information 
publications and tools, in particular an interactive risk 
assessment online tool. As a result, there are 3 structures 
dealing with OHS issues within the EU (in addition to the 
DGs): the Eurofound, SLIC and EU-OSHA. None of them 
has a strong implementation mandate, e.g. the power to 
direct competent authorities in Member States to follow 
certain approaches. A succession of Action Programmes 
have been implemented, latest being the “Strategic 
Framework” 2014-2020. The first challenge it identifies is 
improving “implementation of existing (…) rules”, and 
several “strategic objectives” relate to this challenge, e.g. 
“providing practical support to small and micro enterpri-
ses” and “improving enforcement by Member States”. It is 
unclear, however, whether instruments and measures 
foreseen will succeed to “improve enforcement”.
Actual OHS outcomes across the EU appear markedly 
unequal. Eurostat publishes key harmonized indicators for 
OHS – accidents of different levels of seriousness, and 
diseases. The latter, however, suffer under “time lag” 
problems (illness may surface decades after the fact, and 
reflect on the OHS system as it used to be and not as it is 
now) as well as reporting/detection challenges. The rate of 
reporting of work-related accidents is also problematic, 
introducing serious bias in the data. The most reliable 
indicator (and with no time-lag_ is the rate of fatal 
work-related accidents (which inevitably end up being 
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recorded33). The average standardized rate of fatal 
accidents for 100,000 workers in EU Member States 
ranged from 1.5 to 7.14 for 2008-2013, with an average of 
2.44. Nor was the huge discrepancy explained by the 
wealth gap between “Old” and “New” Member States – 
the EU-15 average was 2.42 and the EU-28 was 2.56. In 
fact, a number of the richest, “oldest” Member States (e.g. 
Belgium or France) ranked way worse than average. The 
best performers included the UK, Netherlands, Germany, 
Finland and Sweden (in that order). The worst were 
Romania, Lithuania, Portugal, Austria and Latvia (in that 
order). Thus, the effective approximation of OHS between 
Member States appears lagging. 
Interestingly, among the best performing countries (and 
for several decades already) is the UK – a country against 
which the European Commission brought an infringement 
case for failure to fully implement Directive 89/391/EEC. 
The UK held that its 1974 Health and Safety at Work Act, 
which qualified employers’ health and safety duties with 
“as far as reasonably practicable”, did not violate the 
Directive (and in fact the Act’s establishment of a universal 
OHS mandate, and risk-based language, probably inspired 
the Directive). The EC thought otherwise and referred the 
case to the ECJ in 2005. In June 2007, the ECJ found against 
the EC and upheld the UK’s position. Leaving aside the 
legal arguments, the EC held that the qualification 
amounted to “defective implementation”, equating 
strictness of legal language with effectiveness. The 
“implementation challenge” thus may stem not only from 
weaknesses in the institutional framework, but from an 
inadequate model of what implementation means and of what 
drives improvements in compliance and performance. Equating 
“effective enforcement” with “strict legal language” and 
“availability of dissuasive penalties” is a very narrow view 
– and one that does not match the evidence available.
This is all the more problematic as available evidence 
suggests that, in terms of enforcement, effectiveness rarely 
correlates with “quantitative” indicators of deterrence. A 
review of OHS inspections in Britain and Germany, for 
instance34, shows that, between 2006 and 2013, OHS 
inspections were from 4 to 7 times more frequent (pro 
rated to the enterprise population) in Germany than in 
Britain – whereas outcomes were essentially similar (after 
a long period where Britain’s were far better). The possible 
explanations include a longer- and better-established use 
33  This indicator does have one limitation: because the number of 
cases is low, variations year-on-year can be high in percentage, and 
small differences in rates (or short-term changes) should not be 
over-interpreted.
34  Author’s own research based on official British (HSE) and German 
(SuGA) data, to be published 2016 or 2017, details available upon 
request.
of risk assessment by enterprises, greater emphasis on 
practical guidance (and better availability of guidance 
documents), more systematic use of risk-based targeting 
for inspection visits (and better data), clearer division of 
roles between the different institutions involved etc. 
Environmental Protection
While European environmental action was theoretically 
possible based on the Preamble’s goals and articles 
100-10135, it was not before 1972 that the general concern 
for environmental issues led to the first Environmental 
Action Programme (EAP) adopted in 1973. This empha-
sized “comprehensive assessment of the impacts of other 
policies”36 –what would later become a more systematic 
practice of impact assessment. The first and second EAPs 
combined research, sector-specific work and a strong push 
for quality improvements for air, water and waste. One 
early major directive was 75/440/EEC on surface water 
“intended for abstraction of drinking water”, with 
Directive 80/778/EEC37 then going further and defining 
specific parameters (and testing measures) for drinking 
water. Both are representative of a phase when European 
environmental regulation relied primarily on performance 
standards applying to the actual quality of elements of the 
environment: the water ready to drink has to meet these 
requirements. Because drinking water supply is highly 
centralized, with either state/municipal actors or closely 
regulated monopoly utilities, control and enforcement 
were made easier, and the Commission could limit itself to 
infringement procedures without this impairing the 
effective achievement of the Directives’ goals. 
In the 1980s, successive EAPs emphasised the links 
between Internal Market and environmental issues38 and 
made greater use of “emission standards” (i.e. regulating 
the pollution rather than the resulting state). The SEA then 
gave stronger powers in environmental matters to 
European institutions. The 1990s saw again a change of 
approach (sector/integrated approaches, recognising the 
limitations of emissions- or quality-based norms39), as 
well as increasing resistance to European environmental 
regulations, from a business and economic perspective.40 
Nonetheless, significant legislation was adopted in the 
1990s, in particular the Integrated pollution prevention 
and control Directive (IPPC - 96/61/EC later replaced by 
2008/1/EC). It “applies an integrated environmental 
approach to (…) industrial activities” meaning that 
35 Complemented by article 235, which provided for a mechanism 
when action was “necessary to achieve the goals” of the Treaty.
36 Hey 2006, p. 19
37 Now superseded by 98/83/EC
38 Hey 2006, p. 19
39 Ibid., pp. 21-23
40 Ibid., pp. 23-24
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“regulators must set permit conditions (…) based on (…) 
the Best Available Techniques (BAT)” so as “to prevent 
emissions and waste production and where that is not 
practicable, reduce them to acceptable levels41”. The IPPC 
Directive is important because of the regulatory instruments 
prescribed to enforce compliance – namely permitting, 
with specific conditions imposed, followed by regular 
monitoring (inspections). While the IPPC mechanism 
offers some flexibility (conditions can be tailored to each 
facility), it also creates a significant ex ante barrier (permit 
issuance) – and there is no requirement for Member States 
to review previously existing permitting requirements, and 
consolidate them. There is also no mechanism to ensure 
that methods used for monitoring and inspections are, in 
practice, consistent across the EU.
In the 1990s was also set up the European Environment 
Agency (EEA) which, like EU-OSHA or EFSA, is an agency 
tasked with scientific assessment and advice to the 
European institutions, and with information to the public 
and enterprises. It is not in charge of supervising enforce-
ment. Thus, while the development of environmental 
regulation proceeded apace, no implementation structure 
was created – something which is particularly problematic 
given the changing nature of this legislation. Whereas 
early directives set quality objectives to be achieved by 
Member States, mostly concerning small numbers of 
easily controllable utilities (water), subsequent regulations 
increasingly applied to large numbers of economic actors 
(manufacturers of industrial products, operators of 
industrial or agricultural facilities etc.) – i.e. to areas where 
actors are numerous, and action is indirect. A superficial 
review of compliance levels suggests they are higher for 
areas of direct action governing a small number of actors 
(water) than for more complex and “dispersed” areas (air), 
which is unsurprising. 
The only structure that aims at improving “implementa-
tion and enforcement” of EU environmental regulations, 
IMPEL (European Union Network for the Implementation 
and Enforcement of Environmental Law), is an informal 
network of national and local competent authorities for 
environmental enforcement, that started operating in 
1992 and grew somewhat more formal over time, in a way 
similar to SLIC. Its core activities are, capacity building, 
information and cooperation. It is referenced in several 
official EU documents, and has been the recipient of a 
series of EU grants for research and guidance into 
environmental inspections and enforcement best practice 
– but it remains outside of the EU institutional system. 
Over time, IMPEL has produced an increasing body of 
publications summarizing best practices in performance 
assessment for environmental inspectorates, implementa-
41  DEFRA 2010, Environmental Permitting guidance – The IPPC Directive
tion of risk assessment methods, choice of appropriate 
types of interventions depending on issues and target 
groups etc.
IMPEL recommendations strongly support a risk-based 
and risk-proportionate approach, the need to balance 
enforcement actions with promoting voluntary compli-
ance, and diversification of environmental regulators’ 
activities beyond inspections and enforcement, to take 
into account the diversity of issues, compliance drivers, 
target audiences etc. In the 7th EAP42, the Commission 
specifically refers to IMPEL’s work43 in Priority Objective 4, 
which aims at “maximising benefits” by “improving 
implementation”. It notes “significant differences in 
implementation between Member States”44, the “high 
number of infringements, complaints and petitions”45 and 
foresees to “further develop inspection support capacity at 
Union level, drawing on existing structures”46 and extend 
“binding criteria for effective Member State inspections 
and surveillance to the wider body of Union environment 
law”. Instruments to “support capacity” include professio-
nal networks (IMPEL) and “peer reviews” to increase “the 
efficiency and effectiveness of inspections”47. What the 
EAP does not incorporate is a vision of the overall approach 
to be used to promote compliance, even though it 
implicitly supports IMPEL’s recommendations..
Several events and processes in recent years are also 
relevant to review: the implementation of the REACH 
Regulation (EC 1907/2006), the potential for major 
environmental accidents illustrated e.g. by the 2010 Ajka 
alumina plant accident in Hungary, and the latest emissi-
ons cheating scandal involving the Volkswagen group. 
The adoption of REACH has led to the creation of the 
European Chemicals Agency (ECHA)48, in charge of leading 
the evaluation process for chemicals registered under 
REACH (and of related scientific and information duties), 
and of reviewing the use of chemical substances of very 
high concern (SVHC). Enforcement responsibilities remain 
solely with national inspectorates, though ECHA does host 
a coordination Forum on enforcement. Thus, while REACH 
requires the registration and hazard assessment of over 
140,000 different chemicals (to be completed by 2018), 
stringent approval procedures for the use of SVHCs, and 
information requirements for every chemical at every 
42  See: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX: 
32013D1386&from=EN 
43  Point 63, page 190 
44  Point 57, p. 189
45  Point 58, ibid. 
46 Point 60, p. 190
47  Point 65 (iii), ibid.
48  See: http://echa.europa.eu/ - it is also involved in the implementation 
of other directives, but REACH is the one of most interest in our case
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stage, there is no mechanism foreseen to support and 
verify effective compliance. The effort is entirely focused 
on registration and regulation.
In 2010, the massive havoc wrecked by the breaking of a 
tailings dam at the Ajka alumina plant reminded that 
massive disasters due to highly visible, long established 
and well understood industrial processes can still happen 
in the EU. While accidents can happen, this disaster was 
clearly preventable from a risk perspective. Given the nature 
of the activity, and the age of installations, this should have 
been classified as high-risk, been the subject of a high 
level of care by its operator and also of a high level of 
supervision by the environmental regulator (neither of 
which were the case). Targeted enforcement could have 
helped prevent risk, but did not take place.
In September 2015, a worldwide emissions testing fraud 
scandal broke out, affecting vehicles produced by the 
Volkswagen AG Group. It was detected by US regulators, 
there are suggestions of earlier “cover ups” linked to VW’s 
local clout. The truth is still unknown, and occurrence of 
fraud (albeit massive) is not proof that a system is unfit for 
purpose, but this does strengthen doubts about adequacy 
of environmental enforcement. Reliance on “normalized” 
conformity assessment tests, prior approvals with no “real 
life” checks”, and decentralized (and non-harmonized) 
enforcement may not be able to deliver the regulations’ 
stated outcomes. The response here is not “more 
regulation” or “stricter enforcement”, or assuming that all 
businesses fraud – but to review the existing structures 
that “deliver” the regulations, and see if they can be made 
more effective (and efficient) at their core tasks (and how). 
To date, the EU has mostly relied on indirect and informal 
coordination of enforcement, with infringement procedu-
res as a “backup”49 – and environmental NGOs to support 
monitoring and push for action. However, though NGOs 
can play a strong positive role50, improving the effectiven-
ess of environmental “regulatory delivery” appears 
essential.
49  Scheuer 2006, pp. 335
50  See Bentata and Faure 2015
The impossibility of “optimal 
regulation” and the complexity of 
compliance drivers
Shortcomings in EU regulations implementation lead to 
consider cross-learning between areas, but also questions 
of regulatory design and compliance. Understanding which 
of the four setups drives stronger harmonization is 
insufficient – we also must consider whether the enforce-
ment approaches they promote are adequate, in order to 
come up with recommendations on what an “optimally 
effective and efficient” EU-wide regulatory enforcement 
architecture could be.
Enforcement is important because regulations are not 
self-executing (Yeung 2007), and because there are no 
“optimal” rules. Ogus (1994) has shown that all types of 
mandatory norms (“target”, “performance” or “specifica-
tion”) have limitations – those easier to control and enforce 
are also least directly connected to the desired outcomes, 
and the “outcomes-based” ones are least connected to 
businesses’ actions and least enforceable (pp. 166-171). Black 
(1997) suggests that the generalization necessary to develop 
rules results in problems when applying them – and that a 
rule’s success should be measured in a strict instrumental 
way (achieving policy objectives). But rules are not perfectly 
correlated to the hazards they seek to address (Bardach and 
Kagan 1982, p. 71). Building on Diver (1983), Baldwin (1995, 
pp. 179-181) has shown that rules are always over- or 
under-inclusive, and that “an alternative response is to write 
rules that devolve discretion down to enforcers” (p. 184) 51. 
Even very specific norms do not work uniformly in practice 
because of differences in enforcement methods. Trying to 
curtail discretion can lead to difficulties in fighting “creative 
compliance”, i.e. formal compliance with requirements that 
“covers” undermining of the regulation’s objectives 
(Baldwin 1995, pp. 185-189). Even “target” rules are not 
immune to being “gamed” – because it is impossible to 
“target” everything that would be meaningful (Bevan and 
Hood 2006). Going “beyond compliance” thus seems 
necessary to really achieve the purpose of public policies 
(see Gunningham, Kagan and Thornton 2003) A recent 
report by the Scientific Council to the Netherlands’ 
Government underlined the same risk of “creative compli-
ance”, and called in response for increased regulatory 
discretion (WRR 2013). 
51  Cf. Ogus (op. cit., pp. 170-171) searching for ways to make standards 
- more “optimal”, concluding with flexible language relying on 
enforcers’ competence. There is no escaping discretion in any case. 
Even in systems (e.g .US OSHA) which try and minimize regulatory 
discretion (with many side-effects), discretion remains –in the hand 
of judges called upon to decide conflicts between regulators and 
businesses.
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Since excessive rigidity harms the economy, freedom and 
the regulations’ own purposes, the question how to organize 
this indispensable discretion to avoid capture, abuse, and 
excessive variations – and achieve optimal impact.
The links between enforcement and compliance (or 
“better than compliance” behaviours) are complex. A 
common view is purely “deterrence-based” and results in 
increased inspections frequency and sanctions. Decades of 
research show that this view is too narrow, and results in 
disappointing compliance levels. Rather, compliance is 
fostered by at least three drivers: moral values, legitimacy 
of authorities, and rational calculations (deterrence) – the 
latter appearing to be the weakest. 
Moral values are among the strongest drivers of compli-
ance – but influencing them through public policy is 
difficult, and long-term. Deterrence is far easier to 
use– but has important limitations. First, its effects are 
mediated by the values of the regulated subjects (see 
Kirchler 2007) – meaning those whose values already 
support compliance will experience a stronger dissuasion 
effect, but those whose values do not will be far less 
influenced (whereas these are precisely the target). 
Second, really strong dissuasion tends to have considera-
ble costs – both in terms of finances and freedom 
(personal and economic), meaning that strong deterrence 
is impossible to achieve in most cases (see Tyler 2003). 
Finally, when efforts at dissuasion are excessively intrusive 
or heavy handed, they tend to negatively affect procedural 
justice, and actually decrease compliance (see Tyler 2003, 
Kirchler 2007, Blanc, Macrae, Ottimofiore 2015, Hodges 
2015 etc.).
Indeed, the degree to which regulated subjects (citizens, 
businesses) find authorities and rules legitimate is one of 
the strongest compliance drivers – and also the most 
easily influenced one (strengthened, or weakened) by 
public authorities’ actions. In turn, a strong factor 
influencing legitimacy is procedural justice – the extent to 
which public authorities are perceived as fair, not in terms 
of results, but of their processes. High procedural 
increases legitimacy of authorities and rules– and thus, 
compliance (see Tyler 2003). It is therefore essential to find 
the right enforcement balance between achieving some 
deterrence, and fostering procedural justice. 
A simplistic deterrence model assumes purely “economi-
cally rational” decisions, and sees organisations as unitary 
entities, neglecting that firms comprise many individuals, 
and human behaviour is shaped by their “cognitive 
development and moral understanding”, as well as social 
norms (Hodges 2015, pp. 3, 15-16). Crucially, decisions are 
more often taken on the basis of the “fast heuristic 
approach”, which “involves impulsiveness and intuition”, 
than using the “slower system that is capable of reasoning 
[and] is cautious” (ibid.)52. 
A last essential factor is the ability to comply – which itself 
requires both knowledge and material capacity. The first, 
particularly for SMEs, makes clear information and 
guidance crucial. The second means that complex and 
onerous requirements with marginal safety benefits may 
actually harm overall outcomes by distracting resources 
away from more important improvements, or by pushing 
businesses towards non-compliance because they see 
rules as excessive53.
To sum up, we can outline four foundations of compliance: 
• Enabling conditions: understanding of rules, financial 
and technical ability to comply 
• Economic incentives: deterrence (probability of 
detection, sanctions, reputation loss), economic 
benefits of compliance (reputation, market positioning, 
productivity)
• Social drivers: group conformity (peers are compliant), 
group ethical values (aligned with regulatory goals, or 
with legal compliance as such)
• Psychological drivers: legitimacy of authorities (influen-
ced by individual and group experience), procedural 
justice (or lack thereof) experienced in interactions with 
authorities.
An optimal system should cover all these foundations and 
strike the right balance to fit different categories of 
regulated subjects – the majority which tend to comply 
voluntarily if the preconditions for compliance exist 
(legitimacy, knowledge, “realistic” regulations), and a 
minority of “rational calculators” (Voermans 2014, Elffers 
1997). For them, an element of deterrence is essential 
– and this will also ensure the majority of “voluntary 
compliers” that there is a “level playing field” – but this 
deterrence should not become so burdensome that it 
alienates the majority.
Conclusion
Regulation can have important benefits for public welfare 
– it also has costs. Being mindful of costs and benefits is 
essential and, as Helsloot (2012) has shown, excessive 
economic costs can actually translate into net negative 
results in terms of safety. Good regulatory design is 
important, but insufficient: real attention needs to be 
given to enforcement or regulatory delivery. In turn, this 
52  In addition, decisions are often taken on the basis of the “fast 
heuristic approach”, which “involves impulsiveness and intuition” 
(ibid. and Tversky and Kahneman (1974), Bennear in Balleisen et al. 
(2015), Thaler and Sunstein (2008) pp. 19-39) 
53  See the “economic” side of the “license to operate” concept out-
lined by Gunningham, Kaghan and Thornton (2003).
requires to balance different compliance drivers: procedural 
justice, knowledge and capacity, deterrence where 
appropriate.
EU regulatory systems have developed differently for food, 
non-food products, OHS and environment. These differen-
ces appear caused more by historical circumstances and path 
dependency than by inherent characteristics of these 
different regulatory areas. The European Treaties applied 
directly to food and non-food from the onset, while OHS 
was less central, and environment absent – this resulted in 
different paces of development. The creation of the Single 
Market further strengthened rules for product markets, and 
successive food crises led to a high level of European 
harmonization of food safety enforcement. As a result, while 
strong rules and institutions ensure a degree of uniformity in 
food safety (with a sound risk-based approach), this is far 
less true in other areas, and there are serious concerns of 
implementation weakness. Ongoing European programmes 
and regulatory proposals all emphasize implementation, but 
they rely mostly on regulatory design, informal mechanisms, 
and a narrow vision of what drives compliance. This leaves 
us with three out of four areas where the setup does not 
appear “fit for purpose” – and one (food) where innovative 
approaches are insufficiently supported.
Because these are four “core” regulatory fields that do not 
typically require very different institutional set ups and 
approaches54, and because there appear to be clear 
differences in effectiveness of delivery models, cross-lear-
ning between these fields could bring major benefits. The 
FVO offers a possible model: strong institution, clear 
mandate, real powers, and visible effects. Its emphasis on a 
risk-based deterrence model is, however, too narrow – and 
insufficient efforts to support SME compliance have negative 
effects for growth, jobs and consumer safety in many 
Member States. By contrast, good practices such as food 
hygiene ratings (Denmark, UK, now the Netherlands), 
hands-on guidance for SMEs (Britain’s Safer Food Better 
Business and OHS guidance, Lombardy’s ‘good hygiene 
practices’ manual), assured advice (Britain’s Primary Authority 
scheme) are insufficiently promoted across the EU.
By contrast, IMPEL is an informal network with insufficient 
power to force change in competent authorities’ practices – 
but it has a broader, more balanced view of compliance and 
of good enforcement approaches. It also shows the 
importance of using horizontal, cross-learning and not only 
top-down harmonization. Thus, structures and harmoniza-
tion are stronger in the food safety field, with positive effects 
on European integration, but environment has developed a 
richer perspective on compliance, and an optimal model 
would seek to combine both.
54  Cf. Mertens 2011, Blanc 2012 and OECD 2014
Introducing stronger institutions and powers at the 
European level to achieve more harmonization of 
enforcement in a “top down” way may prove challenging, 
however, politically – and face resistance from Member 
States’ inspectorates. Britain’s Primary Authority may offer 
an innovative model to ensure more consistency, more 
effectiveness, a more balanced compliance approach and 
a better combination of “prosperity and protection”, 
which could be replicated at the EU level. Rather than 
having a centralized body harmonize enforcement 
practices, it relies on designating local authorities as 
“primary authority” for a given (group of) business(es), 
and have them provide compliance support, and (binding) 
guidance to other enforcement authorities in dealing with 
this particular business(es). It requires of course harmoni-
zed legislation (which the EU has), and also an oversight 
body (the Better Regulation Delivery Office in the UK, 
which “vets” which authorities can become “primary” in 
which field, based on competence, and resolves conflicts). 
Replicating this at the European level would require 
innovative institutional and legal solutions, but may in 
some areas help move beyond the alternative of “strong 
but rigid harmonization” or “innovation but divergence”. 
In short, addressing the European “implementation gap” 
and making EU regulations more consistently, effectively 
and efficiently applied require a combination of steps:
• More “binding” guidance, through a central institution 
(like the FVO), a decentralized system (like Primary 
Authority), or a combination of both
• A comprehensive approach to compliance (and “beyond 
compliance”), using innovations from all Member States 
and spreading them, building on risk-based approaches 
but seeing “regulatory delivery” as going far beyond 
narrowly seen “enforcement”.
Elements of “best practices” exist both at the European 
and Member States levels, and cross-learning can allow to 
make considerable progress. To do so will, however, 
require to challenge many established structures and 
beliefs. The first step is to remember that “more” does not 
always equate “better”, as Britain’s outstanding OHS 
performance, with comparatively few inspections, 
testifies.
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2.  International cooperation via 
networks and agencies: A tale 
of perceptions, informality 
and national cultures 
 




The European Union: Even rules, 
uneven practices
In an international governmental structure with 28 
members, the implementation of joint laws is bound to be 
an issue. Indeed, implementation of EU legislation is a 
booming field of scholarly research, and increasingly is 
also a topic receiving careful consideration at the political 
level. As the European Commission stated in its 
Communication ‘A Europe of Results: Applying Community 
Law’ (CEC, 2007: 10), ‘The timely and correct application of 
Community law is essential to maintain a strong founda-
tion for the European Union and ensure that European 
policies have intended impacts.’ Some scholars assert that 
we are witnessing a ‘European enforcement deficit’ (e.g., 
Jans et al., 2007). However, if we were honest we would 
admit not knowing much about the size of this deficit. We 
have no across-the-board evidence of how Europe’s 
thousands of regulations, directives and decisions, in 
addition to the many soft-law types of agreements, are 
actually implemented and complied with in all of the 28 
member states of the European Union. Thus, instead of an 
‘enforcement deficit’ it would be more accurate to speak 
of an ‘information deficit’ (Versluis, 2008). We do know 
that implementation of EU law is by no means uniform. 
Case studies have affirmed that implementation of EU 
legislation can differ markedly between member states. 
Let us illustrate this with two concrete examples.
A case study on the Safety Data Sheets Directive of 5 
March 1991 (91/155/EEC), which regulates safe handling of 
dangerous substances and preparations, demonstrates 
that while each of the four member states analysed 
(Germany, United Kingdom, Spain and the Netherlands) 
transposed this directive correctly, its actual application 
left much to be desired (see Versluis, 2007 for the case 
study). This case study demonstrates that only the 
Netherlands paid – be it marginal – attention to enforce-
ment, and only a handful of chemical companies indicated 
serious efforts to comply with the obligation of providing 
safety data sheets. A core reason for this lack of attention 
at the ‘street level’ was that the directive was simply not 
considered sufficiently important. Its low salience 
influenced the time and attention that national inspectors 
devoted to it. In sum, this case study shows that a law in 
the books is not automatically a law in practice. 
The case study on the Seveso II Directive (96/82/EEC), 
which regulates the handling of dangerous substances, 
shows a very active implementation practice (see Versluis, 
2004 for the case study). This highly salient directive 
triggered much attention in the same four member states 
scrutinized above, yet the amount and type of attention 
differed between the four countries. This case study 
illustrates the enormous variety in the ways that member 
states may put the same EU directive into practice. While 
Dutch and British inspectors spent considerable time 
assessing the safety reports that chemical companies were 
required to produce to comply with this EU directive, their 
German and Spanish colleagues devoted much less effort 
to this activity. German inspectors spent between 10 and 
30 days assessing a safety report, while British inspectors 
spent 25 to 50 days per report. The same holds true for the 
amount of time spent doing on-site inspections: while 
Dutch inspectors spent from 10 to 20 person-days per year 
on inspections related to this directive, their Spanish 
counterparts spent from 1 to 5 person-days per year. From 
this case study we can conclude that particularly the 
domestic policy tradition, alongside the level of national 
experience and expertise with the specific topic, influen-
ced the inspection style of individual member states. 
In sum, while an information deficit certainly remains 
about the state of compliance in the European Union, we 
can conclude that even rules do not automatically lead to 
even practices, and that the way all 28 member states 
implement EU legislation remains an important agenda 
topic. To address this issue, the European Union has often 
resorted to more centralization and horizontal coordina-
tion. Thus, there has been ever-increased involvement of 
the EU level in national implementation practices, as well 
as an increased number and variety of international 
cooperation initiatives. 
This contribution explores the increased international 
cooperation by looking at one specific form: cooperation 
via networks and agencies. In particular, it examines two 
examples of such cooperation. The first is a comparative 
analysis of different transnational networks, and the 
second is an analysis of the European Railway Agency. 
These examples show that international cooperation 
between national inspectorates is only likely to work when 
there is interdependence, some form of informality and an 
eye for national cultural differences. Furthermore, the case 
studies illustrate the importance of perceptions. 
Perceptions influence implementation behaviour and also 
what works and does not work in international coopera-
tion between national inspectorates. 
Implementation problems in the EU: 
Increased international cooperation  
as the answer
The European Commission set the tone with its 2001 
White Paper on European Governance. That paper states 
that one way to better tackle implementation problems is 
to resort to European agencies, as such agencies would 
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‘improve the way rules are applied and enforced across 
the Union’ (CEC, 2001: 24). Indeed, we have seen a 
proliferation of EU agencies in all sorts of policy sectors 
since the 1990s. But explicit references to implementation 
to justify in one way or another why a new agency is set up 
are more recent, dating only from the 2000s. The 
European Maritime Safety Agency, for example, owes its 
very existence to implementation problems. The agency 
was established in the aftermath of the Erika (1999) and 
Prestige (2002) oil tanker accidents, with the explicit 
expectation that the agency would result in better 
implementation of EU maritime safety rules. And this 
trend has not yet ended. In response to the financial crisis, 
the European Securities and Market Authority was 
established in 2012 to supervise domestic regulators and 
safeguard the stability of the European financial system. 
The idea appears to be gaining ground that implementa-
tion – while in principle a responsibility of the member 
states (TFEU, Article 4) – will benefit from more direct 
EU-level involvement; and more explicitly, that EU 
agencies will induce better compliance with EU law at the 
member-state level. The rationale underlying this 
expectation is a belief that agencies – possessing (inde-
pendent) expertise and an apolitical stance – will produce 
high-quality evaluations and better results. 
Today there are more than 40 EU agencies. Keading and 
Versluis (2014) categorized the different ‘implementation 
roles’ that these agencies have. They found that nine of 
these EU agencies – mostly related to DG MOVE and DG 
MARKT – are invested with a variety of tasks related to 
ensuring that rules are implemented and enforced 
effectively at the national level. These agencies’ compe-
tences to influence implementation at the national level 
vary enormously. They range from capacity building (e.g., 
providing training or technical assistance), to explicatory 
(explaining rules in published guidelines and reports or in 
practical workshops and conferences), to indirect 
enforcement actions in member states (such as peer 
reviewing, state visits and inspections). The more recently 
set up financial sector agencies have the farthest-reaching 
competences, directly influencing national implementa-
tion activities. They can bindingly settle disputes between 
member states, or prohibit certain activities or products 
(e.g., the European Securities and Markets Authority has 
such authority). 
In sum, international cooperation between national 
inspectorates is on the rise. EU regulatory agencies have 
strong ties with their national counterparts, and influence 
the daily work of national inspection agencies. The same 
applies to the increasing number of both formal and 
informal networks set up to contribute to better imple-
mentation of EU law. What does all this international 
cooperation between national inspectors via networks and 
agencies teach us? How and when does it seem to work? 
What value do domestic inspectors attach to this interna-
tional cooperation? The sections below describe two case 
studies conducted following the same premises. By 
focusing on the perceptions of national inspectors, they 
analyse how and when international cooperation in 
European networks and agencies is considered to be of 
added value. 
International cooperation via 
networks: Informality is the trick
This first case study is based on research by Polak (2015; 
see also Polak & Versluis, 2016) on the effectiveness of 
international networks in improving domestic compliance 
with EU legislation. The core question was how effective 
do national inspectors consider participation in an 
international network to be for improving implementation 
of EU legislation within their own member state. The 
research focused on participation of Dutch, Polish and 
Portuguese inspectors in four international networks. The 
findings indicate that while interdependence may first and 
for all motivate international cooperation, it is the 
perception of a network as being informal that is the 
determining factor for it to be considered worthwhile in 
delivering the benefits that networks might produce. 
Informality unleashes opportunities for mutual learning to 
occur, for mutual trust to flourish and for resource sharing 
and conflict resolution to actually take place. On what 
basis was this conclusion reached?
The EU increasingly relies on ‘networked governance’ as 
an independent mode of steering. In it, networks are seen 
as supplements to the executive position of the European 
Commission in implementation of EU measures (Hofmann 
et al., 2011). Why would national officials participate in 
international networks? We know little about the value 
that participants in these networks actually attach to the 
cooperation and whether they consider the networks to 
indeed bring about the abovementioned benefits. If the 
participating actors do not consider international 
networks useful for their own work ‘back home’, we might 
ask whether such networks ever will make a difference. 
While participants’ perceptions do not necessarily reflect 
their actual behaviour, perceptions are likely to influence 
behaviour by serving as ‘cognitive and normative frames 
for action’ (Egeberg & Trondal, 2011: 874). Our analysis was 
based on 28 interviews with participants in four networks 
related to three EU directives. The Consumer Safety 
Network and Prosafe are, respectively, a formal and an 
informal network associated with the General Product 
Safety Directive (2001/95/EC). IMPEL is an informal 
network associated with, among others, the Directive on 
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Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control (2008/1/EC). 
Finally the European SAFA Steering Group is a semi-formal 
network associated with the Directive on Safety 
Assessment of Foreign Aircraft (SAFA; 2004/36/EC). The 
commonality between these four networks is that all bring 
together national officials involved in implementation of 
EU directives.
The first conclusion that can be drawn based on this 
comparative case study, is that interdependence is a key 
factor motivating international cooperation. Supporting 
the conclusions by Boetzelaer and Princen (2012), our case 
study demonstrates that interdependence is an important 
functional argument for cooperation. As an inspector 
involved in Prosafe indicated, ‘Product safety is a topic on 
which you cannot think in national terms only. I spoke with 
a business operator who said, “So what if my product is 
not admitted to the Antwerp port. I’ll take it to Hamburg 
and import it to Europe from there.” I answered, “Then I’ll 
inform my colleagues in Hamburg that this product is 
headed to them.” My conversation partner wasn’t happy 
about that. …It doesn’t work to think nationally. We are in 
an internal European market, so we have to cooperate – 
otherwise products will enter our market even though 
we’ve just sent them back because they are unsafe.’ While 
interdependence often triggers international cooperation, 
it is not sufficient for explaining the high value that 
national inspectors attach to such cooperation. 
As a second conclusion, national inspectors identified a 
number of virtues of international cooperation. Yet they 
attached different value to these virtues. Among the 
virtues mentioned were mutual learning, mutual trust, 
resource sharing and conflict resolution. While all of the 
officials interviewed spoke highly of mutual learning, there 
were marked differences between the officials from the 
different member states. Portuguese and Polish officials 
were more positive about the added value of cooperation 
in international networks, as they saw it as stimulating 
learning. According to a Portuguese official involved in 
product safety, ‘Cooperation is particularly important 
because it makes it possible to see how other member 
states work. Together we find solutions to issues. We help 
each other, and we learn with each other. We have to learn 
from each other.’ Dutch officials didn’t stress learning as 
particularly important for themselves. These inspectors, 
instead, positioned themselves as ‘teachers’. Why would 
Dutch officials then participate in international networks, 
if as they indicated, they take less away from the coopera-
tion? Here we come to the second virtue identified: mutual 
trust. There can be no positive effect of international 
cooperation unless the participants involved open up. 
International cooperation might not necessarily stimulate 
learning for the Netherlands, but it does expand mutual 
trust, according to a Dutch inspector: ‘Often, the first 
thought is, why should we implement this here if other 
countries don’t do it? Cooperation is used to hold a mirror 
to our own performance. We may think we are doing well, 
but is this actually the case? And are they [Eastern-
European countries] actually so bad over there? There is a 
lot of rabble-rousing. Images and noises come up very 
quickly. Sometimes they are the truth, but no one checks 
whether it is indeed the case. Because of cooperation, you 
see that things are done the same in other countries. 
IMPEL contributes to strengthen mutual trust.’ As a third 
virtue of international cooperation, interviewees men-
tioned resource sharing. Here again we found a cross-
country divide. Portuguese and Polish officials underlined 
the rather mundane benefit that participation in networks 
brought them: it reduced the financial burden of imple-
mentation. Particularly in the field of product safety, the 
costly testing of whether products are safe can be shared 
among the members of the network. The last virtue of 
international cooperation identified by the actors 
interviewed was conflict resolution. Particularly in policy 
domains where risk assessments play a role – in our cases, 
product safety and air safety – differences between 
member states may have a direct effect on individual 
agencies’ ability to implement EU law effectively. 
Cooperation may prevent differences from having this 
effect – and conflicts from getting out of hand – by 
facilitating the resolution of differences. For example, 
there is always some subjectivity involved in interpreting 
the results of risk assessments, and talking to each other 
and jointly analysing assessment results helps inspectors 
come to a common understanding, thus facilitating the 
day-to-day implementation work of each and every 
inspectorate. 
As a last conclusion, this comparative case study illustrates 
the importance of informality. Officials unequivocally 
referred to informality as the key to making international 
cooperation work – and to formality as the surest way to 
stifle meaningful cooperation. What, then, are the benefits 
of informality? The answer was succinctly expressed by a 
Portuguese official: ‘Informality is why you have so much 
input from the participants.’ Informality stimulates 
openness about the problems authorities struggle with – 
and the benefit of openness, in turn, is that it allows 
cooperation to function as an effective learning, trust-
building and problem-solving instrument. In Prosafe this 
works as follows: ‘The solution to problems is found only 
if the reason for the problems is explained. If the reason is 
not explained, we cannot find a solution that suits the 
problem. And there can only be trust when the informa-
tion that comes in is honest. In Prosafe, we talk freely.’ The 
way this process plays out is particularly evident in the 
field of product safety. Two networks are active this area. 
The formal Consumer Safety Network and the informal 
network Prosafe. All of our interviewees, including those 
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from the European Commission, agreed that the formal 
network had not achieved the same level of effects as the 
informal network. According to one Commission respon-
dent, ‘When government officials come to Brussels to 
attend, they do so as representatives of the member 
states. The formal character of meetings hardly fosters 
cooperation at a practical level. It can even act as a brake 
on cooperation. Prosafe works better, because it is 
informal.’ The environmental network IMPEL started 
experiencing problems the moment Commission officials 
began to formally participate. The network lost its 
effectiveness – member states were no longer really open 
– which was then a reason for the Commission to quit its 
involvement in the network. 
There is one complication to informality as a crucial factor 
in making international cooperation in networks work: it is 
perceived informality that seems to do the trick. Thus, 
officials’ perception of cooperation as being informal 
determines their behaviour in networks. Legal informality 
– i.e., the lack of codification in EU legislation – seems to 
be an absolute precondition in this regard; but the same 
does not apply to material informality – i.e., the complete 
lack of involvement in the network of the European 
Commission or other official EU actors. This is illustrated 
by the case of the European SAFA Steering Group for air 
safety. This is a legally informal, but materially formal, 
platform of cooperation. It is not codified in EU legislation, 
but it is chaired by a member of the European Commission 
and attended by officials from the European Aviation 
Safety Agency (EASA). Despite the formal set-up of the 
meetings, officials nonetheless perceive them as informal 
events. According to one interviewee, ‘The European 
Commission acts as the chair of those meetings. So it is 
the EC representative who runs the show. But in 99% of 
the cases, the EC representative is very low profile, and it is 
a kind of a formal thing: they open the meeting and thank 
all the participants, close the meeting and so on. But I 
don’t feel watched by the EC, by no means. I am pretty 
sure that neither I nor any of my colleagues have ever felt 
constrained, say, because the EC representative is there. 
On the contrary. It is a technical discussion. The EC 
representative is not a techie… not an engineer or a pilot. 
So we can discuss freely between us… the [EC representa-
tive] doesn’t understand our language anyway, and that’s 
very good.’ In this same vein, alongside perceived 
informality location also matters. Brussels is not condu-
cive to cooperation, it seems: ‘Whenever these things take 
place in Brussels, it is too stiff. It is too strict, too formal, 
too Commission-centred. And whenever Prosafe meetings 
take place… [at] different locations, everything changes. 
We had a Commission representative at one of our project 
meetings, and that meeting had the same level of great 
cooperation because it was not in Brussels. It was in 
Warsaw, and everybody felt safe.’ In sum, it is not 
informality stricto sensu, but the perception of cooperation as 
informal that smoothens cooperation; and it is not 
necessarily the actual absence of the Commission or other 
EU officials, but rather the absence of the Commission as 
guardian of the treaties that facilitates the perception of 
informality. Commission officials can participate in 
networks, as long as they make sure not to disrupt the 
informality of the meetings; it helps too if Commission 
officials open up about their own problems, as some of 
the interviewees indicated.
International cooperation in the 
European Railway Agency: Differences 
in national perceptions matter
After discussing the importance of perceived informality in 
making cooperation in international networks a success, 
we now turn to an example of cooperation through an EU 
agency: the European Railway Agency (ERA; see Versluis & 
Tarr, 2013 for this case study). What can we learn from this 
case study on the role of an EU agency in implementation 
practices at the member-state level? Several scholars have 
analysed the impact of EU agencies on member states’ 
compliance behaviour (e.g., Groenleer et al., 2010; 
Gulbrandsen, 2011; Versluis, 2012), but the case study on 
the ERA highlights differences in actors’ perceptions of the 
agency’s impact on domestic compliance. The expectation 
that agencies can improve implementation is not new. 
Dehousse (1997: 254) argued that agencies can ensure that 
‘actors in charge of implementation of Community policy 
behave in a similar manner’. In particular, Dehousse 
expects agencies to have an impact via the promotion of 
‘horizontal cross-fertilization among national administra-
tions’ (Dehousse, 1997: 255). Majone (1997: 272) also 
addressed the importance of agencies in facilitating ‘the 
development of behavioral standards and working 
practices that create shared expectations’. Based on 19 
interviews with Commission officials, ERA staff and 
inspectors from six member states, we conclude that the 
theoretical expectations outlined above are not necessa-
rily justified. 
The ERA was set up in 2004 (Regulation 2004/881/EC) to 
reinforce safety and interoperability and therefore help to 
create an integrated railway area. It participates in three 
types of activities with potential impact on compliance at 
the member-state level: issuing recommendation and 
opinions; networking and dissemination of information; 
and monitoring. ERA cooperates with two types of 
national authorities: national safety authorities (NSAs), 
which monitor safety regulations and supervise railway 
safety, and investigating bodies (IBs), which lead investi-
gations of serious incidents such as accidents. ERA 
organizes network meetings and workshops involving all 
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European NSAs and IBs. In addition, it issues guidelines and 
best practices reports. The ERA activities with the greatest 
likelihood of directly influencing member-state activities are 
its national visits and its transposition checks. Based on the 
interviews with the different types of partners, we can 
conclude that different groups have different perceptions of 
the ERA’s role and impact.
We start with the ERA officials themselves, who emphasized 
the ERA’s role in providing a neutral forum for meeting and 
exchanging ideas. This links to conclusions drawn earlier on 
the importance of informality. While not using the term 
informality, an ERA official observed a similar effect: ‘We’re a 
partner and not the police, and therefore we can bring 
people together in a neutral place where all the actors meet 
and facilitate consensus. We may even suggest solutions.’ 
The ERA could provide the Commission with a lot of 
information about problems at the member-state level. 
Based on, for example, the transposition checks that the ERA 
does, the Commission could potentially initiate infringement 
procedures. ERA officials, however, downplay this possibility, 
arguing that it would undermine the agency’s position. The 
ERA’s position is a powerful one, as it sits in the middle of a 
triangle between the Commission, the sector and national 
authorities. Several ERA officials indicated this as a valuable 
position that generates trust: ‘The member states are afraid 
of the Commission because the Commission can do nasty 
things to them, and they all know they are not complying. 
We come from the sector and meet with people at the 
working parties all day every day. So people tell us things 
they don’t tell the Commission.’
There are no uniform perceptions among member-state 
representatives about how useful the ERA is in advancing 
implementation of EU railway legislation. Rather, a sharp 
divide can be observed between the group of member states 
that scores highly on regulatory capacity and performance 
(the Netherlands, Germany and United Kingdom) and some 
of the member states that score lower (e.g., Italy, Poland and 
Hungary). Respondents from all six member states conside-
red the network meetings to be useful, but they differed in 
their final evaluations. Italian, Polish and Hungarian 
inspectors stressed learning a lot from participation in the 
ERA meetings, and that these lessons were very beneficial to 
national implementation practices. Dutch, German and 
particularly British inspectors were less positive. As illustra-
ted by this quote from a British inspector: ‘I probably invest 
between 5 and 7 per cent of my working hours supporting 
ERA. Not supporting me, but supporting ERA. That’s a lot of 
time. And they are supposed to be supporting me, and not 
the other way around.’ This is illustrative of the viewpoints 
of member states that don’t consider themselves as 
profiting from cooperation via the European agency. In sum, 
the ERA’s perceived role and impact on national implemen-
tation practices differs diametrically between countries.  
The European Commission, finally, has very specific ideas 
about the role that the ERA should take up, at least in the 
future. The Commission officials interviewed foresaw a 
much stronger role for the agency, with more competen-
ces in monitoring domestic implementation. These 
interviewees realized that not all member states, or even 
ERA staff, shared that vision, but they nonetheless 
indicated that the ERA would ‘play a bigger role in the 
future in the railway sector than is the case today.... ERA’s 
competences are going to increase gradually towards 
inspections.... We cannot exclude that there will be hot 
debates, even during the preparatory phase of the new 
legislation. The national authorities will have to get 
accustomed to a new regime.’
This case study points to opposition by powerful and 
resourceful member states to a strong EU agency with 
hierarchical means, while less powerful and resourceful 
member states expressed support for such a strong 
agency. In the first category of countries, the ERA has 
relatively low impact because existing regulatory traditi-
ons are strong and the agency seems to have little to add 
by way of knowledge or resources. For this category of 
countries, an increase of ERA competences would in fact 
likely interfere with existing standards and practices. While 
respondents from these countries seemed willing to 
cooperate – and were generally positive about the idea of 
cooperation via the European agency – they suggested 
that the ERA offered little added value for their own 
regulatory tradition. The second group of countries, those 
with less regulatory capacity and lower performance – 
seemed to perceive cooperation via the ERA as an 
opportunity for mutual learning, and wished the agency 
would do more. 
Dehousse (1997: 254) argued that agencies can only be 
expected to have an impact on domestic compliance ‘if 
they agree on the definition of a given problem, and on 
the response it calls for’. The ERA case illustrates that this 
is perhaps more difficult to achieve than might at first be 
expected. European agencies have to live with the realities 
of 28 domestic implementation practices, and thus 
potentially 28 different views on the primary problems 
and relevant responses. Trying to reach agreement on the 
definition of a given problem, and on the appropriate 
response, might be a sheer impossibility. After all, the 
problems – and thus the required responses – will never 
be the same for all member states. Perhaps we must start 
realizing that the added value of EU agencies in improving 
domestic implementation is not to be found in stimulating 
common behavioural standards and working practices. 
Rather, the heterogeneous realities of the 28 EU member 
states call for a differential approach by EU agencies and 
the Commission alike. 
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Successful international cooperation: 
A tale of perceptions, informality and 
national cultures
Both case studies drawn on here illustrate the importance 
of taking perceptions seriously, particularly perceptions of 
the street-level actors responsible for implementing EU 
legislation ‘on the ground’. As stated above, perceptions 
are not always reflected in actual behaviour, but they do 
serve as frameworks for action. The case studies suggest 
that cooperation can produce mutual learning, mutual 
trust, shared resources and conflict resolution, as long as 
participants perceive the cooperation as informal. Only in 
an informal setting are national officials likely to open up 
and share knowledge, experiences and problems. And 
such candid sharing is necessary to bring about the 
abovementioned benefits. In addition, the case studies 
demonstrate that perceptions of the usefulness of an EU 
agency or network in stimulating effective national 
implementation differ widely between member states. 
What works to make country A compliant in situation Z, 
will not necessarily work for country B. Domestic contexts 
vary; and reasons for lagging, incomplete or incorrect 
implementation of legislation vary with circumstances. 
Compliance problems always stem from a combination of 
underlying reasons, be they intentional (i.e., 
noncompliance due to opposition to regulations or 
unwillingness) or unintentional (i.e., noncompliance 
because of ambiguity about the rules, a lack of expertise 
or other capacity limitations). This will obviously impact 
what inspectorates have to do to resolve problematic 
cases. We have long understood that ‘sticky’ domestic and 
sectoral traditions matter (see, e.g., Almond & Verba, 
1963). What works in the Polish aviation sector will not 
necessarily be equally successful in the British agricultural 
sector or the Greek financial market sector. It might even 
be counter-productive. 
International cooperation between national inspection 
bodies is most likely to be successful in areas where there 
is some form of interdependence and where the environ-
ment is one of mutual trust and informality. Even if these 
conditions are met, cooperation will be effective and add 
value only if national circumstances and cultures are 
considered and taken seriously. We need to be aware that 
harmonization and streamlining of national inspection 
approaches can never be fully realized; and we should 
question whether this is actually a goal worth working 
towards. It is clear that the Commission is thinking about 
addressing compliance problems along the lines of further 
harmonization. In its recent Communication ‘Better 
Regulation for Better Results: An EU agenda’, it argues 
that ‘[i]n many cases, one set of EU rules replaces a 
patchwork of 28 different national rules, so making life 
easier for citizens and businesses’ (CEC, 2015: 3). But in fact 
reality is a patchwork. We know from the case studies 
drawn on here – and the many more case studies out there 
– that even rules do not always automatically lead to even 
practices. It would be more helpful if the Commission – 
and EU agencies – would simply accept and try to work 
with the patchwork, and accommodate national 
differences. 
The case studies explored in this contribution demon-
strate that reasons for noncompliance will never be the 
same across the European Union. Thus, the approaches 
taken by inspectorates to address noncompliance should 
never be exactly the same. Rather than investing in 
expanding harmonization and streamlining the working 
practices of national inspectorates, it would be wiser to 
put money into further European-level investigation of 
tailor-made responses to individual instances of noncom-
pliance and to share the results internationally. Such 
investigation would require the Commission to assess not 
only where and how tailor-made responses would benefit 
implementation, but also whether such responses could 
be implemented within the limits of the EU treaties (e.g., 
regarding the principle of equality of member states 
before the treaties). It would also require member states 
to play their – constructive – part in making cooperation 
work better, for example, by indicating what they need 
and how they could contribute to making cooperation 
more effective. Making cooperation work better is, indeed, 
a shared responsibility.
In addition, EU-level harmonization should always address 
higher principles of inspections, never the low-level 
details, which should be left to the member states. This 
was nicely expressed by a British railway inspector: ‘Their 
[ERA] belief is that one solution will fix everything. But this 
will never work. They should go to the different member 
states and find out what the specific problems are. ERA is 
looking for common methods of work. And this is where 
the problem stands. You will never, ever, ever, literally 
have common methods of work. For me, you have to go 
one level higher. What are the principles of independent 
accident investigation that must be achieved, no matter 
which way you work.’ Such an approach at a more abstract 
level – an approach that, moreover, is sensitive to the 
perceptions of national implementing actors, to the 
patchwork of cultures and enforcement styles in the EU, 
and to the nature of compliance problems – may not only 
be more effective in ensuring implementation; it may also 
increase the acceptability of EU action in the domain of 
implementation among those that are indispensable for 
making EU rules work in practice.
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Introduction: Cooperation as a 
challenge55
Many societal problems extend beyond the level of the 
nation state. They manifest throughout Europe or even on 
a global scale. Environmental pollution, for example, has 
no regard for national borders. Since the establishment of 
the European internal market, food safety and other 
health risks have spread across the continent at a 
staggering pace, while workers may now move from one 
country to another, though often facing highly variable 
employment conditions. Technological developments, 
such as the Internet and digitalization, are playing an 
important role too in the internationalization of trade and 
finance – with all the attendant potential negative 
consequences, as demonstrated by the recent global 
financial crisis and the ease with which dangerous 
products ordered online can enter the European market. 
To get a grip on cross-border trade and transactions – 
both physical and digital – a complex machinery of laws 
and regulations has been established over the past 
decades, particularly at the European level. The underlying 
assumption is that agreement on basic rules will help 
minimize risks, increase product quality and safety, and 
enhance the functioning of markets. 
Yet, these rules, as we know all too well from the national 
context, are of little merit without means to ensure 
compliance. Therefore, at the national level a motley 
collection of oversight authorities and inspection services 
has been established, ranging from market regulators to 
environmental and labour law inspectorates.56 These 
national oversight authorities and inspectorates were 
originally also responsible for supervising compliance with 
European regulations. They were the ones who ensured 
that regulations agreed in Brussels were also implemented 
in and by the member states – at least on paper. 
In practice, it has turned out to be rather difficult to ensure 
that the same rules are actually implemented in the same 
way in and by all the EU member states. National 
oversight authorities and inspectorates frequently face 
two major challenges in their role as “extended arms of 
Brussels” – as they may increasingly be perceived. First, 
they may lack the required capacity (in terms of know-
ledge, information, experience, and resources) to oversee 
55  We thank Eva Berkhuijsen and Martijn van der Steen for their  
helpful comments on an earlier version of this contribution.
56  In the following, we refer to both inspection and oversight, because 
these tasks or functions in practice flow into one another to some 
extent. Our main focus is the national inspection service that is ac-
tive in monitoring compliance with safety and quality regulations; 
we concentrate less on issues of market regulation.
compliance with European rules. Second, even if they do 
have adequate amounts of the right kinds of capacities, 
there may be a lack of political and public backing for 
enforcement of European regulations within EU member 
states. For both these reasons, national oversight activities 
and structures vary widely, in their nature as well as their 
magnitude. 
Such differences are by no means always problematic. 
Indeed, they might even be advisable, for example, if 
“local” circumstances demand a particular approach or if 
national-level ownership is needed to ensure compliance. 
In other cases, however, more uniformity in oversight is 
needed. To protect workers and consumers throughout 
Europe, it is not enough simply to have European and 
national regulations on the books; coordination and 
monitoring of their enforcement is also needed. Moreover, 
to secure a level playing field for businesses, a measure of 
alignment or even cooperation is needed between 
inspectorates across national borders. 
Establishing such coordination and cooperation is easier 
said than done, especially in regulatory domains in which 
there are frequent disagreements. Nonetheless, in virtually 
all policy domains, including those in which Europe is just 
beginning to get involved, like education and healthcare, 
some alignment is already appearing among inspectorates 
in the ways they conduct oversight. In domains where 
European cooperation has a longer history, extensive 
partnerships between inspectorates may be observed, and 
even a degree of centralization at the European level via 
European networks or EU agencies. The question, then, is 
not so much whether national inspectorates will coope-
rate, but rather when they will do so, why and how 
precisely. That question, or rather, these questions are the 
central topic of this contribution.57 
We argue that while cooperation might appear to be the 
only sensible way forward, it is not necessarily logical, and 
it certainly is not always simple or even recommendable. 
More cooperation between national inspectorates is not 
always better. When deciding whether more cooperation 
is needed or desirable, the nature and scope of the 
problems being addressed and the societal outcomes 
being pursued must form the starting point. The kinds of 
capacities to be drawn on and the types of benefits 
expected from cross-border cooperation are further 
considerations. Finally, there is the question of what 
support will be needed for cooperation, both at the 
national level and to maintain cooperation across borders. 
57  To answer these questions, we rely on academic literature, previous 
scientific research on implementation, enforcement, oversight and 
compliance in the EU, and personal communication with Dutch and 
foreign inspectors.
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Cooperation between inspectorates, then, constitutes a 
challenge, but it also offers a strategy for attaining 
compliance with European regulations in the domains of 
safety and quality. Cooperation as a strategy requires not 
only the right mindset among the inspectors and inspecto-
rates seeking to work together, but also the right skillset 
– and it is precisely on this latter point that many gains 
remain to be made.
Section 2 sets out some reasons, both functional and 
institutional, why inspectorates might work together. 
Section 3 then examines the forms such cooperation may 
take, from informal and ad hoc to more formally structu-
red arrangements. Throughout sections 2 and 3, we seek 
to identify and better understand some of the differences 
between countries and between industries and economic 
and social sectors. Section 4 closes this contribution by 
presenting a number of conclusions, as well as possible 
next steps in discussions on oversight of European 
regulations and internationalization of national 
inspectorates.
What reasons for cooperation could 
there be?
Cooperation takes time and energy, and success is by no 
means guaranteed. There are many potential barriers and 
constraints: from differences in language and identity, to 
the simple fact of distance, as well as possible losses of 
organizational autonomy. So why would inspectorates 
cooperatewith other inspectorates at all, especially across 
national borders?
Undoubtedly, inspectorates are not always in a position to 
choose whether or not to cooperate with foreign counter-
parts; they sometimes must, for official or practical 
reasons. Pressure to cooperate may be applied from 
different directions. The European Commission, for 
example, in its capacity as guardian of the EU treaties, may 
intervene directly in the way national oversight systems 
are organized. Sometimes this intervention concerns 
cooperation between oversight authorities, including (or 
especially) in the implementation of European directives. 
Special interest groups may also apply pressure. As such, 
collectives of businesses or citizens may perceive cross-
border cooperation between inspectorates as a solution to 
problems they are experiencing (including an overly 
cumbersome regulatory burden). 
In most cases, aside from external pressure, it is ultimately 
(as yet) up to the inspectorates themselves to decide 
whether to cooperate with other inspectorates, within or 
even beyond the European level. National inspectorates 
may have a range of reasons for doing so. We look at 
these, drawing an analytical distinction between functio-
nal considerations and institutional motives (see Figure 1 
for an overview).
Functional considerations
Broadly speaking, there are several functional reasons for 
inspectorates to work together. Mutual learning is the first. 
Together inspectorates can be smarter, because coopera-
tion increases the availability of knowledge, information, 
and opportunities. Second is efficiency, as it may be more 
economical to conduct oversight together. A third reason 
is effectiveness. Working together, inspectorates are 
better able to achieve their oversight objectives. We take a 
closer look at these three functional reasons below, 
illustrating them with a few examples.
Learning The most common reason for cooperation is to 
learn from others’ experiences and bring together know-
ledge and information. Indeed, availability of knowledge 
and information varies widely between inspectorates. 
Smaller inspectorates often have particular difficulty in 
acquiring the right expertise and information. For some 
inspectorates, such as those in the most recently acceded 
EU member states, this problem may be compounded by 
short institutional track records and lack of experience. 
Moreover, inspectorates in much of Europe are under 
pressure to downsize, which may deprive them of expertise 
they have built up over years. Knowledge transfer and 
sharing of information and experience may offer a solution. 
Ultimately, such exchanges can lead to mutual learning, 
convergence of oversight practices, and a more level playing 
field across Europe in the conduct of oversight. 
One of the best-known cooperative frameworks for 
promoting learning among national inspectorates is the 
EU network for Implementation and Enforcement of 
Environmental Law (IMPEL).58 A primary reason for 
establishing IMPEL in 1992 was to stimulate uniform 
implementation of EU legislation and regulations in the 
area of environmental policy. The Food Law Enforcement 
Practitioners (FLEP) network is another group of oversight 
authorities set up in the early 1990s to facilitate informal 
information exchange and promote learning and coopera-
tion, this time focused on food safety regulation. Among 
FLEP’s aims are to foster mutual trust and develop 
practical solutions to bottlenecks encountered in imple-
menting EU regulations.59 From 1990 to 2010, the network 
met regularly to discuss various oversight issues. In 2014, it 
began to work more closely with the Heads of European 
Food Safety Agencies network, in addition to resuming 
meetings of the FLEP as a network. 
58  For more information about IMPEL, see http://impel.eu/. See also 
Martens (2006).
59  For more information on FLEP, see http://www.flep.org/
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The International Liaison Group of Government Railway 
Inspectorates (ILGGRI) is an informal network, in this case 
bringing together railway oversight authorities. Since 1997, 
it has provided a forum for sharing knowledge and 
experience on safety and interoperability, among other 
things.60 Unlike IMPEL and FLEP, ILGGRI operates mainly  
as a platform to enable national inspectorates to keep in 
contact with one another, rather than as a vehicle for 
promoting uniform implementation or harmonization of 
oversight. That latter purpose is served by the European 
Railway Agency, a more formally structured and relatively 
independent EU agency set up in 2004.61
The Standing International Conference of Inspectorates 
(SICI) and the European Partnership for Supervisory 
Organisations in Health Services and Social Care (EPSO) 
likewise function as platforms. SICI is a formal cooperative 
structure that now involves some 32 education inspectora-
tes in Europe and has a relatively long, some 20-year 
history. Within SICI, inspectorates exchange information, 
foster professionalization of education inspectors, and 
carry out joint inspection and evaluation projects.62 
Since the mid-1990s, EPSO similarly has stimulated 
exchanges of knowledge and information, both formal 
and informal, in addition to promoting cooperation in 
monitoring the quality of healthcare.63 Nonetheless, 
oversight in healthcare remains primarily nationally 
organized, and the EPSO network has kept its distance 
from attempts to organize cross-border oversight.64  
That said, the growing mobility of doctors throughout the 
European Union is stimulating some national inspectorates 
to set up information-sharing mechanisms. The idea is to 
draw up and maintain “blacklists” of medical specialists 
banned from exercising their profession due to malprac-
tice in one country, to prevent them from migrating and 
continuing to practice in another country. 
 
Efficiency Working together often brings efficiency gains. 
Cooperation may deliver scale advantages, both for the 
inspectorates and for the industry or enterprise supervi-
sed. For instance, if an inspectorate adopts the findings of 
a cooperating inspectorate, it does not have to do all 
inspections itself, leading to cost savings. As such, national 
inspectorates might join forces in a European network or a 
European oversight agency. Sharing scarce resources and 
60  For more information on ILGGRI, see http://www.ilggri.org/
61  For more information on ERA, see http://www.era.europa.eu/.  
On EU agencies, see, for instance, Groenleer (2009; 2011), Groenleer 
et al. (2010), and Busuioc et al. (2012).
62  For more information on SICI, see http://www.sici-inspectorates.eu/
63  For more information on EPSO, see http://www.epsonet.eu/
64  Personal communication with Dutch health care inspector
jointly conducting enforcement activities may even enable 
national oversight bodies to be reduced in size – though 
cooperation also has costs, so-called transaction costs, 
which are not always recovered in the short term. 
Enterprises supervised might also gain efficiency benefits 
from cooperation. After all, if they no longer needed to be 
inspected by 28 (or more) different regulatory authorities, 
their regulatory burden could be considerably reduced.
Some of these benefits are observed among the inspecto-
rates participating in the EU Offshore Oil and Gas 
Authorities Group (EUOAG). They exchange experiences 
and expertise related to, for example, the safety of 
offshore drilling platforms.65 The cooperating inspectora-
tes learn from one another, and their cooperation 
produces efficiency gains. For example, a mobile drilling 
platform certified in one member state could ideally be 
used in another member state without further inspection 
barriers. After all, if standards are the same, relying on 
another partner’s certification should not pose a problem, 
and no extra expenditures would need to be made to have 
a platform re-inspected.66 Though this rationale makes 
sense from an efficiency perspective, as we will see later, 
the situation becomes considerably more complex when 
accountability enters the equation. 
The Food and Veterinary Office of the European Union 
(FVO) organizes audits and inspections in the member 
states, in the areas of food safety and animal health, 
among others. The aim of these audits and inspections is 
to ensure adequate implementation and compliance with 
EU legislation and regulations. Though these controls 
concern national oversight systems rather than individual 
businesses, this meta-oversight role, in theory, could also 
produce cost savings for the supervised industry, as well as 
for the member states, for example, by preventing 
inconsistencies in the way European regulations are 
applied.67 
Whereas the efficiency argument was not the primary 
reason for establishing EUOAG and FVO, efficiency 
considerations have played a key role in the creation, 
under EU law, of a number of decentralized EU agencies. 
Thus, the European Medicines Agency (EMA), the 
European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), and the 
European Chemicals Agency (ECHA) in many cases operate 
as central authorities for, respectively, authorization of 
new medicines, certification of airplane parts (among 
them parts for the Airbus 380, which is the first airplane to 
65  For more information on EUOAG, see http://euoag.jrc.ec.europa.eu/
66  Personal communication with Dutch mines inspector
67  For more information on FVO, see http://ec.europa.eu/food/
food_veterinary_office/index_en.htm. See also Lezaun & Groenleer 
(2006).
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be fully certified by Europe), and assessment of chemical 
substances.68 
EASA and the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), 
similar to FVO, conduct inspections in the EU member 
states. Or, to be more precise, of the member states and 
the way that national inspectorates enforce European 
regulations. When individual businesses are inspected, it is 
almost always done in close cooperation with a national 
inspectorate, in teams made up of both national experts 
and EASA or EMSA officials. In fact, research has shown 
that, rather than replacing national oversight bodies, EU 
agencies like EASA and EMSA are (as yet) more accurately 
considered complementary to the national inspectorates 
– which begs the question of whether any real efficiency 
gains are ultimately made. Nonetheless, these agencies do 
have considerable added value in stimulating mutual 
learning processes, though in this regard they are little 
different from the European networks.69
Effectiveness Even though EU agencies are being given 
ever-broader inspection mandates and competences, 
effective approaches to addressing cross-border problems 
nonetheless begin with coordination and cooperation 
between countries and national inspectorates. To oversee, 
for example, foreign-based businesses operating 
(temporarily) within national borders and to prevent such 
businesses from evading regulations, national inspectora-
tes need to share information, bilaterally, with foreign 
counterparts, or multilaterally, via the networks in which 
they are organized. Inspection services are thus dependent 
on one another.70 Without information, there is no way for 
them to guarantee minimum standards of safety or quality 
within their own national borders. 
Dependencies between national inspectorates will likely 
continue to increase over time, particularly in view of the 
constant growth of cross-border trade and transactions, 
especially in industries and sectors where oversight issues 
are intrinsically transboundary in nature. Furthermore, as 
interactions between inspectorates expand in the context 
of European networks and EU agencies, their cooperation 
will inevitably give rise to new European rules for dealing 
with the risks associated with cross-border trade and 
transactions. Indeed, studies suggest that interactions 
tend to become more institutionalized over time and 
gradually start to encompass a wider spectrum of 
activities.71 From the perspective of one or a few member 
68  For more information on EMA, EASA and ECHA, see http://www.
ema.europa.eu/ema/; https://easa.europa.eu/; http://echa.europa.
eu/nl/. See also Pierre & Peters (2009) and Groenleer et al. (2010)
69  Groenleer et al. (2010)
70  Van Boetzelaer & Princen (2012)
71  Thatcher & Coen (2008), Groenleer (2011), Levi-Faur (2011)
states, mutual dependencies can thus be an important 
driver for even broader cooperation, towards, what can be 
called, an ever closer implementation and enforcement 
Union. We provide a few examples below.
Countries have worked together in the Euro Contrôle 
Route (ECR) network since the early 1990s. This network 
was established by the Benelux countries to harmonize 
oversight of cross-border road transport, its ultimate aim 
being better road safety. Since its inception, the network 
has carried out joint “check weeks” focused on a specific 
theme, foreign traineeships for inspectors, and informa-
tion exchange, among other activities. The network has 
grown from three members to now encompass fourteen 
countries, with five additional countries holding observer 
status.72 It represents an important step toward joint 
action on commonly perceived problems, as well as a 
shared understanding of the need for partnership to tackle 
the issues. The situation is somewhat different in our next 
two examples.
The first regards oversight of international animal 
transport. This is an area in which inspection intensities 
have differed markedly between EU member states. Some 
countries inspect on a routine basis, while others inspect 
only sporadically. Businesses know this and may instruct 
their lorry drivers to detour through another country to 
avoid likely inspections. This adversely affects both animal 
welfare and the functioning of the internal market. With 
cooperation, for example, in the framework of the Heads 
of European Food Safety Agencies network, attempts are 
being made to end these kinds of undesirable outcomes. 
This has turned out to be rather difficult, however, because 
ending abuses requires countries to demonstrate a 
willingness not only to exchange knowledge, ideas, and 
best practices, but also to adjust their oversight practices. 
This is something they are not always prepared to do.73 
Another example is monitoring the safety of products in 
line with the applicable European directives. Machines, for 
example, have to be approved before they can be used in 
Europe. Oversight of the approval process is done 
according to the “initiating country” principle. That means 
it is up to the inspection service of the country that 
considers a machine to be unsafe to call its manufacturer 
to account, regardless of whether the machine was 
actually produced in that country. Implementation of this 
principle has turned out to be far from uniform, despite 
establishment of a so-called “Administrative Cooperation” 
(ADCO) working group of member state representatives to 
discuss concerns and issues.74 
72  For more information on ECR, see http://www.euro-controle-route.eu/
73  Personal communication with Dutch food safety inspector
74  Personal communication with Dutch labour inspector
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Indeed, differences between national oversight organizati-
ons are still considerable, even just considering national 
regulators. The Netherlands, for example, has six 
oversight authorities on markets, while in Germany there 
are some 80, and the United Kingdom has more than 200. 
This diversity and the large numbers of agencies involved 
make alignment difficult to start with. The step towards 
cooperation then becomes a particularly complex affair. 
While a number of national inspectorates have actively 
sought cooperation with foreign counterparts, most 
inspectorates have done so only to a very limited extent or 
in an extremely selective way. This variation is explained, 
apart from the differences between national oversight 
systems, by diverse factors, among them the economic 
importance of a supervised industry or sector within a 
country, geographic location, perceived risks, capacity to 
work together (human, financial and material), and 
relationships with other (national) regulations. The priority 
given to cooperation will be a result of these different 
factors, though the national regulatory culture and 
oversight philosophy, alongside other experiences with 
cooperation at the national level (which we return to in the 
conclusion), also play a role.
Institutional motives
Beyond functional considerations, inspectorates may have 
institutional motives for cooperating across borders.75 
First, oversight authorities may be stronger together; that 
is, they might cooperate to maintain their influence, or to 
further expand it. Cooperation could give them greater 
clout, for example, vis-a-vis policy bodies within their own 
country. Second, cooperation may generate legitimacy and 
build reputations. We phrase this as “garnering support”. 
A third and final motive for cooperation, though more a 
concern of political leaders and policymakers than of the 
inspectorates themselves, is avoidance of responsibility in 
the event that something does go wrong, often termed 
“blame avoidance” in the literature. Thus, cooperation 
may offer a way to shift or avoid blame.76 These three 
motives are elaborated briefly below, again illustrated 
with a few examples.
Maintaining or expanding influence A first institutional reason 
for cooperation is national inspectorates’ desire to 
maintain or even expand their influence, first, on 
European legislative processes and, second, on national 
implementation processes. At the front-end of a policy 
75  These institutional motives are difficult to disentangle from func-
tional considerations as they are often closely related. For research-
ers, moreover, institutional motives are not easy to unmask as 
inspectorates have an incentive to camouflage their intentions. See 
also Groenleer et al. (2014)
76  Hood (2010)
process, inspectorates might “upload” information, for 
example, providing comments and inputs on Commission 
proposals for laws and regulations. This might be done 
formally in an advisory role, such as in the case of IMPEL 
or one of the different ADCOs associated with implemen-
tation of specific directives, or informally, such as in the 
case of EPSO. 
At the back-end of a policy process, after “downloading” 
the rules, national inspectorates are responsible for 
enforcement. In this role, they might bring in specific 
expertise that policy bodies lack, to ensure that the 
regulations established are ultimately also enforceable. 
Cooperation may strengthen their position, allowing them 
to play a more central role in the processes of crafting 
regulation and ensuring feasible oversight, internationally 
but also at the national level.77
Garnering support Cooperation often reflects positively on 
inspectorates. Policy bodies may perceive inspectorates 
that seek contact with foreign counterparts as being 
outwardly oriented and willing to learn from others. 
Cooperating across borders may therefore foster support 
for the inspectorates’ work in key national arenas. 
Cooperation can strengthen inspectorates’ international 
reputation as well, while also raising their stature in the 
eyes of those supervised. 
While inspectorates often seek to learn from foreign 
colleagues, cooperating may furthermore provide them 
opportunities to actively showcase oversight practices 
developed nationally (or bilaterally). By spotlighting 
certain practices via cross-border cooperation, wider 
support for the practices could be generated throughout 
Europe. This may have long-term benefits: the better the 
institutional “fit” between what is already happening at 
the national level and the practices that are considered 
desirable in Europe, the smaller the potential adjustment 
costs of making any changes necessary to stay in step with 
advancing Europeanization. 
Avoiding blame Inspectorates conduct oversight to minimize 
social or economic risks, for example, by ensuring that 
products and services comply with quality and safety 
criteria. This does not mean that nothing ever goes wrong, 
though politicians might like to suggest otherwise. If 
things do go wrong, politicians often hasten to point to 
the inspectorate as to blame. The (simplistic and some-
what opportunistic) conclusion frequently drawn is that 
the oversight system failed and therefore needs to be 
reorganized. For example, the recent financial crisis 
brought to light serious gaps in regulation at the European 
level. These allowed banks and countries to take enor-
77  Egeberg (Ed.) (2006)
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mous risks, to the detriment of the entire European Union 
and spurring a wave of new supranational, European-level 
regulation.78 
If oversight is organized at the European level, blame can be 
simply shifted to a – in citizens’ eyes – relatively anonymous 
and rather abstract European network or European agency, 
like EFSA, which has the thankless and almost impossible 
task of preventing food safety emergencies such as the BSE 
crisis and the dioxin scandal.79 More generally, cooperation 
within networks or agencies at the European level can allow 
difficult decisions to be made without national actors 
having to bear the full brunt of any (negative) consequen-
ces. This may be convenient, for example, on regulatory 
issues that elicit resistance in society, such as the question of 
whether genetically modified food should be allowed into 
the European market. 
Nonetheless, if something does goes wrong – say, there is 
an incident involving the earlier-mentioned mobile drilling 
platform (or a food scandal or a train accident) – politici-
ans and, particularly, citizens are still apt to point first to 
the national inspection service. Or at least, this is what is 
assumed by inspectorates, including the inspection service 
in charge of the offshore oil and gas industry.80 The 
national inspectorate may itself be confident that its 
colleague inspectorates (or the private certification bodies 
that they have inspected) have done adequate inspections 
and issued bona fide certifications, but the political risk is 
too great to sail blindly on trust. 
In the end, it is national inspectorates that are held 
responsible for implementing EU legislation and regulati-
ons and ensuring compliance with them.81 This, despite 
the fact that in some cases they may no longer carry out 
the requisite tasks themselves or even possess all the 
competences needed to effectively fulfil the mandate 
because these have been shifted to the EU level.
What types of cooperation can be distinguished?
Once national inspectorates decide to cooperate, much 
depends on the arrangements they choose for doing so. 
Cooperation may be structured in a variety of ways, 
though these are certainly not all heavy-handed arrange-
ments. We describe here four “ideal types”82 of coopera-
tion between inspectorates: intergovernmental European 
78  Groenleer et al. (2014)
79  Lezaun & Groenleer (2006), Boin et al. (2014)
80  Personal communication with Dutch mines inspector
81  Personal communication with Dutch transportation inspector
82  These are hypothetical or abstract types, not perfect or optimal 
types, in the sense that they are formed from the characteristics of 
the phenomenon of cooperation, but they do not correspond to all 
of the characteristics of any one particular case of cooperation.
cooperation outside the EU framework; informal and 
formal European/EU networks, including ADCOs; indepen-
dent European agencies; and supranational cooperation 
under the auspices of the European Commission (see 
Figure 2 for an overview).
The distinctions drawn, however, are mainly for analytical 
purposes. In practice, numerous additional “types” may be 
identified. Moreover, forms of cooperation in oversight 
develop continually over time, often independent of the 
underlying issue or problem addressed. In general, 
cooperation has been found to expand over time to 
include an ever-wider scope of activities. Interactions 
between cooperating parties also tend to take on a more 
structured character over time. They become more 
formalized, as well as including greater numbers of 
participants. Finally, the decisions made within coopera-
tive structures tend to become more binding over time.83
Intergovernmental European cooperation outside the EU 
framework
Cooperation does not necessarily start in one of the most 
intensive forms. It often begins with informal contacts 
between one or a few staff members of different inspecto-
rates, for example, following a (chance) meeting at a 
conference. Or, inspectors may find they need certain 
information or expertise, which prompts them to consult on 
an ad hoc basis with counterparts in other member states. 
Taking cooperation a step further, more systematic 
mechanisms for exchanging data might be established 
between two or more national inspectorates, often in 
response to a concrete problem and with a clear objective 
in mind. Such exchanges could be accomplished through 
consultations or reports, but also via a dedicated (ICT) 
system set up especially for the purpose. While this kind of 
cooperation may not necessarily be part of the EU 
framework, it may have a link with the European Union, 
for example, using EU administrative systems.
The Polish labour law inspectorate and the Dutch social 
affairs and employment inspectorate, for example, signed 
a cooperation agreement to address labour market 
abuses, a topic that both are keenly interested in. The 
inspectorates exchange data on sham arrangements, 
unscrupulous employment agencies, and businesses that 
have violated labour laws.84 They do this via IMI, the 
Internal Market Information System, a computer database 
set up by the European Commission for sharing informa-
83  Thatcher & Coen (2008), Groenleer (2011), Levi-Faur (2011)
84  Personal communication with Dutch labour inspector. See also  
the press release (in Dutch): https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/actueel/
nieuws/2013/12/18/poolse-arbeidsinspectie-en-inspectie-szw-
sluiten-samenwerkingsovereenkomst 
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market legislation.85
Various European cooperative arrangements among 
inspectorates have been founded on an intergovernmen-
tal basis, established through, for instance, administra-
tive agreements or memorandums of understanding 
(MoUs). These are often set up by a select group of 
European countries, though non-EU countries may also 
be involved, such as Norway or Switzerland. Typically, 
administrative support is provided by a secretariat based 
in one of the participating countries. The costs of such 
cooperative arrangements are usually shared among the 
participants. 
Examples of these are the above-mentioned 
International Liaison Group of Government Railway 
Inspectorates (ILGGRI), the European Forum of Food Law 
Enforcement Practitioners (FLEP), and the European 
Partnership for Supervisory Organisations in Health 
Services and Social Care (EPSO). These intergovernmen-
tal networks exchange knowledge and experience on 
subjects of mutual interest, they discuss relevant 
subjects and developments in their field and coordinate 
further thinking. Sometimes they may also provide 
inputs to European agencies; for example, ILGGRI 
contributes information on railway matters to the 
European Railway Agency (ERA). Or they may make use 
of EU agency facilities; for example, the European 
85   For more information on IMI, see http://ec.europa.eu/internal_
market/imi-net/index_en.htm
Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) hosts a database of 
inspected ships for the Paris MoU on Port State Control.86 
Another example is Euro Contrôle Route, the earlier-men-
tioned network for road transport inspections established 
by the Benelux countries.87 Within the network, partici-
pants seek to align their road transport inspection 
activities, in order to increase their effectiveness. Though 
the agreements reached are not binding, they reflect a 
gradual merging of enforcement actions through mutual 
consultation, cooperation, and joint initiatives.
Informal and formal European networks, including the 
ADCOs
European networks of national inspectorates have been 
created in many policy fields.88 The ways these networks are 
organized vary widely. Some networks are informal and 
dominated by the member states, while others are more 
formalized and under the strong influence of the European 
Commission or are coordinated by an EU agency.89
Initially, IMPEL operated as an informal network of 
European environmental inspectorates, but it has since 
been formalized, acquiring an independent legal status 
86  For more information on the Paris MoU, see  
https://www.parismou.org/
87  For more information on ECR, see http://www.euro-controle-route.
eu/site/
88  See, for an overview, Dutch Board of Inspectorates (2009). 
89  Coen & Thatcher (2008), Börzel & Heard-Lauréote (2009),  
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and official recognition via an MoU with the European 
Commission. At present, in addition to facilitating 
exchanges of information, knowledge, and experience, the 
network organizes training courses, workshops, and 
exchange programs; drafts technical guidelines; establi-
shes minimum criteria for inspections; and organizes joint 
or coordinated inspections. Inspectorates and their 
inspectors work together on specific cases, which the 
inspectors involved consider to be one of the major 
reasons for IMPEL’s success.90
 
In addition to informal networks, a range of more 
formalized European networks has been established in 
recent decades. This establishment, in practice, has often 
come down to the formalization of existing informal 
cooperative arrangements via European legislation. In 
addition to these, a number of European working groups 
have been set up to implement EU directives related to the 
internal market. These are the so-called “ADCOs” 
(Administrative Cooperation Groups), in which representa-
tives of both national inspectorates and the European 
Commission are active. For example, in the framework of 
the Radio and Telecommunications Terminal Equipment 
Directive (R&TTE), the ADCO for R&TTE serves as a forum 
for cooperation and information exchange between 
national market oversight authorities.91
Formal networks serve various objectives.92 One of the 
most important of these is coordinating implementation 
of European legislation and regulations. National 
authorities for consumer protection have worked together 
in the Consumer Protection Cooperation (CPC) network 
since 2007. The aim of this formal network is to bring a 
quick and effective halt to commercial practices that 
violate European consumer law,93 particularly in situations 
where customers and businesses are based in different EU 
member states. Member state representatives meet three 
to four times each year in the CPC Committee, which 
serves as a platform for discussing, for example, the 
development of common approaches to oversight through 
means such as common standards and guidelines. This 
committee also discusses “enforcement action plans,” 
including coordinated annual Internet sweeps.94
90  Personal communication with Dutch and Belgian environment 
inspectors
91  For more information on the R&TTE, see http://ec.europa.eu/
growth/sectors/electrical-engineering/rtte-directive/index_en.htm
92  Lavrijssen & Hancher (2009)
93  For more information on the CPC network, see http://ec.europa.eu/
internal_market/scoreboard/performance_by_governance_tool/
consumer_protection_cooperation_network/index_en.htm
94  Personal communication with Dutch consumer protection enforcer
Formal networks can additionally provide national 
inspectorates a platform for reaching agreement on how 
EU legislation and regulations will be implemented, 
therefore promoting harmonization of operational 
processes. They may also offer early opportunities to 
identify bottlenecks in implementation of European rules 
or to request clarifications from the Commission if 
European rules are unclear. Furthermore, they can 
facilitate identification of best practices and the conduct of 
peer reviews, such as in the IMPEL Review Initiative and 
PROSAFE Joint Actions.95 PROSAFE, the Product Safety 
Forum of Europe, promotes cooperation among European 
market surveillance authorities. In addition to providing 
training and improving communication between member 
states, it also coordinates product-specific market 
surveillance activities for greater oversight efficiency and 
provides opportunities for more in-depth study of best 
practices.
Best practices and peer reviews are seldom binding, but 
they may nonetheless significantly impact policy, both in 
the member states and especially at the European level. 
The Commission’s involvement in formal networks has 
cultivated close linkages with representatives of national 
inspectorates. This also provides inspectorates a channel 
for submitting recommendations for adapting regulations; 
and the Commission may request advice from inspectora-
tes based on their practical expertise. This is observed, for 
example, in the Senior Labour Inspectors’ Committee 
(SLIC)96 and the ECHA’s Enforcement Forum.97 SLIC helps 
the Commission monitor enforcement of occupational 
health and safety legislation; in the ECHA’s Enforcement 
Forum national inspectorates advise on regulations for 
safe use of chemical substances. 
A major advantage of European networks is the bottom-
up character of the cooperation, which promotes 
acceptance among national inspectorates. Member states 
and their national inspectorates are responsible for 
implementing oversight within their own national 
borders.98 This is, at the same time, an Achilles heel of 
cooperation via networks, regardless of whether they are 
informal or formally structured.99 Because network 
cooperation is often voluntary and decisions are not 
always binding, national authorities are still free to 
95  For more information on the IMPEL Review Initiative and PROSAFE 
Joint Actions, see http://www.impel.eu/projects/impel-review-
initiative-iri-2015-programme/; http://www.prosafe.org/
96  For more information on SLIC, see http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.
jsp?catId=148&intPageId=685
97  For more information on ECHA’s Enforcement Forum, see http://
echa.europa.eu/nl/about-us/who-we-are/enforcement-forum
98  Eberlein & Grande (2005)
99  Kelemen & Tarrant (2011)
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organize their implementation of EU legislation and 
regulations as they see fit, with all the attendant potential 
consequences for cross-border inconsistencies. If 
difficulties do arise, the European Commission usually has 
few qualms in proposing stricter requirements for national 
oversight or even farther-reaching Europeanization of 
oversight, for example, through EU agencies.100
European Union agencies
The term “agency” is a source of considerable confusion, 
because the word is used for different kinds of entities 
within the European Union. The agencies referred to here 
are autonomous entities with an independent legal status 
under European public law. They are usually established by 
means of a regulation.101 At present, there are more than 
30 such agencies, all active in various policy areas and with 
a variety of tasks and mandates. Most agencies are not 
based in Brussels, but operate out of other EU member 
states. In total, they employ more than 5,000 staff and 
have aggregate annual expenditures of more than one 
billion euros.
Most agencies have a limited mandate, though a few have 
broader competences. As such, they might make decisions 
in individual cases, such as on authorization of medicines 
or food products, or they may be responsible for carrying 
out oversight, for example, in the aviation or maritime 
industries. EMSA, the earlier-mentioned agency for 
maritime safety, seeks to ensure uniform conduct of 
inspections and use of the same inspection criteria and 
reporting procedures by inspectors across the European 
Union. It seeks to achieve these goals through workshops 
and other means.102 
Given the influence of the existing national authorities, EU 
agencies are frequently organized as “network” organiza-
tions, to complement rather than replace member state 
authorities.103 Through the networks that they coordinate 
and, at the same time, are a member of, the agencies are 
well positioned to contribute to increasing stakeholder 
involvement and enhancing information exchange and the 
sharing of good practices. 
Initial experiences of EU agencies suggest that their 
greatest added value lies in stimulating mutual learning 
processes between national authorities and in serving as 
platforms for discussion and debate between European 
and national stakeholders.104 In this sense, EU agencies’ 
100  Pierre & Peters (2009), Groenleer (2011)
101  Groenleer (2009)
102  Groenleer et al. (2010)
103 Curtin & Egeberg (2008), Groenleer (2009), Busuioc et al. (2011), 
Busuioc et al. (Eds.) (2012)
104 Zito (2009), Groenleer et al. (2010), Sabel & Zeitlin (Eds.) (2010)
contribution differs little from that of European networks 
of national authorities.105 But the role of agencies does 
appear to be growing, not necessarily centralizing, but 
federalizing tasks. For example, decisions made by EASA, 
the agency for aviation safety, can be binding.106 And, not 
unimportant, EASA coordinates joint inspections.
 
Supranational cooperation under the auspices of the 
Commission
No single European agencies have, as yet, been establis-
hed to swallow up national authorities.107 The most 
intensive form of cooperation is the central conduct of 
inspections at the EU level. Cooperation within the Food 
and Veterinary Office (FVO) comes closest to this. In this 
supranational arrangement, oversight authorities from all 
EU member states have joined forces under the auspices 
of the Commission to undertake joint “meta” inspection 
activities.108 
Nonetheless, it would be an exaggeration to label the FVO 
a European inspection agency. National inspectorates still 
exist and remain in charge of the foremost inspection 
tasks within the member states. But in conducting their 
work, they are more bound to uniform rules and procedu-
res. Indeed, FVO inspections are often additional to the 
inspections already scheduled and carried out by national 
authorities. They are therefore frequently perceived as an 
extra regulatory burden, by both the businesses supervi-
sed and the national inspectorates.109
Even if member state authorities were eventually 
absorbed within a single European-level agency, it is still 
unlikely that national inspectorates would entirely 
disappear. An EU agency is unlikely to possess the 
necessary knowledge of the local context, to say nothing 
of language divides, which may also constitute major 
barriers. It is more likely that national authorities will 
continue to exist, but develop, for example, into regional 
offices or centres of excellence in a particular field. In the 
areas of food safety and aviation safety, for example, 
some national inspectorates can already be observed 
moving towards this focus on a more limited scope of 
specialized tasks, mindful that other tasks are already 
being performed through supranational cooperation, with 
the close involvement of the Commission, and sometimes 
even under its authority. 
 
105 Schout (2012)
106 Groenleer et al. (2010)
107 Thatcher & Coen (2008)
108 For more information on the FVO, see http://ec.europa.eu/food/
food_veterinary_office/index_en.htm
109 Personal communication with Dutch food safety inspector
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Conclusion: Cooperation as a strategy
This contribution sought to answer the questions posed in 
the introduction: when do national inspectorates 
cooperate, why do they do so, and how precisely. We 
found that cooperation is certainly not always logical, 
simple or even recommendable. The nature and scope of 
the problems addressed and the societal outcomes 
pursued must form the starting point for determining if 
cooperation is warranted. Is cross-border cooperation 
necessary and desirable given the problem to be addres-
sed? How much and what kind of cooperation should be 
sought to achieve the desired social effects? These are, in 
essence, questions about the appropriate level and extent 
of coordination and cooperation. Indeed, these are 
fundamental issues in the functioning of the European 
Union, not only with respect to decision-making but also 
with regard to implementation and enforcement of 
legislation and regulations. 
Cooperation, then, constitutes both a challenge and a 
strategy. Cooperation confronts national inspectorates 
with major dilemmas, for example, regarding how and 
where to invest time and energy in the short term, to 
improve effectiveness and efficiency in the long term. 
Moreover, cooperation involves risks, for example, 
because working together might eventually undermine 
national autonomy in determining how oversight of 
European regulations should be conducted. To attain 
compliance with European regulations in the field of safety 
and quality, national inspectorates have nonetheless 
risked the step towards more intensive cooperation with 
counterparts in other countries. Though inspectorates 
sometimes have no choice in the matter, functional 
considerations and institutional motives have tended to 
play a role in decisions to cooperate. Inspectorates often 
make a deliberate choice to work together, though the 
forms cooperation can take vary widely. 
Cooperation as a strategy requires not only the right 
mindset among the inspectors and inspectorates seeking 
to work together, it demands the right skillset as well. It is 
precisely on this latter point that many gains remain to be 
made. Inspectors tend to be mainly content-driven. They 
derive their motivation from, and are experts in, impro-
ving safety and quality in a particular industry or economic 
or social sector. For strategic cooperation within Europe, 
however, process management skills are needed, such as 
aptitude in bringing together different interests and 
preferences, ability to forge coalitions, capacity to 
How cooperate?
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Figure 2. Forms of cooperation.
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influence an agenda, and skill in lobbying European 
policymakers and in “uploading” information and 
knowledge. This calls for education and training of 
inspectors, both nationally and in cooperative arrange-
ments among countries, beyond a singular focus on the 
topic of inspection. 
In some countries, cooperation between national 
inspectorates is already common, for example, aimed at 
reducing regulatory burdens. Moreover, joint training of 
staff and common methodologies have been developed 
on overarching themes associated with inspection. The 
culture of cooperation that seems to be emerging from 
activities such as these may be an important explanatory 
factor for the outward orientation of inspectorates, and 
their willingness to join in cooperation with counterparts 
abroad. For that matter, the skills required for cooperation 
will already be better developed within countries with 
close national cooperation arrangements among inspec-
torates compared to countries lacking in such a culture of 
cooperation. 
Cooperation across organizational boundaries, starting 
with other inspectorates within the country and then 
expanding to the European or international stage, can 
therefore be viewed as a next step in the professionaliza-
tion of oversight systems and the individuals that are part 
of such systems, particularly inspectors. It allows inspecto-
rates to increase their capacity (not only in terms of 
knowledge, information, experiences, and resources, but 
also in terms of skills) to oversee compliance with 
European rules, and may help to boost political and public 
support for enforcement of European rules within their 
territories. Ultimately, cross-border cooperation between 
inspectorates can contribute to the reduction of unneces-
sary and undesirable differences between national 
inspectorates and their practices, and, therefore, to the 
improvement of the societal outcomes of regulatory 
oversight.
| 46 | 
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Introduction: The position of 
regulatory oversight in the state 
Every country has its own system of government and its 
own principles that underlie the design of state structures. 
Nonetheless, in all countries governments perform many 
of the same functions. Policy is developed, laws are 
crafted, laws are implemented and laws are enforced.  
The particular way these functions is fulfilled, however, is 
unique in each of the EU member states, meaning that we 
often have to look hard to distinguish where correspon-
ding functions are found. This is made even more difficult 
because different functions are often brought together 
within a single organization, and these organizations are 
unique not only to the country, but also to the particular 
economic or social sector they serve. For example, things 
might be organized differently for industry than for 
education. The difficulty I touch upon here is particularly 
evident in regulatory oversight. Its organization varies, not 
only from country to country, but also from sector to 
sector. It is difficult to distinguish any single pattern, which 
means that it is not easy to pinpoint appropriate partners 
and points of contact between countries. It therefore 
seems appropriate to explain for the Netherlands how the 
regulatory oversight system has developed in recent years 
and what the current status of the system is. 
In the Netherlands we can state that the function of 
regulatory oversight is performed by a separate govern-
ment organization in many social and economic sectors, 
and also that these government oversight organizations 
are often horizontally linked to one another. As such, there 
are – by way of example – specific oversight organizations 
for the different modes of transportation (rail, road, 
aviation and shipping), and these are then also incorporat-
ed together within one organization, which also includes 
other regulatory domains (the Human Environment and 
Transport Inspectorate). The Netherlands, moreover, has 
two distinct types of organizations for regulatory oversight 
called, respectively, ‘inspectorates’ and ‘authorities’. The 
inspectorates represent the older and thus more classic 
pattern of regulation, while the authorities are newer 
types of regulatory organizations, established in line with 
more recent policies geared towards supporting market 
mechanisms (often in the context of the European Union).
In the Netherlands there is growing appreciation for the 
craftsmanship that is required to adequately implement 
regulatory oversight. Overseeing compliance with the law 
is increasingly understood as a highly professional 
endeavour, which requires both knowledge of the 
regulated domain and expertise about the conduct of 
oversight itself. Specialist studies have therefore been 
established for regulatory inspectors. Academic research is 
also being done on the topic, and an academic-profes-
sional community has formed. Broadly speaking, we can 
state that the Netherlands, with regard to the substance of 
its regulatory oversight, is most at home with the 
International Best Practice Principles, as developed by the 
OECD in 2013.
Regulatory oversight requires a particular art of leadership 
and management. Interactions with society, too, in line 
with the need for oversight organizations to maintain 
greater openness and communication within the public 
arena, make particular demands of regulatory organiza-
tions that differ from those pertaining to the civil service 
apparatuses that directly support the political work of 
government. Even though regulatory organizations are 
bound up with politics, special significance is attached to 
their autonomous professional status and the relative 
independence necessary to maintain it. Oversight 
organizations’ degree of independence in relation to the 
politically accountable minister differs in the Netherlands 
between the traditional inspectorates, which are posi-
tioned closer to the minister, and the newer regulatory 
agencies, which as ‘authorities’ have been accorded 
greater independence by law. Despite a movement 
towards a more autonomous oversight system, it 
nonetheless remains part of the executive branch of 
government.
Regulatory oversight is, depending on the domain it is 
exercised in, also linked to the judicial system. In the past 
it was customary for the judiciary to impose any sanctions 
resulting from noncompliance. This, however, resulted in 
much inefficiency and even dismissal of many cases. In the 
Netherlands, moreover, the judicial system has been 
overburdened for many years, meaning that less serious 
offenses have received little attention. To solve the 
problem, the relationship between the regulatory system 
and the criminal justice system was reformed. Over the 
past ten years ‘administrative sanctions’ or penalties were 
thus added to Dutch regulators’ toolkit. This means that 
oversight authorities can now impose an immediate 
sanction on regulated enterprises that are found to be in 
infringement. Of course, major offenses are still deferred 
to the judicial apparatus.
A key characteristic of all public regulatory bodies in the 
Netherlands is their explicit focus on the interests of the 
citizenry. While in the past there was often ambiguity 
about the ‘motive’ for oversight, today its priority is 
undisputedly to protect citizens and public values. 
However, this explicit focus has raised certain expectations 
within society, and these are not always consonant with 
the actual positioning of the regulatory system as part of 
the executive branch of government.
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Background of the development of 
regulatory oversight in the 
Netherlands
In the latter half of the 1990s, regulatory oversight was a 
subject of intense political scrutiny in the Netherlands. 
This increased interest was a result of a number of 
developments. Of course, one of these was the general 
shift in views about the rightful role of government in 
society. Generally speaking, changing attitudes towards 
government’s role led, first, to a more primary role of 
social actors in society’s development and, second, to a 
reduction of direct government involvement – at least in a 
number of domains. In the political rhetoric of the times, 
this was often referred to as ‘more autonomy’ for civil 
society actors, which however was to be accompanied by 
‘more accountability’. In the form in which this ideology 
was expressed, regulators were ascribed key tasks, 
especially initially. Conceptualizations of this were not 
always sharply defined, however, certainly not in any 
consistent way.
Providing a precise definition of the nature of government 
activities has proven difficult to do. In the approach that I 
take in this essay, the notion of the ‘regulatory state’ 
serves as backdrop. I believe the policy of the Netherlands 
government since 1990 can best be categorized as such, 
especially during the period in which policymaking on 
regulatory oversight was being particularly emphasized. Of 
course, all sorts of other drivers of change have also 
influenced the regulatory system. The developments 
encapsulated in the New Public Management (NPM) have 
been especially pivotal in influencing how regulators work. 
Below I look at a number of triggers that provoked a new 
and ‘different’ way of thinking about regulatory oversight. 
The enforcement deficit
Laws exist to be complied with. In many cases, this doesn’t 
happen automatically. Compliance then has to be ‘helped along’ 
by the active intervention of, among others, regulators. This is 
often difficult, taxing and stressful. It is often tempting then to 
refrain from enforcement, thus ‘turning a blind eye’ to an 
infringement. 
The 1990s brought greater awareness of the need to more 
effectively enforce laws and regulations. During that 
period, the concept of the ‘enforcement deficit’ was 
emerged, which provided an empirical measure for failure 
to comply with statutory regulations. Within Dutch 
society, this represented a trend break. The Netherlands 
had been characterized by a high density of regulations, 
but also by a strongly developed ‘culture of tolerance’ and 
a certain permissiveness towards violations of the law. 
While civil disobedience was recognized as disobedience, 
it was also thought to be a bona fide aspect of the social 
system and therefore a necessary part of life. Graffiti, for 
example, was acknowledged as vandalism but nonethe-
less considered worthy of respect because of the aesthetic 
values it could be associated with. The Netherlands’ soft 
drugs policy offers probably the best illustration of the 
Dutch culture of tolerance. This tolerance, however, meant 
that the real significance of laws and regulations was often 
ambiguous, and there was ample space for selective 
application of rules. Enforcement organs, too, often 
turned a blind eye to violations and were flexible in the 
face of infringements. This, all together, resulted in a 
relaxed attitude towards rules. Violations and failures to 
comply were often noted, but remained without 
repercussions. 
Towards the start of the twenty-first century, the idea that 
there was too much regulation rapidly gained prominence 
– initially provoking a wave of noncompliance with the 
regulations on the books. Later this evolved into a selective 
approach in applying the tool of regulation. However, at this 
point, when regulations were established, adequate 
compliance with them was also insisted upon. Ensuring this 
was a task delegated, in particular, to agencies mandated to 
monitor compliance and to do so in such a way as to 
promote rule compliance. This demanded a very significant 
culture shift among enforcement organizations. For 
example, while many inspectorates had hitherto empha-
sized mainly advisory services and assistance, they were 
now required to sing a very different tune. 
Reviews were carried out and adjustments made within, 
for example, the inspection organizations, to establish 
modi operandi more in keeping with the new way of 
thinking. To accommodate the desire for more effective 
compliance, new forms of sanctions were also designed. 
One of these was the administrative enforcement 
provisions introduced to lighten the load on the judiciary 
system and also to bring about greater efficiency in the 
imposition of penalties. The Public Prosecutor opted for 
more selective application of criminal law, subsequent to 
an administratively elaborated intervention policy. 
Intervention pyramids and proportional sanctions were 
also introduced within Dutch regulatory organs. The policy 
focused on ensuring compliance was stimulated nation-
wide at the local government level, where enforcement 
activities were mandated to be carried out. Although 
numerous features of these developments were unique to 
the Netherlands, the developments overall transpired in 
step with a larger global trend towards more effective 
government action. In the maintenance of law and order, 
for example, concepts like ‘zero tolerance’ were being 
introduced. These developments formed, certainly in part, 
the backdrop against which regulatory enforcement policy 
in the Netherlands was elaborated.
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Regulatory policy consistent with political and social spirit of the 
times
There is a gap between policy and society. Many policymakers 
don’t know what is going on in society. They just swim along 
with the tide, reacting to whatever is the ‘topic of the day’ within 
the political establishment. There is a need for more ‘feedback’ 
from ‘reality’ and a broader basis than just the impressions 
formed during the latest ‘working visit’ or an incidental 
reprimand.
Inspectorates, and enforcement services more generally, 
can be viewed as front-line organizations. They are in 
direct contact with society and with the way that public 
tasks are supposed to be and can be implemented. They 
are the ones confronted with new circumstances and 
phenomena, and they are often the ones asked to ensure 
that new practices are brought into alignment with the 
law. Within society, there is an growing urge towards 
individuality and variety, and these same attributes are 
also demanded of regulatory enforcement, which is 
increasingly expected to be tailored to individual situati-
ons and circumstances. Yet, particularly against the 
backdrop of the earlier-mentioned expectation of strict 
compliance, this tends to be a source of friction within the 
enforcement services. 
Alongside the greater emphasis on the enforcement task 
of regulators as inspectors, greater accent has also been 
placed on the feedback role that regulators can play. 
Inspectorates typically become very knowledgeable about 
emerging developments in their field of activity and thus 
also within society. They can emit early-warning signals to 
the responsible government officials and policy organs. 
This is not a new role for inspectorates, but it is a role that 
has received new impetus in the current social context in 
which policy and government administration are frequent-
ly accused of having lost touch with the real concerns of 
society and citizens. Of course, this role also implies that 
within the inspection organizations, mechanisms and 
techniques have to be developed for providing this 
feedback efficiently and professionally. Not every 
experience, or every reprimand, or every conflict will be 
worth sharing. Inspection organizations have to approach 
this task with acumen and discrimination. In this regard, 
inspectorates have opted for reporting techniques such 
quarterly reviews for policy organs and annual reports that 
provide glimpses of emerging developments in their field 
of activity. 
In their communications with the national political 
establishment, too – and this means, as a rule, with 
ministries – new configurations have been developed that 
make it possible for inspection organizations to be 
involved in policymaking while maintaining respect for the 
regulator’s independent authority. The implementability 
and enforceability of new laws are also assessed, and the 
inspectorates play a role in this too. To perform the 
feedback role adequately, the inspectorates have develo-
ped new means of communication that, in principle, 
address a wide spectrum of social actors. The media, 
especially, as well as the political establishment, especially 
elected representatives, are especially important audien-
ces for this function of oversight. 
Recognizable achievements and accountability
How good is this hospital, this school, this university, and so on. 
Citizens have discovered that things aren’t equally good 
everywhere, and they want to know where the differences lie. 
This has generated considerable interest in ‘transparency’, which 
has then taken the form of ‘rankings’, ‘comparison tables’ and 
‘overviews’. Regulators possess a great deal of information 
about the institutions under their supervision. Citizens, with the 
aid of the media, want to ‘get hold of’ that knowledge.
Government has to demonstrate performance. Publicly 
financed organizations have to demonstrate ‘value for 
money’ to tax-payers. Public tasks have to be carried out 
efficiently. Unlike ‘market organizations’ there are no 
standard indicators for measuring the performance and 
effectiveness of organizations in the public domain. Or, 
better said: thinking in those terms wasn’t habitual prior to 
the 1990s. Performance was often measured by ‘input’ 
magnitudes. The more money went in, the more and the 
better the output was considered to be. Exactly how that 
conversion worked was left to the institution. Its processes 
for achieving its objectives were a black box. Even whether 
the objectives had really been achieved was no simple 
matter to determine. It was therefore frequently a subject of 
dispute. Regulatory inspectors were clearly implicated in 
calls for more exacting standards for determining the 
effectiveness of organizations in the public domain. The 
Healthcare Inspectorate (IGZ), for example, was expected to 
know how effective and efficient hospitals were; the 
Inspectorate of Education had to know the same thing 
about schools. The focus of the inspectorates in these 
domains thus shifted during this period to a more output-
oriented approach, also seeking to use inspection findings, 
where possible, to help improve the effectiveness with 
which those outputs were obtained. The scope of regulation 
also evolved to include assessments of the ‘quality’ of an 
institution. Methodologically, however, this is no easy task. 
Moreover, and it widens the scope of emphasis, as society is 
not only interested in the regulator’s particular findings on 
outputs and effectiveness, but also wants to know how the 
regulator arrived at its conclusions. This requires a rigorous 
methodological approach, as well as a high degree 
communicative proficiency. After all, an inspector must not 
only form an opinion about the quality of, say, a school, but 
it must also be able to explain the basis of that opinion to 
the people to whom that opinion is important. 
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In most fields, this has in recent years led to operational 
definitions of quality. These sometimes take the form of 
output indicators or index statistics, but may also be 
communicated in more extensive analyses of the instituti-
ons supervised according to indicators and criteria that are 
set in advance. With this approach, quality management 
systems have been brought more into the equation. They 
too have become a subject of regulatory assessment. 
Inspectorates thus are no longer exclusively concerned 
with questions of ‘compliance’, but also seek to provide 
answers to questions of ‘performance’. Within regulatory 
oversight as a profession, this places a premium on 
expertise about empirical-analytical tools for carrying out 
performance measurements and comparisons. 
The developments referred to here have, furthermore, 
been greatly stimulated by the media’s interest in 
knowledge and information about public institutions. 
Newspapers regularly request performance data, invoking 
the Freedom of Information Act if necessary, and judges 
have generally been sympathetic to these appeals. The 
media adore comparative data, especially those that can 
be presented in the form of rankings. ‘Ranking’ therefore, 
too, has become a ‘tool’ for bringing about a particular 
dynamic in demand-driven systems. In an administrative 
approach to ensuring compliance, these data can be used 
for ‘naming and shaming’ and applied deliberately as a 
public corrective mechanism. The media play an essential 
part in this. 
The Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy 
(WRR, 2004, 2013) has proposed consideration of a 
different type of regulatory oversight system, one that 
places much greater emphasis on ‘learning’, instead of 
concentrating exclusively on accountability, referring to 
this latter as a ‘reflexive role’. The WRR has gone on to 
suggest that a national organization like an inspectorate 
could act in a simulative capacity by compiling and 
spreading ‘good’ examples, in any case, providing rational 
arguments for the various solutions developed by 
institutions and enterprises. The WRR contribution 
questions the function of regulatory oversight, challenging 
regulators to make explicit choices, because ‘accountabi-
lity’, ‘learning’, ‘monitoring’ and ‘sanctioning’ are not 
always fully compatible with one another. The ‘repressive’ 
aspect of oversight, for example, is often at odds with its 
‘simulative’ element.
An interesting aspect in this regard is that the inspectora-
tes themselves are, of course, also ‘public organizations’ 
and the arguments that they consider applicable to others 
can also be considered to apply to themselves. Regulators 
have to be accountable too, and therefore also need their 
own indicators of performance. 
Failing oversight
Where was the regulator? This question is asked every time a 
serious incident or irregularity occurs. Obviously it is a good 
question – and one that has to be answered – but another 
question that could be posed is whether expectations of the 
regulatory system are unrealistically high and unachievable in 
practice. 
Incidents and disasters place the spotlight on responsibili-
ties. They raise questions about the adequacy of rules, as 
well as about the way the rules are applied. Similarly, 
when citizens’ immediate interests are damaged and an 
oversight function of the state may be culpable, regulatory 
agencies are understandably interrogated about how they 
operate. Regulators always come off badly when unwel-
come incidents occur despite their efforts. They are looked 
to for explanations of why they couldn’t prevent the 
incident. At the same time they have to communicate 
clearly how they work. How do they make their selections? 
How do they conduct inspections? What do oversight 
agencies do when they encounter improper abnormalities, 
and what options for intervention do they have? 
Occurrence of serious incidents in a variety of domains has 
put regulatory oversight policy at the top of the political 
agenda. But there are no simple answers to questions of 
how regulatory oversight is best organized for it to 
function in a way that is socially acceptable. Current 
evaluations of whether the regulatory system failed, for 
example, in the case of the financial sector, address these 
kinds of questions. Indeed, oversight systems have never 
been as fundamentally scrutinized as in the aftermath of 
this mega-crisis. An important aspect here is that the 
regular oversight authority was part of the system it was 
supposed to be supervising. Yet, as a ‘participant’ in a 
system, it is difficult to observe from an objective vantage 
what is really going on and to ask critical questions. 
Maintaining an independent and provocative stance 
requires procedures and approaches that transport the 
regulator into ‘another environment’ and in doing so 
expand its perspective. 
Publication of an annual report about the ‘state of the 
system’ can help draw attention to the broad outlines of 
emerging developments and ‘unusual incidents’. 
Regulation aims to have a preventive effect. If crises do 
break out despite this, scrutiny of regulatory systems is 
entirely appropriate. Thus, every incident provides, in turn, 
impetus for the further development of the oversight 
system.
The advent of new regulators
Within the political establishment of the Netherlands, 
interest in market regulation spiked in the 1990s, in step 
with similar trends throughout the entire Western world. 
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These were particularly influenced by European develop-
ments in the context of the European Union. Various 
theorists have given this development a name: many 
speak of the rise of the ‘regulatory state’. In a regulatory 
state, lawmakers ensure that certain tasks are performed, 
but leave execution of those tasks, in principle, to ‘others’. 
The state doesn’t do things itself, and furthermore, it 
seeks to limit its involvement in the performance of tasks 
to the very minimum possible. Furthermore, there is more 
emphasis on the functioning of markets. After all, if 
market mechanisms are being proposed because the 
market is thought to perform better, on balance, as a 
regulator, then citizens must be assured that those 
markets really do function adequately. Markets may work 
well, but their functioning can also be hindered by 
participants within the market, for example, by forming 
cartels. Optimizing market mechanisms therefore became 
the main policy objective of government, which resulted in 
new and more intensive forms of oversight. In the Dutch 
context, these oversight responsibilities were vested in 
new organizations, or were delegated to existing organi-
zations that had been revamped for the purpose. These 
regulators were designated ‘authorities’. Thus, the 
Netherlands Authority of the Financial Markets was 
created, the Netherlands Competition Authority (NMa), 
the Netherlands Independent Post and Communications 
Authority (OPTA), et cetera, which were then later merged 
into a single authority called the Authority for Consumers 
and Markets (ACM). 
These new, or revamped, regulators were given a large 
degree of autonomy in preforming their tasks. Their 
establishment as independent administrative bodies was 
considered the most appropriate legal structure, as this 
would ensure unambiguous political accountability at the 
system level, while preventing the political establishment 
from intervening in individual cases. While most of these 
new oversight authorities were focused on markets and 
market parties, an authority was also created for a sector 
such as, for example, healthcare – which functions 
partially as a market: the Netherlands Healthcare Authority 
(NZa). These new regulators, organized completely 
differently from the more traditional inspectorates, have 
contributed to a repositioning of the regulatory system as 
a whole and the way oversight is performed. One thing 
they do have in common with the inspectorates is that the 
regulatory activities they conduct are recognized and 
accepted across society. This has resulted in greater 
emphasis placed on the professionality and integrity with 
which oversight tasks are conducted. Because the new 
organizations do not bear the burden of a past they have 
been able to evolve more quickly than the inspectorates, 
many of which have a more than venerable history.
Regulatory policy for state oversight 
organs 
Whereas regulatory policy had fallen mainly under the 
authority of those responsible for sectoral policy, after the 
turn of the century the topic of ‘regulatory oversight’ 
became part and parcel of a new way of thinking about 
different types of governance systems and different 
mechanisms for exercising the influence of the state. Of 
course, regulation continued to exhibit features of the 
policy fields supervised and the institutions within them, 
but beyond that, regulation was approached from a more 
general perspective as well. This led to new adjustments in 
the way the oversight system was organized. The most 
important of these are examined below. 
Strengthened position with increased scale
Regulatory oversight was a function of the executive 
branch of government and included among the responsi-
bilities of a minister. Within the different ministries, rather 
than being predominantly generically organized, regula-
tory oversight was incorporated within a directorate-
general. As such, for example, the Shipping Inspectorate 
was part of the Directorate-General for Freight Transport, 
under the Ministry of Transport and Public Works, and the 
Director-General for Freight Transport was the civil servant 
responsible for the regulatory oversight function. The 
conduct of oversight activities was based in a separate 
organizational entity, which furthermore enjoyed a degree 
of autonomy in performance of its tasks. Within the 
ministry, hierarchical channels were strictly adhered to, 
and regulatory officials could approach the minister in no 
other way than via the channel of the director-general. 
The first period of increased emphasis on regulatory 
oversight was marked by organizational changes that 
targeted oversight tasks and resulted in consolidation of 
oversight functions at the ministerial level. This increase in 
scale, which however, did not lead to creation of a single 
regulatory organization in all of the ministries, led almost 
automatically to an upgrade of the status of oversight. 
Leadership of an inspection organization was now 
recognized as having the same level of authority as a 
director-general, meaning that within the organizational 
structure of the ministries the function of regulatory 
oversight became equivalent to a policy function. Within 
the structure of the ministries this was a step towards 
processes geared more towards ‘checks and balances’, 
which provided a more authoritative basis for advising the 
minister for a particular policy area. 
The inspectorates, similarly, were better positioned to 
autonomously influence policy. Drawing on their expertise 
and assessments, they could now address the minister 
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directly and thus operate in an ‘agenda-setting’ mode.  
The notion of autonomy played a central role in this new 
positioning. Beyond the function that the inspectorates 
fulfilled within the ministries, they increasingly also had a 
public role to play. The news and reports they issued about 
what they encountered fed political and public debate. 
Moreover, in the years before and after the turn of the 
century, the Dutch House of Representatives (Tweede 
Kamer) was one of the most insistent on giving the 
inspectorates greater autonomy, to better ensure that the 
news and reports they issued conveyed a realistic picture 
of what the inspectorates wanted to say – and had not 
been coloured by the lens or pen of ministries and 
ministers. It was not considered appropriate for an 
inspection service to report exclusively to a minister in 
areas where social actors were also implicated. As they too 
were recognized as carrying an important burden of 
responsibility, accountability could not be considered to lie 
wholly and explicitly with the ministry. Regulatory 
oversight was, in this sense, ‘socialized’ by the changes in 
the system’s governance. Regulation became a part of the 
network of society with connections to all relevant parties. 
Regarding the relationship between the inspectorates as 
organizations and the ministries, no uniform picture has 
(yet) emerged. Generally speaking, the inspectorates 
perform their tasks under the direct authority of a 
minister. The built-in guarantees to provide oversight 
agencies sufficient professional autonomy remained 
varied, from legal provisions (such as, e.g., for oversight of 
education) to a complete absence of any specific provisi-
ons in certain cases. A development common to all was 
the substantial upgrade in the status of regulatory 
oversight at the end of the recent turn of the century, 
across all policymaking areas and in the functioning of 
social sectors. Within the ministries they are now treated 
with difference. 
Cooperation between inspectorates
Considering the way the regulatory system developed, the 
step towards the inspectorates entering into dialogue with 
one another seems a rather natural one. Thus, an 
institutionalized form of cooperation was created between 
inspectorates, later named the Inspectorate Council. This 
has provided increasing levels of coordination and 
guidance to the inspectorates in their operations (resulting 
in greater uniformity of oversight) and also produced 
comparisons based on benchmarks, thus promoting ‘good 
practices’. This cooperation was initially motivated by a 
desire to share knowledge and therefore feed learning 
processes; though the regulated sectors and industries 
were also proponents of greater organizational coopera-
tion and alignment among regulators, to stimulate more 
rationalized oversight regimes. Motivated particularly by 
that cooperation, interactions between regulators began 
to centre increasingly on standards of professionality in 
regulatory work. Discussions have taken place on 
methodological aspects of the work, and common 
approaches have been elaborated, for example, for 
risk-based oversight. 
More than previously was the case, inspectorates must 
now provide precise justifications for the way they go 
about their business and the choices they make in a 
particular period. Inspection – oversight – capacity is 
always limited. Because the areas supervised are always 
many times larger, regulatory authorities have to be 
rationally selective in their engagement. The methodolo-
gical question is then how do they justify that selectivity. 
In any case, the risk-based approach scores highly in 
current practice. There is much less consensus and clarity 
on the exact risks that should be defined and how those 
risks should be ‘weighed’. 
Cooperation between regulators would then suggest that 
a conference, such as the one we are holding now, might 
be organized on such a topic by the regulators, in this case 
the inspectorates.
The political context
As noted, in the lead-up to the turn of the century, the 
Dutch political establishment demonstrated considerable 
interest in market-based mechanisms for regulation and, 
by extension, in a diminished role of the central govern-
ment. Added later was a wholesale pursuit of decentraliza-
tion in all areas of government administration. 
Furthermore, there was considerable interest in ‘alterna-
tive’ forms of governance, particularly focusing on 
rearranging administrative burdens. All these develop-
ments were obviously influenced by developments in the 
European Union, in which the Dutch were more apt to lead 
the way than to be followers. These developments have 
not changed track in any essential way in recent years. 
However, much has been learned on the topic self-regula-
tion since the financial crisis and from other crises, and 
these lessons have brought about a more cautious 
approach resulting, particularly, in a stronger role for 
regulatory oversight. In the areas of combating crime, 
maintaining public order, preventing terrorism and, in fact, 
across the entire sphere of the judiciary, the significance of 
central government’s presence has only increased. 
Enforcement and compliance, prevention and sanctioning 
have become high priorities. 
Rationalization and deregulation
Successive governments in the Netherlands have imple-
mented political programmes in which the theme of 
reducing the cost burden imposed by regulation on society 
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is a prominent policy goal. ‘More effect, less burden!’ is a 
slogan often used to express this policy. This maxim has 
direct relevance for regulators, because together they are the 
ones responsible not only for the rules but also for the way 
compliance with the rules is ensured. They thus represent a 
major share of the cost burden of regulation on society. 
Oversight bodies were initially driven mainly by the desire to 
stay out of the way of economic development. They were 
thus sympathetic to the private sector and furthermore 
mindful of the sense gradually pervading all social sectors that 
the regulatory and inspection burden was overly cumber-
some. Calls for simplification of rules and reduced inspections 
were widely heard. In domains where oversight had to be 
conducted, it was expected to be efficiently organized and, in 
any case, the ‘silos’ separating the various regulatory domains 
were to be broken down. The end-product of this operation 
was to be establishment of a single leading regulator for each 
social sector, with the authority to direct the others in carrying 
out their activities. Formation of the Inspection Council 
mentioned earlier as a ‘compulsory form’ of cooperation 
between oversight authorities was the result. 
Next to these tangible changes, there was also a shift in 
rhetoric. In line with current social and economic develop-
ments, demands grew for stricter regulation than in previous 
years, and of course these directly affected the regulatory 
system. In addition to regulatory activities carried out by the 
state itself, interest has increased in linkages between 
private oversight agencies and regulatory oversight in the 
public domain. Though numerous questions can be raised 
about such ‘co-regulation’, we are nonetheless seeing more 
and more of it. To some extent, it is unavoidable because 
government regulators can no longer assemble all of the 
required areas of expertise within their own organizations, 
due to scarcity but also because of the high costs involved. 
International cooperation via private organizations that carry 
out oversight tasks under market conditions are perhaps a 
natural evolution, and in fact, they are already common in 
various domains (e.g., in traffic and transportation). But this 
evolution calls for even greater scrutiny of public legitima-
tion and links with public regulators.
Decentralization
As indicated, movement towards more competences for 
local levels of government administration and increased 
autonomy of civic organizations are basic principles 
underlying policies. The provincial and municipal govern-
ment levels, rather than the central level, have therefore 
become increasingly responsible for implementation of 
national legislation. A question that has then also arisen is 
whether regulatory oversight tasks will also be decentralized. 
In fact, most local government administrators take this as a 
given. In situations where individual municipalities are found 
to lack sufficient organizational strength and expertise to 
implement and enforce complex laws, the preferred 
response is to solve the problem mainly with cooperation at 
the municipality level or with cooperation between 
municipalities and the provincial government, rather than by 
maintaining a national regulator. Maintenance of a national 
regulator is feared would provide an instrument for central 
government interference, via that regulator, and such a 
scenario has been rejected. Evolution towards administrati-
vely stronger local governments is institutionally bound up 
with the dual division of responsibilities introduced at the 
municipal level in 2002. Municipal governments are formally 
controlled by their municipal council. It is therefore 
considered inadvisable for ‘others’ to also maintain lines of 
oversight on the municipalities.
For civic organizations the situation is slightly different. In 
the Dutch administrative context, civic organizations are not 
organically linked to local government, but have an 
autonomous position in society owing to national legislation 
and national funding allocation mechanisms. From the start 
of this century, however, an evolution strongly hinged on the 
notion of ‘governance’ has been under way, evident 
particularly in the Dutch public housing sector and among 
institutions in the education and healthcare sectors. 
Consistent with this notion, policymakers have sought to 
support and strengthen ‘implementing organizations’ and to 
avoid any impression of implementers being ‘subordinate’ 
to a central authority in executing their tasks. 
Although national regulations are being implemented, these 
are designed in such a way that accountability for implemen-
tation lies explicitly with the institution concerned. 
Implementing bodies are accountable, insofar as possible, to 
their local environment. In this regard, we can speak of 
‘horizontal accountability’, with the notion of ‘stakeholder’ 
used to identify those that are implicated. The institutions 
are governed by an executive committee, often designated 
as an executive board or council and composed of full-time 
directors. The institution then falls under the authority of a 
Supervisory Board. That board is staffed by ‘wise and 
experienced’ members of society. Nonetheless, the position 
of national oversight in relation to institutions in the social 
sectors remains a regular topic of public debate. 
Conceptually it is not yet well established. 
Quantity
Politically the desire to engineer a shift towards ‘less 
oversight’ or a ‘different position of oversight’ has been 
expressed in imposition of hefty quotas or quantitative 
targets for the national oversight organs linked to the 
ministries. This accent on quantitative targets has stimulated 
increased cooperation among the inspectorates for 
efficiency purposes. It has also deepened thinking about 
what oversight intensity is needed or desirable and led to at 
least token acceptance of risk-based regulatory oversight 
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policy. This has become a generic operational strategy 
among the cooperating inspectorates. The way it has been 
implemented varies widely between the different inspecto-
rates, and it is still far from being substantial in all. The 
political establishment itself has not yet settled on a 
consistent policy line regarding intensity of regulatory 
oversight. It has, however, formulated a maximal provision: 
enterprises may not be visited more than once a year. In 
short, the legal basis for determining a reasonable intensity 
of inspections is still under development; and various 
approaches are still competing for primacy or rise to the 
surface when ‘political convenience’ dictates. It is up to the 
regulator to establish convincing justification for this and to 
carefully communicate that within the political and public 
arenas.
Oversight by inspectorates, especially in domains lacking a 
relatively ‘straightforward’ enforcement element, can be 
done convincingly only if the expertise of the regulator is not 
called into question. Much of the regulatory work carried out 
by the inspectorates is a continual process of ‘evaluation and 
weighing of evidence’. Staff members, the inspectors charged 
to do this work, have to know their business. Yet, the 
contraction of oversight systems and the merging of 
oversight tasks has placed that expertise under pressure. 
Oversight of the healthcare system has to be done by people 
who ‘know’ healthcare, and the same holds true for the 
nuclear safety authority and the Inspectorate of Education – 
to name just a few. But it also applies to those in leadership 
positions within regulatory organizations: If they want to be 
valuable discussion partners for sector representatives, 
ministries and members of government, they have to ‘know’ 
the issues they’re talking about. It is this in-depth knowledge 
that gives an inspection organization its added value. Of 
course, everything in moderation, and here again, a degree of 
judiciousness is called for, because a too single-minded and 
narrow view is not conducive to a vibrant oversight system.
Oversight effectiveness and methodology 
Next to discussions about location, organization and 
position, there is, of course, also the issue of the impact of 
the work done by the inspectorates. That impact can be 
encapsulated by the answer to the question: does any good 
come out of it? In other words, are things better because an 
inspection agency is involved. These are not questions that 
can be straightforwardly answered. The effectiveness of 
regulatory systems is in fact a topic generating considerable 
scepticism. It is therefore important for the inspectorates to 
realize that they are part of the system they supervise. They 
are marked, in part, by some of the same characteristics. 
Society has shown itself to be sympathetic to an inspection 
agency that clearly articulates and monitors a particular 
standard and takes action consistent with it. But there is 
little sympathy for an inspection agency that establishes that 
things have gone wrong but then doesn’t (or is unable to) 
take action. It is not a signal of strength for an inspectorate 
to conclude that things have gone wrong year after year, 
because it then becomes apparent that they have inade-
quate capacity to intervene effectively with the parties 
concerned. It’s especially bad news for inspectorates if 
‘others’ produce documents showing that things aren’t as 
they should be, and the inspection agency itself had not 
noticed. 
Relatively little evidence-based knowledge is available on 
what designs and procedures could help inspectorates 
become more effective organizations. Similarly very little 
theory has been developed about the job of inspecting. The 
inspectorates themselves, moreover, have not been very 
proactive when it comes to demonstrating their own 
effectiveness. For a long time they took themselves for 
granted: ‘We are here, so we must be doing okay!’ Some 
research on oversight performance has since emerged, but 
much of it tries to make too big a leap. For example, 
researchers have sought to demonstrate that oversight of 
the educational system has brought about measurable 
improvements in the quality of education. Others set out to 
prove that the quality of healthcare provision has been 
positively influenced by the work of the Healthcare 
Inspectorate. Such questions, in my view, are ‘too large’; 
instead, questions of effectiveness have to be formulated at 
a more intermediate level. 
Researchers in the Netherlands have picked up on US studies 
that approach oversight as a ‘problem-solver’. Thus, 
regulatory inspectors are challenged to identify what 
problems they aim to solve within a specified period of time, 
and to demonstrate that the problem was indeed solved. 
This is then considered an indicator of effectiveness. 
Furthermore, among the cooperating inspectorates, it would 
be worthwhile to conduct critical assessments of the 
procedures of the cooperating partners and the end-results 
obtained. Cooperation among regulators across Europe 
could offer especially valuable prospects for learning, and in 
fact, a number of sectors already boast of experience in 
cooperative arrangements at the cross-European level. In 
the fields of, for example, environmental law enforcement, 
healthcare and education, voluntary modes of cooperation 
now exist between the EU member states. Various other 
regulators come together within the institutions of the 
European Union, including in the EU agencies that have been 
set up for many social sectors.
Common areas for development
Certainly when compared with the situation that existed 
around the mid-1990s, the classic state regulators have 
changed in many important aspects. They have evolved 
| 57 |
from rather nonbinding, bureaucratic government organs 
with a low social profile, into more recognizable state 
institutions with more rationalized and finely tuned 
procedures. Cooperation and knowledge transfer are now 
the order of the day. Changes in governance, especially the 
stronger accent placed on decentralization and privatization, 
have affected the whole of Dutch society. Regulatory 
oversight organs, including the inspectorates, have been 
particularly implicated in this policy vision. According to the 
conventional wisdom, risks associated with the burgeoning 
autonomy in society can be obviated by a proactively 
operating regulatory system, which then also functions as a 
safety net. This vision brought about a revival of the classic 
regulatory organization, while also upgrading the status of 
regulatory oversight organizations. Moreover, it has led to a 
new type of regulators, expected to focus less on the 
centrally positioned minister and more on the accountable 
organizations and institutions. 
Immense criticism of the regulatory burden, particularly 
from the private sector, among other factors, led soon after 
the turn of the century, in about 2002, to a view of regulators 
as primarily an encumbrance, impeding and hindering 
innovation. Regulators thus became the personification of 
the onerous regulatory burden, in part due to the very 
improvements they had made in their own procedures, 
which had raised the profile of regulation and made it more 
tangible and felt, and therefore also more of a perceived 
encumbrance. This evolution was strongly reflected in 
politics, resulting in a more constrained approach among the 
inspectorates – certainly in quantitative terms, but also with 
regard to the autonomy with which they conducted their 
work, and the public role fulfilled by the leaders of these 
organizations. The overall impression is therefore that they 
have adopted a more defensive posture.
The emphasis today lies mainly on cooperation, on 
implementation effectiveness and on reports issued by 
inspectorates documenting their accomplishments in these 
regards. With respect to social impact and social action, 
much less is apparent. The inspectorates seem to be 
receding back into the background, becoming more a part of 
the state bureaucracy – their own logos and letterheads are 
disappearing – and less the autonomous government 
entities in the social sectors in which oversight must carry 
out its functions.
Forms of oversight are vital to maintain strong performance 
among organizations and enterprises in our society. 
Self-regulation is an option, but repeated scandals involving 
corruption, dishonesty, fraud and negligence also show that 
to keep organizations ‘in line’, effective regulatory systems 
will continue to be a necessity. In addition, regulation 
provides feedback, and that is needed in any system. Such 
feedback does not have to come ‘from the government’, but 
it is important to consider what other form such feedback 
might take, and also be assured of impact because it is 
backed by sufficient knowledge and authority. This is no 
simple task. Within the dynamics of European develop-
ments, several issues can be raised that are of particular 
concern to the Netherlands:
1.  European regulation in particular rightly assigns an 
important role to private certification and accreditation 
organizations (the so-called ‘notified bodies’). Much of the 
oversight conducted in market sectors is based on a 
mixture of state regulation and private standard-monito-
ring institutions. However, these organizations’ relation-
ships with national regulatory authorities are far from 
clear, which undermines transparency and the sense of 
accountability. Concerns have also frequently been raised 
about whether the work of certification organizations is 
performed in a sufficiently unbiased manner, and whether 
it isn’t important for this work to be done in a more 
transparent manner. Cases in point are problems that 
have emerged with breast implants, automotive 
emissions tests and the admission of new rolling stock 
(the Dutch Fyra project). In-depth dialogue on these topic 
is under way in the Netherlands (see the contribution of 
Haiko van der Voort).
2. Regulatory professionals in virtually all social and 
economic sectors have come to understand that decisions 
on inspection intensities have to be based on an analysis 
of risk, in line with the desire to reduce the burden 
imposed by regulatory oversight. This approach thus 
differs from the more legalistic-administrative attitude 
which sets requirements of a certain number of inspecti-
ons within a certain time interval. Deepening knowledge 
about these two approaches could be an important area 
of interaction among the member states of the European 
Union. Moreover, to maintain a level playing field, greater 
coordination is needed on the forms and amounts of 
sanctions (penalties) for noncompliance. Sanctions 
imposed on individuals and enterprises under supervision 
should furthermore be made known back and forth across 
the European Union and must then be respected. This 
requires openness about any measures instituted.
3. The Netherlands acknowledges the individual responsibi-
lity of the member states for compliance and enforce-
ment, but nonetheless considers professional interaction 
and exchange within the European Union to be of major 
importance. Professional development and the facilities 
that provide it should have a strong international 
component, to establish professional-level cooperation 
between countries, more than in the past. Participation 
back and forth in one another’s training activities would 
provide a very natural way to raise professionalization to a 
higher (international) standard.  
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The dynamics of transnational 
cooperation between public and 
private regulators and enforcers
The activities of many organizations cross national 
borders, as transport and trade go from one country to 
another. Yet each country has its own regulatory culture 
and tradition, and countries’ regulation and enforcement 
systems are all different. As a result, business processes 
now operate on a different – usually larger – scale than 
inspections. This poses at least two problems. First, 
national inspection authorities may possess insufficient 
countervailing power in the face of international busines-
ses (Bartley, 2003; Marx, 2008; Van Waarden, 2009). 
Second, businesses incur considerable unnecessary costs 
in complying with different, perhaps contradicting, 
national regulations.
Cooperation among national inspectorates is a logical 
answer to this, although cooperation among inspectorates 
is more difficult than may appear, as demonstrated by 
Groenleer and Kartner in this volume. The current 
contribution adopts a broader view on cooperation, as it 
also takes private regulating bodies into account. Many 
organizations impose norms on others and also carry out 
inspections or audits to verify compliance. These entail not 
only regulators and inspectors in the public sector. Private 
organizations also regulate and enforce, as expressed by 
the concept ‘self-regulation’. At both the national and 
international levels numerous self-regulation programmes 
have been organized by companies, trade organizations 
and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). There is an 
entire industry dedicated to standardization, including 
organizations like the International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO), accreditation bodies, certification 
authorities and private inspection bodies. 
The very existence of these private regulatory bodies 
implies opportunities for solving the two problems 
mentioned in the opening of this contribution. Indeed, 
private international standards and inspection activities 
facilitate public regulation and enforcement in some 
cases. Moreover, they sometimes act on the same, 
international scale as large companies. They may also 
have capacities that public regulators lack, such as 
information-gathering abilities, knowledge of private 
norms and greater access to human resources 
(Gunningham & Grabosky, 1998: 52; Ogus, 2004; Garcia 
Martinez et al., 2013). These are in fact some of the 
reasons why cooperation with private regulators has the 
potential to improve public regulation and oversight. 
This contribution looks at some of the complexities of 
cooperation between public and private regulators, from 
now on called ‘co-regulation’. Co-regulation implies that 
regulation and inspection activities are carried out by 
multiple different regulatory authorities, each with its own 
operational logic and history (Schiff Berman, 2007). Public 
regulators, broadly stated, apply a legal-hierarchical logic, 
while private regulators apply the logic of the market. 
When public and private regulators cooperate, these logics 
inevitably collide, and that collision introduces a degree of 
dynamism to co-regulation in practice. 
The aim of this contribution is to advance understanding 
of these dynamics and to draw lessons from such 
cooperation for public inspectorates. First, a typology is 
sought of co-regulatory efforts, settling on two major 
types (section 2). For each type, particular characteristics 
of the dynamics of co-regulation are described drawing on 
national and international case studies (sections 3 and 4). 
The final section exploits knowledge about these 
dynamics to address the issue of cooperation among 
national inspectorates. 
Our intention is not to advocate or refute the value of 
co-regulation. Rather, we will take co-regulation as a 
given, and examine how it works out in practice. The 
analyses is based on the literature and policy documents 
on transnational co-regulation, as well as empirical 
findings from the Netherlands. The empirical findings are 
derived from three case studies on co-regulation involving 
a desk study and 63 interviews with public and private 
regulators and enforcers.110 
Who is responsible? Two types of 
co-regulation
Co-regulation can be conceived of as a continuum from 
public regulation to self-regulation (Bartle & Vass, 2005; 
Van der Heijden, 2009: 65; Senden et al., 2015). A degree of 
coordination is involved in typical regulation and inspec-
tion activities, which generally involve a ‘director’ (a norm 
or a standard), a ‘detector’ (an indicator or information) 
and an ‘effector’ (an instrument for enforcement; Hood et 
al., 2001). As such, co-regulation may entail harmonization 
of standards, exchange of information and coordination 
on sanctioning. The essence of co-regulation is that 
different regulators care about each other’s activities and 
anticipate on them. 
Many different types of co-regulation may exist. They are, 
in fact, too numerous to analyse in this contribution. 
Moreover, the key issues raised by co-regulation do not 
relate to the various types. They centre, implicitly or 
explicitly, on who is responsible for the consequences of 
noncompliance. Much of the literature centres on failed or 
110  The casestudies are made for my dissertation (Van der Voort, 2013)
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imperfect forms of co-regulation (e.g. Dorbeck-Jung, 2010; 
Van der Voort, 2015). Many critics take the government’s 
perspective and express scepticism about the ability of 
private parties to regulate themselves. The government is 
often seen as bearing ultimate responsibility for any 
regulatory activities aimed at ensuring compliance with 
laws and, more broadly, to safeguard public values 
(Dorbeck-Jung, 2010). If traditional regulatory tasks are 
delegated to private parties, a relationship of mutual 
dependencies is created between public and private 
parties. Public regulators become partly dependent on 
private regulators’ performance of regulatory tasks. 
Adequate performance, however, is not always guaran-
teed: many self-regulating companies, trade organizations 
and certifiers lack motivation or capacity to be sufficiently 
rigorous (Gunningham & Rees, 1997; Hutter, 2006; Potosky 
& Prakash, 2009). 
With this in mind it would seem more sensible to base our 
typology of co-regulation on responsibilities for regulatory 
activities. Van der Heijden (2009: 58–73) distinguishes 
responsibilities for developing the regulatory oversight 
framework and responsibilities for the execution of 
regulatory tasks. This distinction suggests the following 
rough typology of transnational co-regulation:
- Private parties executing oversight activities within a public 
regulatory framework. This type is in line with EU policy, 
considering their definition. Co-regulation is defined by 
the EU as, ‘a mechanism whereby a Community legislative 
act entrusts the attainment of the objectives defined by 
the legislative authority to parties which are recognised in 
the field (such as economic operators, the social partners, 
non-governmental organisations, or associations)’ 111. This 
suggests that private parties may execute tasks that are 
predefined within a legislative framework set by national 
or supra-national government. They operate within a 
framework that they cannot influence. Their only influence 
is discretionary freedom in interpreting the tasks they are 
given. 
- Public and private parties both regulating and executing 
oversight side by side. This second type suggests private 
parties setting a regulatory framework themselves, 
alongside governments. Public and private regimes are 
separate and independent entities. Co-regulation then 
emerges when these regimes begin to recognize each 
other and operate with consideration of the other’s 
existence. This mutual recognition may be explicit, and 
formulated in public-private arrangements – again 
regarding standard-setting, information exchange and 
111  European Commission, 2014, 2014 Revision of the European  
Commission Impact Assessment Guidelines - Public Consultation 
Document, p.37-38; first mentioned in the Interinstitutional  
Agreement on Better Law-Making (2003) OJ C-321/01
intervention – though respecting one another’s 
independence.112 
Both types of co-regulation imply considerable input from 
public and from private regulators, and they also imply a 
dynamic of colliding operational logics. The sections below 
explore dynamics of co-regulation for each of these types. 
Private parties executing oversight 
within a public regulatory framework
The basic model
When private parties execute oversight within a public 
regulatory framework the tasks of the public and private 
regulators and enforcers are predefined. Defining the 
conditions under which regulatory activities are carried out is 
entirely the responsibility of the government. In this sense, 
this mode of cooperation is purely hierarchical: government 
is superior to the private regulators, and the latter’s tasks are 
confined to execution. Government determines the level of 
discretionary freedom of self-regulatory institutions, and this 
freedom may well differ per arrangement. The roles of public 
and private inspectorates may also be defined in the 
framework, which promotes uniformity. In an international 
setting, coordination between public inspectorates, too, is 
centrally defined with predetermined roles. The framework 
represents the larger system which sets out how public 
regulators and inspectorates are to relate to private 
regulators. A well-known model the Community formulating 
essential requirements of products or processes in its 
legislation and assigning private standard-setting bodies 
(European Committee for Standardisation (CEN) and 
European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardisation 
(CENELEC)) to develop and adopt operational standards. 
There are, however, other versions of this model. 
In the EU the model of private parties executing oversight 
within a public regulatory framework is common. Indeed, 
the very definition of co-regulation takes this as its starting 
point. It presupposes the prior involvement of a legislative 
authority that identifies the objectives that should be 
secured by private actors. Co-regulation is viewed as an 
implementation mechanism (Verbruggen, 2015). 
A number of experiences with this model have been 
documented at the national level, as evidenced by our first 
case description. 
112  In theory it is possible that public parties de facto execute oversight 
within a private regulatory framework (Scott, 2002). This category 
may also be found empirically, but it will not be considered in this 
contribution. 
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Case 1. Oversight in the Dutch poultry sector:  
A confrontation between public and private regulation
Institution of a predefined framework is an attractive 
option for governments to mitigate the potential risks 
posed by private regulation. Having responsibilities 
already explicitly stipulated on paper facilitates accounta-
bility. This premise led former Dutch Ministry of 
Agriculture to draw up a policy framework entitled 
Supervision of Controls (TOC, Toezicht op Controle in Dutch) 
in 2005. The framework described a system wherein 
certifying bodies could take over some public inspection 
tasks and set out the conditions under which this would be 
allowed. The framework was applied in a voluntary 
certifying system in the Netherlands’ poultry sector. 
During the negotiations between government and 
industry on the system to be implemented, public 
regulators demanded that the private partners provide 
extra quality guarantees. First, certifiers were to conduct 
extra, unannounced inspection visits. Second, a penalty in 
the form of a fine was to be added to the certifiers’ 
sanctioning toolbox. A third, more widely supported 
demand was that producers were to obtain accreditation 
for a product certification system (NEN EN 45011). The 
extra guarantees evoked much resistance. Neither poultry 
farmers nor certifiers were eager to go along with the fine. 
The controversy deepened when the fine was declared 
incompatible with the product certification system. The 
Dutch Accreditation Council, upon consulting the 
European Cooperation for Accreditation (EA), called the 
fine ‘unacceptable’ for NEN EN 45011 accreditation. As a 
consequence, the sector faced two mismatched standards, 
both backed by regulators. While government backed the 
TOC system, the Dutch Accreditation Council advocated 
NEN EN 45011. The industry eventually opted for compli-
ance with the latter, as that accreditation was vital for its 
export position, unlike the TOC. 
The extra, unannounced inspections were controversial 
too. The costs of these visits were to be distributed over 
the members of the voluntary system, as an expression of 
the industry taking responsibility for its own quality 
control. A first controversial point here was how the 
European regulations should be interpreted. What did 
‘unannounced’ exactly mean? Did it just mean not being 
programmed in the regular inspection rounds, or would a 
call the day before also be forbidden? Government 
resisted any room for discretion in this regard, while the 
self-regulating industry demanded more freedom for 
manoeuvre. The government demanded the stricter 
interpretation, whereupon the controversy shifted to the 
required number of inspections. Industry wanted the 
percentage low, to minimize cost and burden, while 
government wanted a higher percentage, to provide 
stronger guarantees and accountability. The controversies 
eventually resulted in noncompliance and distrust, 
compromising the TOC’s effectiveness (Van der Voort, 
2013: 79–116).
This case demonstrates the types of confrontation and 
issues that arise in regulatory systems involving varies 
types of agencies. Government wanted to be invulnerable 
to accountability issues, and undertook to protect itself by 
defining a strict framework and demanding extra 
guarantees. Participants in the voluntary system, however, 
would bear the costs, and they feared for their competiti-
veness, especially in relation to non-participants. 
Moreover, demands made by government sometimes 
proved incompatible with those of the standardization 
industry, which compelled the industry to make difficult 
choices. Industry considered its position towards interna-
tional trade partners more important than its position 
towards regulators operating on a national scale.
Case 2. Medical devices: More government as a reflexive 
response to incidents
The model of public regulating frameworks is common at 
the European level. A well-known system for enabling 
international trade while still respecting national jurisdic-
tions is the CE (Conformité Européenne) marking of products. 
Under the system products are allowed to be traded 
within the entire European Union if they are approved by 
an inspection organization assigned by an EU national 
government (90/385/EEC). The assigned inspectors are 
usually private actors and are called ‘notified bodies’. 
Notified bodies are designated, monitored and audited by 
the relevant member states via the national competent 
authorities, usually ministries, national agencies or 
inspectorates. 
Trade in medical devices is regulated this way, in accor-
dance with three EC Directives (90/385/EEC, 93/42/EEC and 
98/79/EC). Though products with a CE marking can 
circulate freely throughout the EU, there are conditions. 
According to the regulations, responsibility for gaining 
approval lies with the manufacturer. They have to prove 
that their product meets predefined ‘essential require-
ments’. Furthermore, they must, depending on the risks of 
the device, have their product inspected by a notified 
body. The notified body writes a conformity assessment. 
Member states must allow products with a CE mark into 
their market, unless they can prove that the product fails 
to comply with the essential demands in the pertinent 
directives. 
Many medical devices are traded within the European 
Union. Once in a while problems arise, which often imply 
direct health risks to users. This was the case for the breast 
implants produced by Silimed. When faulty products are 
determined, critics typically respond by addressing 
individual regulators or inspecting bodies, though notified 
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bodies may be targeted as well. The professionality of 
notified bodies may be questioned. For instance, the British 
Medical Journal (2012: 345, e7126) published a list of eight 
notified bodies that would ‘likely [be] more interested in 
repeat business than patient safety’.
A second type of response concerns the system. Media 
and politicians may raise concerns about the autonomy of 
the notified bodies. After all, these institutions are 
selected and paid by manufacturers to conduct their 
analyses of product safety. Wouldn’t there be ample 
incentive for notified bodies to be lenient to manufactu-
rers? It is difficult for government to brush aside this 
critique. In 2014, EU authorities considered strengthening 
controls on medical devices, looking particularly at the 
role played by the notified bodies, in the context of the 
foreseen adoption of two new EU regulations on medical 
devices (2012/0266 (COD) and 2012/0267 (COD)). The 
following measures were considered, among others:
• extra requirements for notified bodies, for instance, 
regarding the qualifications of their personnel;
• institutional changes among the notified bodies, for 
instance, creating a limited elite group of notified bodies 
for high-risk products;
• reinforcement of public regulation and oversight by 
establishing an extra assessment committee for medical 
devices and carrying out extra market surveillance.
These kinds of measures mark a departure from the 
premise of the manufacturers’ responsibility, and a shift 
towards a greater public grip on manufacturers and the 
notified bodies. They also imply a tightening of the 
conditions under which private regulators operate and 
possibly a loss of their potential capacities. 
Case 3. Admittance of the Fyra trains in the Netherlands 
and Belgium: Interpretation of the inspector’s role
The Netherlands and Belgium developed a high-speed rail 
line called the Fyra to provide rapid service between 
Amsterdam and Antwerp. The trains to be used were being 
manufactured by AnsaldoBreda. The trains were completed 
and admitted to the Dutch and Belgian infrastructure as 
being in compliance with the pertinent EU regulations 
(Directives 2007/58/EC, 2007/59/EC, 2008/57/EC and 
Regulation 13712007). The procedure went as follows: 
- The manufacturer was deemed responsible for 
producing the required quality of trains and thereto was 
to implement a quality management system.
- The manufacturer was deemed responsible for 
complying with EU regulations, as published in the 
Technical Specifications for Interoperability (TSI), and 
with national regulations, the latter mainly regarding 
national infrastructure. 
- The manufacturer was to hire a notified body to audit its 
quality management systems and compliance with 
regulations.
- The national public inspectorates were to check 
compliance with EU regulations. This was to involve 
assessments of the plausibility of all documents 
submitted by the manufacturer and the notified body as 
well as confirmation that all necessary procedures were 
followed. 
Yet, just five months after admittance of the Fyra trains, 
they had to be removed from the railway network due to a 
number of technical failures and insufficient assurance of 
the manufacturer’s ability to solve them. 
In the Netherlands the situation was a serious blow, as the 
state’s financial investment in the trains was considerable. 
To understand how the procedures could have failed, the 
Dutch parliament held an official inquiry, which is its 
greatest control instrument. The inquiry included in-depth 
research on the admittance procedures and hearings 
under oath. The investigators described their resulting 
impressions ‘appalling’. They criticized the process, and 
particularly the way the Dutch Human Environment and 
Transport Inspectorate interpreted its role and the 
admittance system itself. 
In short, the system was said to place inordinate emphasis 
on paperwork, and the inspectorate department responsi-
ble for admittance was said to have conducted too few 
on-site inspections. Within the inspectorate, various views 
circulated on whether they were even allowed to carry out 
physical inspections of the trains. The Belgian inspection 
service, DVIS, exhibited less constraint in doing so. The 
Dutch inspectors who were interviewed claimed that they 
were operating in the spirit of the European regulations by 
taking trust as their starting point, by being transparent, 
and by sticking to the roles they had agreed upon with the 
notified bodies. The Dutch Human Environment and 
Transport Inspectorate considered its role to be a process 
one. Yet sticking to this role was eventually at odds with 
responding to alarming signals about possible deficiencies 
in the trains. Eventually, the parliamentary inquiry 
committee concluded that those signals should not have 
been ignored. 
This case suggests that differing expectations may exist of 
national inspectorates within the European regulatory 
system. The Dutch Human Environment and Transport 
Inspectorate claimed to be complying with European 
regulations overseeing procedures. The parliamentary 
inquiry commission – which is a political body – expected 
a more classic inspector. It criticized the Dutch inspection 
service for placing too much trust in the notified bodies, 
focusing too much on process audits and a too limited 
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interpretation of their mandate (Tweede Kamer, vergader-
jaar 2015–2016, 33 678, nr. 11: 292–296). 
The dynamics of co-regulation in public regulatory 
frameworks
Several observations on dynamics can be made based on 
experiences with this form of co-regulation. First, 
co-regulation is a zero-sum game. Ideal co-regulation for 
the one is a burden for the other. Conflicts of interest 
regarding standards are especially apt to arise between 
public regulators and the self-regulating industry. Public 
regulators want guarantees of compliance with laws and 
regulations, even when inspections are done by private 
bodies. Transaction costs incurred by industry to provide 
these extra guarantees are often framed as the industry 
‘taking responsibility’. Self-regulating industries need 
transaction costs to be low, to retain their competitive 
position, in relation to both international competitors and 
competitors that have not joined the self-regulatory 
initiative. 
Second, differences between national public inspectorates 
remain, even if international regulatory frameworks are 
very detailed. Arguably, the more detailed the frameworks 
become, the more room for interpretation they offer. The 
medical device case pointed to different perceptions of the 
quality of the notified bodies. The Fyra case is indicative of 
differences across public and private regulators and 
inspectorates regarding their interpretation of their own 
roles and positions. 
Third, a centralistic reflex is common following incidents. 
Political bodies seem at unease with innovative roles for 
public inspectorates. Can they accept the consequences of 
manufacturers’ responsibility? And, can they continue to 
do so after incidents as well? In the immediate aftermath 
of incidents, politicians typically demonstrate little 
understanding of the new roles of inspectorates. Instead, 
we invariably see governments pulling responsibilities 
back into the public sphere, including extra public checks. 
This means that the accent of end-responsibility continu-
ously shifts from government to industry and back again 
– and the roles of public inspectorates with it. 
Public and private parties both 
regulating and executing oversight 
side by side
The model
Our second variation of co-regulation is when public and 
private parties both regulate and execute oversight side by 
side. In this model public and private regulators are 
independent entities. Both carry out regulatory activities 
based on their own standards. They have no hierarchical 
relationship. Insofar as they coordinate their activities, 
they do so based on mutual adjustments. The dynamics of 
this type of co-regulation are introduced below based on 
two cases. 
Case 1. Dutch coach travel: Co-regulatory experiments and 
the problem of crossing borders
The Dutch coach travel trade organization established a 
regulation scheme to improve the quality and image of 
coach travel operators. It’s aim was to create a visible 
quality mark based on management system norms (ISO 
170210) , and to display that hallmark on company buses. 
The hallmark was to signify a level of safety. However, the 
Dutch Accreditation Body asserted that a certificate based 
on management systems represented the quality level of 
the organization, and not of a bus. A sticker on a bus 
would suggest otherwise. The problem was solved by 
using management system certification as just one input 
among others to determine whether the hallmark should 
be granted. This evolved into a self-regulatory system 
encompassing a board, commissions and networks of 
public and private regulators. The industry didn’t mind 
having government inspectors involved, as they provided 
a ‘reality check’, alongside the industry’s own manage-
ment audits. Public inspectorates, in turn, demonstrated 
interest in the hallmark, even considering giving it a role in 
their own risk analyses. The former Dutch Inspectorate of 
Transport and Waterworks suggested that a differentiated 
inspection system might be used, with a lighter regime for 
operators shown to have an adequate management 
system. Public inspectorates like the Dutch department of 
motor vehicles (Rijksdienst voor het Wegverkeer) and the 
Inspectorate of Transport and Waterworks have since 
signed bilateral agreements with the trade organization to 
exchange information. 
The regime will harness important synergies between public 
and private enforcement. Public and private inspection 
methods in this case appear to complement each other. 
Coach travel operators, for example, didn’t fear public 
inspections because of the potential fines involved. Indeed, 
the fines were not excessive. Information on infringements 
encountered by public inspectorates is forwarded to the 
private regulators, and these latter may elect to withdraw a 
hallmark. This is viewed as a much more serious penalty. A 
synergy is thus achieved between the sanctioning instru-
ments. However, the relationship with surrounding 
countries appeared difficult. Travel coaches regularly cross 
borders, and in such cases operators must comply with 
regulatory regimes of different countries. Both inspectora-
tes and trade organization feared that foreign regulators 
would consider the Dutch co-regulatory regime too light 
and therefore single out Dutch coaches for inspections (Van 
der Voort, 2013: 129–143)
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This case shows that a co-regulatory regime is easily 
complicated by the inclusion of multiple regulators. 
Agreements, covenants and networks emerge that must 
be fit into regimes such as ISO 17021, while fulfilling the 
expectations of foreign inspectorates. This wouldn’t be a 
problem if expected synergies outweighed potential 
transaction costs. However, interaction between regula-
tors easily results in unique, even experimental regimes. 
For a sector that must also work with foreign regimes, any 
experimental element tends to be a drawback rather than 
an advantage. 
Case 2. NGO-driven self-regulation: Unstructured and 
intended governmental stimulus
Mutual adjustment is especially relevant in the internatio-
nal context. However, governments have struggled to 
muster sufficient countervailing power to call out global 
companies on standards issues (Marx, 2008; Van Waarden, 
2009; Bartley, 2011). NGOs may be better placed to do so. 
Many global NGOs have actively built global regimes 
based on their ideals. Well-known examples are the Forest 
Stewardship Council (FSC) for timber, the Marine 
Stewardship Council (MSC) for fisheries and Fair Trade for 
food. All formulate norms and may also impose sanctions, 
for example, withdrawal of their hallmarks or ‘naming and 
shaming’. Regarding sustainability issues, these NGOs 
have stepped into the vacuum left by governments. 
Do public and private regulators act independently? 
Sometimes they do. Are they de facto independent from 
each other? No. This case description centres on the 
relationship between national governments, supranatio-
nal governments and NGO-driven regulatory regimes 
based on the literature. The description will show that 
governments play an important role in stimulating these 
NGO efforts. Moreover, their stimulus role is not restricted 
to joint supranational efforts. 
The case for uniformity. Governments working together have 
often played an important priming role for NGO-driven 
regulatory regimes. In 2005, the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations (FAO) published 
standards for eco-labelling for fisheries. This intergovern-
mental action was intended as a contribution towards a 
joint position on quality standards and certification. Such 
a joint position, it was thought, could then evolve into an 
authoritative standard. In the FAO fisheries case, this goal 
was achieved and FAO-initiated standards became the 
reference point for fisheries and certifiers. Gulbrandsen 
(2014) called this mechanism ‘coercive isomorphism’ (after 
DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). An unintended consequence 
was that MSC became the ‘golden standard’, because it 
was the only initiative that could comply relatively easily 
to the FAO standards, and it used them in its marketing 
efforts. 
A different example of priming for private regulatory 
initiatives was described by Hallström and Boström (2010: 
74). They observed that some of their interviewees from 
MSC saw the EU as a potential competitor, because 
discussions were under way within the EU on erecting its 
own labelling system. Whether or not this perception is 
correct, it did incentivize MSC to remain stringent on 
fisheries. 
Both examples suggest that cooperation between national 
governments can act as a catalyst for global self-regulati-
on initiatives, even if there is no intention to do so. 
National governments are hardly able to set authoritative 
international standards. However, they can play stimula-
ting roles. First, they may operate as clients of hallmarked 
goods. Gulbrandsen (2014) found that procurement 
policies and public comparisons enabled benchmarking. 
Governments developing policies to buy hallmarked 
products was a signal to other clients that the government 
took the hallmark system seriously. Governments thus 
provide legitimacy to self-regulation initiatives. This in 
turn provides incentives to these initiatives to interact 
with national governments as clients.
Besides as clients, national governments may serve as 
data providers for self-regulatory institutions 
(Gulbrandsen, 2014). MSC auditors, for instance, need 
reliable data about the fish stock in various areas. Note 
here that data from government seems to be viewed as 
reliable and unprejudiced – or in any case, as the best 
there is. Senden et al. (2015) call these often implicit forms 
of incentivizing self-regulation ‘tacitly-supported 
self-regulation’. They give the example of government 
posing a “threat of shifting towards a public regulation”. 
The examples as mentioned here, however, indicate that 
the array of possible incentives is much wider than that.
National governments may act individually as clients and 
data providers. However, the legitimacy effect of their 
involvement may be larger if governments act collectively. 
In such a case, governments can have a very real influence 
on a market, as a limited number of initiatives receive 
visibility as compliant with public procurement policies. 
This requires coordination at a supranational level 
regarding preferences and criteria that governments 
would like to set. This will be a political process to which 
inspectorates may contribute as experts. 
The need for uniformity? Successful interaction between 
governments and self-regulation initiatives, of course, 
depends not only on the uniformity of government 
involvement. Indeed, some diversity among governments 
is not problematic in itself. Initiatives like MSC, FSC and 
Fair Trade tend to adapt to local circumstances and 
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regimes. They also have a relatively flexible governance 
structure, which enables them to respond to ever-chan-
ging economic, ecologic and social forces (Taylor, 2005). 
MSC has a more hierarchical structure, but has built in 
flexibility by keeping its number of principles low (Gale & 
Howard, 2004; Hallström & Boström, 2010: 64–66). Fair 
Trade has diversified its labels and contracts tailored to the 
countries in which it is active (Taylor, 2005). 
This responsiveness implies that national regimes are 
important. Cashore, Auld and Newsom (2003) found that 
FSC membership of suppliers strongly depended on local 
conditions. Is forestry well organized? Is sustainability of 
forestry seen as a political problem? If not, either the 
number of memberships remained relatively low, or 
membership was motivated by economic calculation. 
National governments can influence such factors. 
These observations cast doubt on the suggestion that ‘the 
more cooperation the better’. Self-regulation initiatives 
may cope quite well with a diversity of national regimes, 
and national governments may not always need foreign 
governments to stimulate self-regulation. This mitigates 
the price of diversity. 
The price of uniformity. Uniformity comes at a price, as 
demonstrated by the global problems experienced in 
some self-regulatory initiatives. A first issue is democracy. 
Global self-regulation may have difficulty representing 
vulnerable values and individuals (Bernstein & Cashore, 
2007; Dingwerth, 2008; Marx & Cuypers, 2010). Although 
economic, ecological and social values are incorporated in 
their governance, MSC and FSC are often criticized for 
being too acquiescent to large corporations (Hallström & 
Boström, 2010: 35). A different global issue concerns 
implicit trade barriers. Large companies may more easily 
comply with standards, for example, regarding manage-
ment systems. Therefore, strict environmental regulations 
may give them an added advantage over smaller scale, 
often poorer companies. A possible consequence is a 
growing divide between rich and poor and between North 
and South (Marx & Cuijpers, 2010). Like democracy, public 
values are also at issue, and for solutions one might easily 
resort to (global) governments. Summarizing, the price of 
uniformity is this: the more explicitly and uniformly 
governments reinforce global self-regulatory efforts, the 
more they also confirm, and even reinforce, its problems. 
The dynamics of co-regulation by mutual adjustment
Four observations on dynamics can be made based on our 
cases of this form of co-regulation. First, national 
governments support global market mechanisms for 
private regulation. National governments have acted as 
clients for hallmarked products and in doing so have 
legitimized the global, private hallmark systems underly-
ing them. Moreover, government purchasing decisions 
may stimulate – sometimes globally – suppliers to get 
hallmarked. As such, national governments support 
market mechanisms without supranational policies. 
Second, private regulators are responsive to national 
regimes. Mutual adjustment as a principle for co-regulati-
on causes both public and private regulators to be 
responsive. The Dutch coach travel industry initiated 
co-regulation, the public inspectorates joined in. FSC and 
MSC differentiated their regimes per country. MSC is 
operating in anticipation of a possible EU role as competi-
tor. This implies that co-regulatory initiatives emerge in a 
sequence of actions and reactions, and take the form of 
regimes that could hardly have been imagined 
beforehand. 
Third, experiments at the national level are seldom 
exportable. The Dutch coach travel regime was difficult to 
imagine beforehand. However, such a regime may be 
framed as experimental afterwards, and experiments are 
not always considered acceptable internationally. Indeed, 
there is no common framework for acceptability, as is the 
case in the other type of co-regulation. Each country 
assesses for itself the reliability of private regulation and 
builds its own regime around it. As Senden et al. (2015) 
pointed out, the regulatory traditions and legal cultures 
within the EU vary, as does the reliance on self-and 
co-regulation. 
Fourth, serendipity is important. In supranational reality, 
independent co-existence of public and private regulation 
is an illusion. Public and private regulators influence each 
other, if only by their very existence. The priming role of 
FAO and MSC’s anticipation of possible competition from 
the European Union are indicative of governments’ role in 
incentivizing self-regulatory efforts, even unintended. 
Cooperation between public 
regulators
What lessons can be drawn from these dynamics for 
cooperation among public regulators? This contribution 
began with the claim that cooperation between national 
public regulators is a logical response to a globalizing 
world that includes private regulators on a global scale. 
Cooperation by definition leads to more uniformity. 
However, the cases indicate that more uniformity should 
not be a goal in itself. Our cases of co-regulation demon-
strate some important limits of uniform public regimes. 
First, operational variety is inevitable. At the European 
level ‘co-regulation’ is officially interpreted as private 
parties executing oversight within a public regulatory 
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framework. This type of co-regulation assumes some 
central coordination within a predetermined hierarchy. 
Roles of public regulators may be similarly defined, as in 
the approval process for medical devices and admittance 
of the Fyra trains. Such a framework would make national 
public regulators more uniform. However, it already to 
some extent exists, and even within a well-elaborated 
framework, differences between public regulators and 
inspectorates will remain. Room for interpretation will 
inevitably provide some discretionary freedom, and 
interpretation will also influence the roles public regula-
tors play and the extent that they stick to these roles, as 
shown in the Fyra case. 
Second, uniformity may result in too much public 
centralism. In the aftermath of incidents, central regula-
tors no longer entirely trust private regulators. Central 
coordination within a framework thus seems to result in 
central reflexes following incidents, inducing more central 
rules on private regulators and the industry regulated. This 
may compromise the very notion of manufacturer’s 
responsibility. Centralism may also compromise the very 
capacities that give private regulators their advantage. 
Third, uniformity may undermine the responsiveness of 
both public and private regulators. An alternative form of 
co-regulation is public and private parties both regulating 
and executing oversight side by side. Public and private 
regulators do not have a hierarchical relationship here. 
Instead, their interaction in regulatory activities begins 
rather organically. At a transnational level, public regula-
tors have found themselves interacting with private 
regulators acting on a global scale. Public regulators here 
– both national and supranational – have proven essential 
in advancing the effectiveness of private regulators, even 
if they have not intended to influence them. By introdu-
cing greater uniformity in their procurement policies and 
standards, cooperating regulators may play an important 
priming role for NGO-driven private regulation schemes. 
Nonetheless, uniformity has its limits. The more explicitly 
and uniformly that governments seek to reinforce global 
self-regulatory efforts, the more they also confirm, and 
even reinforce, its problems. Moreover, variety among 
national regimes – including public regulators – does a 
good job in stimulating self-regulatory efforts. National 
governments are relatively powerful as clients of privately 
regulated products and they can help shape regimes 
wherein suppliers decide to join self-regulatory initiatives. 
Private regulators, for their part, have proven to be quite 
adaptive in coping with different national regimes.
Fourth, uniformity may reduce tolerance for national 
experiments. At the national level, public and private 
regulators in co-regulation initiatives have sought 
arrangements that suit each other’s interests and values. 
This has proven difficult however. Co-regulation appears 
to be a zero-sum game between public and private 
regulators, and arrangements resulting from this game 
can easily grow rather complicated and – intentionally or 
not – relatively experimental. Internationalization is 
problematic for these arrangements in two ways. First, 
although the arrangements may produce a national 
regime, the regulated industry operates in a global market. 
This suggests that it will face trade-offs between export 
position and the values of the national regime, as 
evidenced by the Dutch poultry sector. Second, and related 
to the first, even if an arrangement works within a national 
context it may not be accepted by foreign regulators, as 
anticipated in the Dutch coach travel case. Because 
co-regulation inevitably becomes an experiment at the 
national level, a major question for transnational 
cooperation is whether room to experiment is desirable. 
Involvement of public inspectorates is crucial to gauge the 
transnational tolerance for national experiments. 
These observations imply that there is no such thing as 
independent co-existence of national public regulators. 
Such independence is a myth. Public regulators may be 
linked by central coordination through a framework, by 
the processes and products they regulate, including 
international trade and transport, and by private regula-
tors that operate on a global scale and turn governments 
into clients. 
A second myth is the independent co-existence of public 
and private regimes. They influence each other, if only by 
their very existence. This suggests that policy discussions 
about private regulators should not revolve around the 
question of whether to interact with them, but rather how. 
The final section below gives some ideas for answering 
this how-to question. 
In between the models: Meta-roles of 
governments
The two models represent extremes. The relationship 
between public and private regulators may not be merely 
vertical (model 1) or horizontal (model 2). The cases and 
literature show that governments use their special abilities 
to facilitate interaction between public and private 
regulators. In doing so, they fulfil a meta-role. This means 
they do not participate in the game of regulation and 
inspection themselves, but rather influence the rules of 
this game. Several such meta-roles are conceivable. 
A first meta-role is priming function, as found in the MSC 
case. Setting quality standards may enable self-regulatory 
initiatives to develop and market themselves as compliant. 
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Priming can be done without reference to self-regulation. 
Second, governments can refer to private regulation more 
directly. The European Union did this with its ‘Principles 
for Better Self- and Co-Regulation’113. These deal with 
procedural issues (like openness, monitoring and resolving 
disagreements) and the motives of self-regulatory 
organizations (like good faith and legal compliance). 
Although the principles explicitly target self-regulation, 
there is no reference to any particular self-regulatory 
initiative. 
Third, governments can facilitate establishment of 
regulatory regimes by specific industries or NGOs, to 
enlarge the regulatory playing field. The European 
advertising industry has regulated itself by means of a 
code of conduct and a self-regulating organization 
carrying out policing tasks. To develop its regime, the 
industry held consultations with consumer and public 
health bodies under the auspices of the European 
Commission’s Directorate General for Health and 
Consumer Protection. Among other features, the model 
applied calls for involvement of non-industry stakeholders 
in the process.
Fourth, governments can exert hierarchical pressure on 
specific industries to regulate themselves. Prakash (2000) 
found that after the Bhopal gas tragedy in 1984 strong 
legal pressure was exerted on companies to join self-regu-
latory regimes. This pressure became an important 
incentive for the chemical industry to found the 
Responsible Care Programme. This variant is often called 
‘enforced self-regulation’. 
Fifth, hierarchical incentive can also be provided indirectly. 
In the Netherlands, the government has held clients of 
temporary employment agencies liable for fines imposed 
due to the agencies’ infringements of labour laws. This has 
motivated the employment agency industry to develop a 
register of reliable agencies (i.e., agencies that have been 
demonstrated to pose little risk of liability to their clients). 
In this case, the government used its hierarchical position 
to establish liabilities, but left room for the industry to 
regulate itself and organize its own regime. 
Finally, governments can frame self-regulation entirely 
within their own regimes. This is a meta-role. Private 
regulators cannot develop their own regime entirely, but 
execute tasks within a public regime in the public domain. 
These meta roles taken together provide a starting point 
for deliberations on how public regulators might relate to 
private regulators in specific circumstances. 
113  European Commission, “Principles for Better Self- and Co- 
Regulation”, 11 February 2013
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The variety of cross-border 
cooperation of inspections
The joint conclusion of the papers in this volume is that 
cooperation should not be treated as a value unto itself; it 
is instead a method for organizing government around 
problems. It is a technique for providing better answers to a 
specific set of questions, in a format that mirrors the 
predominant characteristics of the issue under examina-
tion. Cooperation is not a generic value, but requires a 
specific mandate – it is tailor made. 
There are good reasons to dedicate more time, energy, 
and capacity to enhanced cross-border cooperation. Close 
to home, cross-border cooperation is an effective means 
of realigning national and sectored silos of government 
with the demands and challenges of societal issues. More 
importantly, a variety of cross-border issues demand 
cross-border cooperation for inspections. The most 
impactful means of cooperation and the resulting added 
value depend on the issue at stake. Cross-border coopera-
tion is issue-oriented. What exactly should be build depends 
entirely on what is asked.
There is a range of issues that demand for more intensi-
fied cooperation. Many cross-border issues in the EU are 
covered by the internal market regulation, e.g. by a 
European directive with which all stakeholders need to 
comply. The single market implies equal treatment and 
equal conditions in all member-states, and that is as much 
a matter of regulation as it is of inspection. In the context 
of the single market, cross-border cooperation begs the 
question of how to close the circle of regulation via 
arrangements for transnational cooperation on inspecti-
ons, in order to enforce a jointly regulated practice. 
However, the range of issues that might benefit from 
increased transnational cooperation is not limited to the 
realm of the single market. There are, in fact, many issues 
on member-states’ plates that do not fall within the 
bounds of the internal market. In these instances, in which 
there is no EU-level regulation, there still exists the 
possibility that transnational cooperation could be of benefit. 
For example, national inspectorates have the capacity to 
learn from one another by exchanging experiences and by 
developing new professional repertoires together. This is 
not an issue of cross-border regulation, but instead a 
qualitative debate about the routines of inspectors, which 
in turn contributes to the improvement of the profession 
across borders. 
Moreover, health policy, social policy, and education policy 
are typically issues that remain firmly under national rule, 
but still possess certain cross-border elements. The 
question for these issues is how to foster cooperation 
between inspectorates from individual countries to 
enforce regulation that is not (yet) joint, in order to 
develop a shared practice. 
In the introduction to this essay, we called this variety of 
reasons for cooperation the demand for cross-border 
cooperation; i.e., what is the purpose of cooperation? The 
essays that followed show that there exists variety on the 
side of supply as well, and allow us to sharpen these 
categories into a spectrum of cross-border cooperation. 
The requisite variety of cross-border 
inspection: where to go depends on 
where you start
In complexity-science, there is the law of requisite variety; 
to deal with a complex system that yields significant 
variety, the repertoire should be at least as varied as the 
system. A standardized and limited repertoire will in time 
be insufficient to deal with the new and more complex 
options that the system will grow to generate. 
This volume has pointed out the variety of issues and 
arguments for and against cooperation. The main point of 
the book is that transnational cooperation can add value 
to inspections, but the amount of value added is entirely 
dependent on the ability to design appropriate forms of 
cooperation for the specific issue at hand. Cooperation is 
not a general category or a “one size fits all” solution, but 
is instead a highly specific, contextual, and dynamic 
concept. The type of cooperation that works for one issue 
in one context will not be effective for another issue in 
another context. The conversation of transnational 
cooperation needs to reflect that diversity, in order to be 
able to produce the appropriate answers to specific 
questions. 
In this volume, we have mentioned several categories for 
thinking about transnational cooperation (see figure 2  
on page 72): (1) the single market and/or joint regulation, 
(2) joint issues, (3) joint professional interests and/or 
methodologies. Each type of transnational cooperation 
has to take these aspects into account. However, the three 
also lead towards individually unique paths to follow 
when considering and designing transnational cooperation. 
If the single market is the primary concern, transnational 
cooperation will look different than when professional 
development is the purpose of cooperation. Outside the 
single market many issues remain that can benefit from 
transnational cooperation, even though they are hardly 
the subjects of joint regulation. That calls for different 
types of cooperation. When designing cross-border 
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cooperation, the first question should be where the 
cooperation comes from and where it should go to: is it  
a matter of joint regulation, of joint issues, or does the 
demand come from an urgency to collaborate on the 
professional level. From this crucial first question a 
different range of options and next steps opens. 
Because of this variety in the root-cause of cross-border 
cooperation the spectrum of options for cooperation 
should not be portrayed as ranging from ‘heavy to light’, 
‘deep to shallow’, or ‘large to small’. These are not the 
relevant categories. The real debate is whether or not 
suggested options for transnational cooperation can 
achieve the intended purpose motivating cooperation in 
the first place. Such consideration is more a matter of 
appropriateness and of goodness-of-fit than of objective 
categories differentiating between half and whole, or 
small and large types of cooperation. The route towards 
better transnational cooperation should start with 
conversation and debate about the specific demand, in order 
to find appropriate options within the wide variety 
available. There is no universal law or direction for 
transnational cooperation; where to go depends on where 
you start. Defining the start – the purpose and context for 
cooperation - is the most important step in designing 
transnational cooperation. 









The papers in this volume point at four factors for design 
that need to be taken into account very seriously. There 
are options and choices with regards to the desired level 
of formality of the cooperation, the level of institutionali-
zation, the level of harmonization that is intended, and the 
direction of the dynamics towards and within the 
cooperation.
Level of formality: when cooperation is based on binding 
agreements, legal requirements, or is otherwise imbedded 
in structures that exceed individual agents’ ability to 
opt-out of the arrangements, we speak of a high level 
formality. Informal cooperation is based on agreed and 
shared understandings that are not binding from a legal 
perspective, which actors can put aside if they want to. 
Level of institutionalization: highly institutionalized coopera-
tion occurs when cooperation is not merely the ‘act’ of 
working together – a verb – but when cooperation is 
solidified into an organization’s structure – a noun. 
Cooperation can be something organizations do together, 
from within their own organization, on issues or problems 
they define; but cooperation can also be the organization 
itself, e.g. a European Agency to monitor and enforce a 
certain regulation across different countries. A lower level 
of institutionalization is a practical understanding of 
individual inspectorates and how to deal with colleagues 
from other countries, in addition to how to work effecti-
vely together on joint issues, from within individual and 
national organizations.
Level of harmonization: a high level of harmonization 
signifies that cooperation is not about working together, but 
about doing the same; use similar protocols, make the same 
risk-assessments, allocate similar capacity, reach the same 
targets, work by similar norms, apply similar standards. 
Harmonization can be helpful for cooperation, but is not a 
necessity for it. Inspection can use different protocols, but 
still synchronize between practices, accept a given 
workflow, or acknowledge another’s approach. This 
approach runs the risk of neglecting local context and an 
issue’s unique characteristics under the pressure of an 
overly detailed level of harmonization. 
Direction of dynamics: cooperation can be an input or an 
objective, but also an outcome of a process. Highly 
harmonized and institutionalized cooperation can evolve 
and grow out of initially informal, open, and ‘unintended’ 
networks of practical exchange. Cooperation can grow 
from the bottom-up, but can also be defined from the 
top-down. Cooperation can be a directive from executive 
management, or a ‘given’ that follows new legislation; it 
can also be an outcome of an evolving process, initiated 
by individual professions, that spreads across the network 
of organizations and ‘de facto’ results in highly harmoni-
zed working practices and professional standards. 
These options can be used to design different forms of 
cooperation, depending on the particular issues, regula-
tion, or context at hand (see figure 3). 
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We will illustrate the use of the design-options in four 
short examples.
Maximized formality, maximized institutionaliza-
tion, maximized harmonization: uniform EU inspecto-
rate or agency: to overcome national differences in 
regulation routines and cultures, and to enhance 
more harmonization and uniformity in the EU, one 
uniform inspectorate which operates on the whole of 
the EU level can be established (see essay by Blanc for 
examples of this). This one strong agency acts on 
behalf of all the member states and enforces Euro-
pean legislation and directives. The role of the EU is to 
regulate, to harmonize legislation and to stimulate 
common behavioral standards and working practices. 
Strong-formality, minimal institutionalization, 
strong harmonization: close cooperation of individual 
inspectorates: a joint effort to tackle a common issue 
can also be found from intensified cooperation 
between individual inspections in each country. The 
original inspectorates remain, but they work together 
on a more structured basis – either on the basis of a 
formal agreement, or from an informal but strong 
want for cooperation. In order to do so, they actively 
synchronize protocols and harmonize shared good 
principles of regulation. The role of the EU can be to 
coordinate the cooperation, to connect the different 
inspectorates to one another, and to feed the process 
of harmonization via, for example, best practices and 
joint-expert sessions. 
Informal, minimal institutionalization, bottom-up 
harmonization: harmonization can be implemented 
top-down, but it can also evolve from the bottom-up. 
E.g. when colleagues from different inspections from 
various countries exchange personal, practical 
experiences, and tested methodologies. Professional 
groups usually tend to vigorously resist harmonization 
if they perceive it as an ‘external’ intrusion into their 
professional work. However, professional groups also 
tend to be strong in developing shared internal codes 
and protocols for their work. From within the profes- 
sion, in a bottom-up process, it’s possible to achieve a 
high level of harmonization. This is often accomplis-
hed via cross-county networks rather than through 
tight institutional cooperation. It can grow easily from 
an informal agreement on ‘shared problems and joint 
challenges’, and sometimes consolidates into sets of 
formal rules or procedures for practice that possibly 
include, for example, codes of conduct, reports on 
best practices and principles of regulation, methodo-
logy for risk-based inspection, exchanges of expertise 
for analyzing big data, and cooperation on ‘new 
topics’ such as internet trade – for which all countries 
are currently developing new repertoire. 
Strong-formality, minimal institutionalization, 
minimal harmonization: agreement of national 
difference: this stands as the ‘odd man out’ on the 
spectrum of cooperation, in that it formalizes 
countries’ ‘right’ to local differences and represents an 
agreement to disagree on general standards, norms, 
and protocols. Individual inspectorates work on 
similar issues, but do so in their own way. However, 
this does not diminish the fact that from these local 
practices, encounters with cross-border issues and 
other countries’ practices will occur. Therefore, it is 
important that even from an individualistic and 
country-driven arrangement, there remains some 
level of agreement in terms of interaction and 
communication about cross-border issues. The EU 
plays a facilitating role: if national inspectorates don’t 
know how to operate on a specific issue, they can 
consult the EU for advice on what would be the best 
way to handle it.  
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A design-process for cross-border 
cooperation: from possible, to 
plausible and preferable options
 
First: long-list of possible options
Taking issues, regulation, and the profession & methodology, 
and the four factors for the design of cross-border 
cooperation, opens up a broad spectrum of design-opti-
ons. There is an almost endless variety in the possible 
forms to work together across borders – each with its own 
advantages and disadvantages. It is helpful to take that 
extent of the spectrum into account and look at all of the 
possible options simply because it guards against institutio-
nal path-dependency, against lock-in into existing 
repertoires, and against the simple replication of similar 
models from dissimilar sectors or problems. This draws up 
a long-list of possible options for cross-border 
cooperation. 
Then: reality check: a short-list of plausible options
Then, from the long-list of possible options it is necessary 
to channel towards a short-list of plausible options, which 
refers to a reality check of options. Many options are 
theoretically possible, but face pragmatic, political, or 
institutional problems. Even if there is a joint problem, it 
may be practically impossible to harmonize; e.g. when 
institutions hardly know each other and are organized 
entirely differently in various countries. Moreover, some 
options face practical problems of execution and coordi-
nation; a single joint agency is only plausible if it can 
operate effectively in the local areas and local cultures of 
different countries. If local difference matters greatly, it 
can be difficult to work from an entirely centralized 
agency; it is a possible institutional option, but the 
pragmatic plausibility is weak. Note that plausibility is not 
a ‘hard’ and ‘objective’ category, nor is it a general 
normative label. Instead, it is a situational, specific, and 
probably subjective estimate of the practical merit of an 
option. For some cases a centralized option is not 
plausible, for others it will be a superior option. Drawing 
up the short-list of plausible options requires a high-quali-
ty strategic debate that takes into account both the supply 
and demand side of cross-country cooperation of 
inspections.
After that: factor in political preference and analytical 
arguments: preferable options
From the short-list of possible options, countries can 
make a choice for one or several preferable options. This is a 
process that involves analytical arguments and political 
preferences. All of the plausible options have some merit, 
but their strengths – and weaknesses – usually vary. 
Moreover, the choice for preferable options involves 
preferences and values outside the direct sphere of 
inspections; national political color, national interests, 
institutional history, recent developments in a field, media 
attention for the issue are all possibly important factors 
that weigh into the choice of preferable options for 
cross-border inspection. Taking this step requires the 
capacity to combine the analytical arguments for defining 
superior arrangements and an assessment of the political 
space for cross-country cooperation – which is not 
unlimited for most countries, and will be very tight for 
some countries. 
Finally: see cooperation as a continuous adaptive process: 
deliberate design, fit for purpose, but also continuous 
learning and able to adapt if necessary 
The essays also stress that cross-country cooperation is 
not an institutional ‘end-game’. The cooperation is not 
complete once it is designed and implemented. Cross-
border inspection involves institutional choices that have 
major consequences for all countries, inspections, and 
professionals involved. However, these decisions are not 
final decisions for a definitive form. Cooperation always 
involves institutional learning, institutional tinkering, 
continuous development, and adaptation to changing 
external circumstances, internal experiences, and trends 
and developments in for instance new technologies. The 
choice for one option for cross-border cooperation is 
important and requires a careful process and professional 
attention; however, cross-border cooperation also 
requires continuous adaptation. Cooperation is a process 
of deliberate design, but also of continuous learning.
The framework in practice: a first 
range of plausible options for  
cross-border cooperation
The essays discuss a wide variety of possible modes for 
the cross-border cooperation of inspectorates. Several 
core concepts are key to discussing these different modes; 
if we want to see cross-border cooperation as an issue-
based enterprise, we need concept to analyze the issue 
more precisely, look at the most important characteristics 
of the environment, and take into account the range of 
institutional options. Figure 4 depicts these core concepts. 
First, there are different countries involved in cross-border 
inspection. Second, cooperation is never conducted ‘in 
general,’ but always involves concrete issues. Cooperation 
in terms of transnational cooperation is typically focused 
on an issue shared by all of the countries involved. Third, 
there is regulation involved; regulation is related to a 
certain issue and to a certain country. For some issues, 
regulation is already organized at a supra-national level 
and applies across countries. For other issues, national or 
even local regulation leads the way. In between supra-
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national and locally led cooperation, there exist many 
more forms as well. Fourth, there is a range of inspections 
involved in each of the various countries. The institutional 
structure of inspections is different throughout the various 
member states.
These four dimensions are a starting point for a strategic 
discussion about a transnational inspection. Is there a 
joint issue? Is the issue shared across all countries, or by 
just a selected few? Is the issue transnational, or is it an 
issue that manifests nationally, but in all of the countries? 
Is there joint-regulation already in place, or is national 
regulation dominant for the issue? Are there similar or 
already connected inspectorates involved? Answering 
these questions will help to sharpen the debate about 
transnational cooperation. 
Figure 4: core-concepts for transnational cooperation.
regulation regulation regulation regulation
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Cross-border cooperation is a choice, 
but the cross-border encounters 
remain nonetheless
The discussion about transnational cooperation emerges 
from a practical problem (see figure 5). Inspections can 
choose not to work together, or only marginally, but for 
many problems the cross-country encounter of inspection 
regimes will remain nonetheless. Even when inspections 
do not work together, they still face similar issues, work 
from joint regulation, and thus inevitably encounter each 
other in their daily work practice. For example, products 
certified in ‘Country A’ enter the market of ‘Country B’; a 
product for which a certificate was issued in ‘Country C’ 
cannot be checked again in ‘Country D’. By choosing 
cooperation in any given circumstances, countries elect for 
a more deliberate and managed encounter in an effort to 
improve the quality of regulation and compliance, and to 
reduce the hazards of non-compliance. Cooperation does 
not create the encounter; it attempts to standardize that 
encounter’s procedures in a proactive way. This important 
when engaging in a debate about cross-country coopera-
tion; apart from the decision to cooperate, there can 
already be an intense encounter of countries’ individual 
inspection regimes. 








A range of joint answers for a joint 
issue: one agency, one framework, or 
a coordinating agency
The most coherent solution for a joint issue is to instigate 
joint regulation, and enforce that via a joint inspection or 
agency (see figure 6); a form that Blanc analyses in his 
essay in more detail and we already have instances of in 
Europe. Such an agency involves a formalized, centralized, 
and harmonized format for transnational cooperation on 
inspections. However, the actual ‘act’ of inspection is still 
carried out at the local level, since that is where the most 
inspections occur. Local branches of the joint centralized 
agency replace the national inspections on that matter. 
They are the local working units of the centralized unit 
that is responsible for the inspection.
Figures 7 and 8 are deviations of the model of a joint 
regime for regulation of problems. Figure 4 represents a 
joint framework, which countries can use in instances when 
they work on a particular joint-issue for which there is 
joint regulation. The joint framework allows national 
inspections to remain intact, but establishes harmonized 
protocols, standards, norms, codes, and methods. 
National inspectorates remain national and can still use 
their local knowledge, but the joint framework helps guide 
actions in a more concerted and coherent way. 
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Figure 6: a joint inspection, for joint regulation and joint issues, which 





Joint centralized agency that works through local branches
Figure 7: a joint framework for national inspections to work on joint 
regulation and joint issues.
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Figure 5 (on page 75) represents an attempt to reap the 
benefits from local knowledge as well as harmonization, 
but in a more centrally controlled fashion. In this model 
there is a centralized agency that does not inspect on its 
own, but instead coordinates and steers the efforts of 
national inspectorates. There is hierarchical relationship 
between the national and centralized level, but the 
principle of national inspectorates remains intact. Blanc, 
Versluis & Polak, and also Groenleer & Kartner, describe 
several examples of this format. 
Figure 8: a joint centralized agency, for joint regulation, for joint issues, that 




Joint centralized agency, which cooperates with 
or steers national inspectorates
Clustered cooperation for joint issues: 
selected partners tackle joint issues
The figures 6, 7, and 8 represent models that organize 
all-encompassing cooperation and create equal inspection 
regimes for a particular issue, for all member-states. Such 
a high level of harmonization and inclusion can be a 
strategic choice, but other less encompassing options are 
also available. Figure 9 portrays a form in which a joint 
issue, under joint regulation, is tackled by coalitions of 
inspections in various countries that have emerged over 
time and appear to work well. Here, cooperation is not 
designed top-down, but instead grows bottom-up, in 
combinations that apparently ‘fit’ the needs of national 
inspectorates. In this way, clusters of cooperating 
inspections have the opportunity to emerge, which could 
further develop with time and establish additional levels 
of formality, harmonization, and even prelude a model 
more in line with figures 3, 4, and 5. This is also what 
Versluis & Polak suggest in their call for a strategy that 
relies on interrelatedness, trust, and a culture of informa-
lity: once there exists a sense of interrelatedness (issues, 
regulation), and a culture of trust and informality devel-
ops, there is little preventing inspectorates from enhan-
cing their cooperation. This ‘evolutionary’ model could in 
time produce more integrated and harmonized practices 
than a top-down ‘all-in’ model of transnational coopera-
tion. But as a model, it is not without risk; it suffers the 
potential to permit ever more dispersed, disconnected, 
and ineffective practices to remain in place as it grows. 








A clustered cooperation for shared country-specific issues
The clustered approach is common practice in instances 
where there exists some overlap of issues between 
countries in the context of national regulation. Inspections 
work together on specific themes that they share with 
others. Often, cooperation that begins on an ad-hoc basis 
has the potential to grow into a more institutionalized and 
formalized arrangement (figure 10). This type of coopera-
tion is especially interesting for inspectorates that do not 
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operate in the domain of the single market, and/or enforce 
joint regulation, but nonetheless face mutual cross-border 
issues. Such inspections are not particularly in need of a 
single overarching framework or centralized inspection. 
They are likely better helped by improved lines of 
communication, increased mutual understanding, 
personal contacts between leaders, and synchronized 
methods. 
Figure 10: clusters of selective cooperation around country-specific 
issues and regulation.






Cooperation to professionalize the dealing with country 
specific issues
Mertens draws attention to another promising and already 
widely shared mode of cooperation between inspectora-
tes: learning from professional exchange, rather than 
focusing on concrete issues or regulation (figure 11). 
Examples might include exchanges of methodology, 
professional skills, tools, and shared expertise. Even 
though the Inspections of Education probably have few 
cross-border objects to inspect, they can still learn a lot 
from a professional exchange. Cross-border cooperation 
has the potential to help them become more effective at 
dealing with their own national issues, as well as help 
them develop more compelling repertoires for influencing 
the national or European-level debates on better (joint) 
regulation. Experience in the Netherlands has shown that 
a more professionalized field of inspectorates can be more 
effective in a volatile debate about regulation, enforce-
ment, risk, and compliance. Again, professional exchange 
and investments towards the development of a shared 
methodology can also act as a prelude for more institutio-
nalized modes of cooperation. 
Figure 11: professional cooperation between inspections, undertaken in an 








Cooperation around transnational co-regulation for joint 
issues
The essay by Van der Voort introduces a new layer into the 
debate about transnational cooperation. Co-regulation is 
applied in many countries, both within single countries as 
well as at the supra-national level. In instances of transnatio-
nal issues or regulation, this means that countries have to 
interact with one other’s co-regulation regimes (figure 12). 
Certificates from one country enter the market of another 
country, and the question becomes whether each nation’s 
respective inspectorates can accept them or not. The lower 
right side of figure 12 portrays this problem: different national 
practices of co-regulation migrate across national borders 
and national inspections encounter products of co-regulation 
(e.g. certificates) that are not part of the national inspection 
regime. Moreover, multi-national companies work with 
supra-national private inspection agencies, which then 
produce information asymmetries amongst the national 
inspectorates dealing with the private agencies. There are 
several means of dealing with these issues, depending on the 
particular form and level of co-regulation at hand. The lower 
left of figure 9 shows a cluster of several national inspections 
that harmonize their interactions through a transnational 
private inspection agency. 
Figure 12: transnational cooperation to deal with co-regulation.
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Epilogue: a debate about of cross-
border cooperation 
This volume outlines the variety of reasons and options for 
cross-border cooperation of inspections. We have 
attempted to take into account the full extent of the 
spectrum, in terms of perspectives to look at cooperation, in 
terms of reasons or causes for cooperation (demand), and in 
terms of the forms for cooperating (supply). There is good 
reason to take this variety seriously as a starting point for 
a discussion about cross-border cooperation; cooperation 
will only produce the added societal value if it is designed 
from an issue-oriented perspective, which just as well takes 
into account the practical aspects of cooperation as the 
more institutional and formal elements of cooperation. 
The purpose of our volume is to provide a language and a 
grammar for a productive discussion about that variety, 
which nevertheless allows actors to take next steps in the 
design of cross-border cooperation. Such language and 
grammar help to be more precise about the added value 
actors seek from cooperation, the key factors they see for 
a successful cooperation, and the boundaries they see for 
cooperation. A joint language and grammar to discuss 
inherent differences can help the process of designing 
more effective, more robust, and more adaptive forms of 
cross-border inspection. In order to work better together, 
first we need to better assess and appraise differences as 
well. This volume does not answer the question what the 
best cross-border cooperation is, but provides readers with a 
common language and a grammar to have a debate about 
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